Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Frederick C. Teiwes
Edward Friedman
William P. Alford
Gianfranco Pasquino
Paul B. Henze
James Critchlow
Archie Brown

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1979—SPECIAL ISSUE

BEIJING LOOKS AHEAD

Economic Prospects — Robert F. Dernberger

Social Policy — David M. Lampton

Military Modernization — Angus M. Fraser

Relations with Moscow — Harry Gelman



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Problems of Communism

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Cover: This poster, photographed in 1978, highlights China's drive to modernize the economy by the year 2000. Photo by Vincent Mentzel.

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IN THE SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER SPECIAL ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Prospects for the Chinese Economy
Robert F. Dernberger

For some years before and after the death of Mao Zedong, Chinese economic policy combined two orientations—a "left-wing" stress on egalitarian self-reliance and a "right-wing" commitment to rapid modernization with distribution of rewards according to productivity and profitability. Only in 1978 did the modernization approach become dominant, with proponents in top policy positions. Even so, prospects for accelerating Chinese economic growth require achievement (which is problematic) of large and stable harvests in North China and avoidance of new leadership struggles.

New "Revolution" in China's Social Policy
David M. Lampton

China's social policy has been shifting away from a distributive policy intended to promote "equality" and toward one stressing "equity," or reward according to contribution. In at least three key areas—the distribution of material goods and income, health care, and education—this means that inequalities will increase within the rural sector of Chinese society, among provinces, and between the countryside and the cities. Groups dissatisfied with these changes may pose a potential threat to the new orientation should the current leadership coalition in Beijing fail to hold together.

Military Modernization in China
Angus M. Fraser

As part of the new "four modernizations" program, Beijing has committed itself to upgrading the military capabilities of the People's Liberation Army. In pursuit of this goal, the Chinese leadership is moving to improve the PLA's force structure and to modify China's strategic and tactical outlook. But economic constraints and the pace of world technological development have apparently convinced the present leaders to settle for the foreseeable future on enhancement of the PLA's capacity for close-in defense of the Chinese homeland.

Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations
Harry Gelman

In the wake of Beijing's formal repudiation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet friendship treaty in early 1979, China and the USSR have entered into new talks covering the full range of their mutual relations. But a combination of the collective Chinese memory of hostile Soviet actions with respect to China in the past and the present realities of the Sino-Soviet geopolitical rivalry make any large and important steps toward rapprochement highly improbable.

* * *

Essay-reviews

"Rules of the Game" in Chinese Politics
Frederick C. Teiwes

Examination of the operation in Chinese domestic politics since 1949 of legal or quasilegal statements of principle and less explicit rules determined by long-standing practice or cultural proclivity suggests a growing breakdown in "the rules of the game," particularly in the 1966-76 period. It would seem that renewed reliance on formal rules will be indispensable to maintenance of political stability in the future.

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Beijing and the Chinese Countryside
Edward Friedman

The Chinese Communists came to power with the great advantage, in contrast to the Bolsheviks in Russia, of considerable popular support in the countryside. But Mao and his closest associates nearly frittered away that advantage through ultra-leftist policies, although some development did take place in the countryside despite their activities. The present leaders face the challenge of democratizing politics sufficiently to restore the confidence Chinese peasants once had in the regime.

Law and Chinese Foreign Trade
William P. Alford

Without departing from the traditional Chinese view of law "as an imperfect tool for the regulation of society," China's leaders today have pragmatically begun to adopt a variety of legal codes and other measures. A principal aim of this trend is to foster modernization and attract those forms of foreign investment and commerce China deems appropriate.

Eurocommunism: Challenge to West and East
Gianfranco Pasquino

Eurocommunism is a process in which European Communist parties try to redefine relationships with respect to domestic political systems and to the international Communist movement. The process poses questions for the West because it threatens European integration and defense. In the East, it undermines the legitimacy of the Soviet model and suggests an alternate that could promote dissent if not political change in the Soviet bloc.

Nationalism and Communism
Paul B. Henze

Recent works by the English scholar Hugh Seton-Watson demonstrate that while nationalism may have given Communist leaders a number of opportunities in the past, it seems to be posing problems of equal or even greater magnitude for them today. Nationalism is proving resistant to Communist manipulation both within multinational Communist societies and in contexts such as Western Europe or the Third World. Indeed, in some cases communism is becoming merely an ideological framework within which nationalist—and by extension, imperialist—motivations and ambitions are clothed.

Muslims Peoples in the USSR
James Critchlow

Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union continue to prove resistant to assimilation into Great Russian society. Moreover, assimilationist pressures may be easing if one is to judge from a number of recent studies, particularly a Soviet publication "rehabilitating" the 19th century Tatar Enlightenment.

Governing the USSR
Archie Brown

Jerry F. Hough's major revision of Merle Fainsod's classic study of the political system of the USSR, *How Russia is Ruled,* adds new insight into the Soviet policy process, as well as a wealth of detailed new information. Despite some shortcomings in the book and the uneasy compromise it represents between Fainsod's and Hough's respective outlooks, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* is likely to be as widely read as its predecessor.

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Beijing Looks Ahead

EDITORS' NOTE—The period since the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 has witnessed substantial ferment in China. In part, this ferment has reflected the growing willingness of the Chairman's successors to turn their backs on at least some aspects of his legacy. In part, it has stemmed from a sense of the inadequacy of old approaches to deal with the domestic and international problems confronting the country. This special issue explores the reassessments that have taken place in four major areas of Beijing's concern. Mr. Dernberger evaluates China's economic performance in the last years of Mao's life and efforts of the present leadership to improve upon that record. Mr. Lampton looks at recent revisions in the objectives of Chinese social policy and the difficulties the new orientation may create. Colonel Fraser traces Beijing's rising commitment to a program of military modernization and its implications for China's force structure and foreign policy. Finally, Mr. Gelman discusses the opening of new talks between China and the USSR and appraises the prospects for these talks in light of the issues separating the two countries.

Prospects for the Chinese Economy

by Robert F. Dernberger

China's ambitious program of economic modernization formally launched in 1978 is indicative of a major reorientation in the economic outlook of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). With the death of Chairman Mao Zedong and the removal from power of the "gang of four," the way was clear for the emergence of those who would stress efficiency, modest interdependence, and growth over such principles as self-sufficiency and equality of income distribution. Thus was resolved, at least for the near term, the intense "two-line struggle" over economic policy between left-wing and right-wing elements of the CCP in the post-Cultural Revolution era, a struggle with antecedents going back to the earliest years of the People's Republic.[1]

The CCP has laid out for China a challenging 10-

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[1] Western analysis has long referred to the two competing groups by such terms as "moderates" or "pragmatists," on the one hand, and "Maoists" or "radicals," on the other hand. However, the present article uses the more accurate and less emotional or normative terms "left wing" and "right wing" of the CCP, in accordance with the usage in the many articles on the struggle appearing in the Chinese press over the past two years.

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Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng, left, and Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping pictured in 1978 when China launched its accelerated drive for economic modernization.

—James Andanson/SYGMA.

year plan of economic development, and there is plentiful evidence of a concerted effort by the current leadership to search out and attack the basic problems impeding growth, whether they be excessive diffusion of investments, inefficient management, backward technology, or insufficient incentives for productive work. Yet, a number of economic realities, including foreign-exchange limitations and difficulties in achieving the elusive goal of high and stable harvests, have already dimmed prospects for achieving the original growth targets. The current leadership appears to have realistically assessed these problems, but this alone is no guarantee of solution. Should performance fall still further short of promised goals, there might be a resurgence of those advocating Maoist economic prescriptions and consequently a revival of economically debilitating political instability.

To evaluate the current policies and the prospects for their fulfillment, it is instructive to trace the final stages of the policy struggle in the mid-1970's, both as a basis for understanding the alternative orientations and as a means of highlighting the economic problems inherited by the new leadership.

An Unstable "Consensus"

By 1973, the Chinese economy was beginning to recover from the serious effects of the Cultural Revolution and of the policies introduced by the extreme left wing of the CCP, which had gained considerable influence over economic policy during that upheaval. Right-wing elements around Zhou Enlai had staved off a left-wing coup by Lin Biao in autumn 1971, and in April 1973, Deng Xiaoping, former Secretary General of the CCP and a leader denounced as the "number two capitalist roader" (behind Liu Shaoqi) during the Cultural Revolution, had reemerged, as Vice Premier.

Writing in this journal at the time, Dwight Perkins described what he discerned as a "consensus" mix of policies at work in China, some of which signaled "a return to the main lines of pre-Cultural Revolution economic policies" advocated by the right wing of the CCP, and others representing a continuation of the economic policies introduced by the radicals, or left wing, of the party during the Cultural Revolution.[2] Among the former were an increase in the proportion of the state budget devoted to investment, calls for restoration of "rational rules and regulations" in the system of decentralized planning and control over production, higher government prices for some agricultural products in short supply, greater autonomy and flexibility of decision-making for production teams (the smallest unit of China's collectivized agriculture), and downplaying of egalitarian income distribution in favor of pay differentials as an incentive to achieve higher growth and productivity. Left-wing tendencies were seen in policies favoring rapid expansion of rural small-scale industrial enterprises, emphasis on self-sufficiency as the leitmotif of the "learn from Dazhai" campaign for expanding agricultural production, and continued calls for economic self-reliance and autarky.

During this period, reemergence of right-wing ideas was perhaps most evident in the area of foreign trade. Previously, the consistent left-wing pursuit of autarky or extreme self-reliance in economic development had prevailed. As a result of this orientation, by 1969 im-

[2] See Dwight H. Perkins, "Looking Inside China: An Economic Appraisal," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1973, pp. 1-13. Perkins himself did not attempt to specify which policies were "right-wing" and which "left-wing," but his perceptive discussion of the policies did hint at the instability of the compromise.

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Table 1. Growth Trends in the Chinese Economy, 1957–78

(average annual growth, in percent)

	1957–70	1966–69	1969–73	1974–75	1976	1966–76	1977	1978
Gross national product	5.1	2.5	10.1	5.1	0.0	5.7	8.2	11.6
Industrial production	9.3	4.7	13.1	7.3	0.0	8.0	14.3	13.4
Agricultural production	1.8	0.0	6.1	2.1	0.0	2.8	-2.7	8.3

SOURCE: Derived from National Foreign Assessment Center, US Central Intelligence Agency, *China: A Statistical Compendium*, ER 79-10374, Washington, DC, July 1979.

ports of machinery and equipment from abroad had dropped to only 12 percent of China's total annual imports and less than 5 percent of China's total annual investment in machinery and equipment. Furthermore, in 1969 no new contracts were signed with foreign businessmen for the delivery of complete plants, and foreign engineers working on projects delivered under contracts signed in previous years were sent home. Between 1969 and 1973, however, a major shift occurred: imports of machinery and equipment (in current values) increased at an annual rate of 40 percent, while in 1973 China negotiated contracts calling for the delivery of more than US$1 billion worth of complete plants.[3]

Moreover, during 1969-73 trade with the developed West continued to claim an increasing share of China's expanding trade turnover. Japan, which had already become China's leading trade partner shortly before the Cultural Revolution began, continued to expand its share, from 15 percent in 1966, to 17 percent in 1969, to 20 percent, or US$2 billion out of a total turnover of US$10 billion, in 1973.[4] Most dramatic, however, was the sudden surge of Sino-American trade. Easing of US restrictions on trade between the two countries began in the summer of 1971, and the communiqué signed in Shanghai by US President Richard M. Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in February 1972 called for increased bilateral scholarly exchanges and commercial trade pending formal US recognition of China and establishment of "normalized" relations. Sino-American trade amounted to approximately US$100 million in 1972 and jumped to more than US$1 billion in 1973, when the United States became China's second most important trading partner.

From partial data released by the Chinese in 1970–72, Perkins judged that China had overcome the adverse economic effects of the Cultural Revolution and had entered a period in which growth would exceed the rates recorded in the previous decade and a half. Recent compilations tend to confirm the statistical trends upon which Perkins based his analysis (see Table 1). China's gross national product (GNP), industrial production, and agricultural production in 1969–73 did indeed grow at annual rates which not only vastly exceeded those of 1966–69 but, more important, also exceeded the long-term growth of the economy from 1957 through 1970 (respectively, the final year of the first Five-Year Plan and the year immediately following the end of the Cultural Revolution).

Despite these promising developments, the "consensus" mix of policy and the favorable prospects for growth described by Perkins proved short-lived. To his credit, Perkins did qualify his optimistic forecast with two important caveats: possible difficulties with regard to the expansion of agricultural production and potential political instability. Yet, even he did not and could not have reasonably foreseen the dramatic events that ensued. Let us examine these and their causes.

Persistent Leftist Formulas, 1974–75

Contrary to expectations, the promising revival of economic growth in the early 1970's was not sustained in 1974 and 1975. The average annual growth rate of GNP declined to 5.1 percent; the growth rate of industrial production, to 7.3 percent; and that of agricultural production, to 2.1 percent. These drops in aggregate growth rates were symptomatic of the many serious and unsolved economic problems accompanying the unresolved "two-line struggle" over eco-

[3] See Nai-Ruenn Chen, "China's Foreign Trade, 1950-74," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 617-52; and Richard E. Batsavage and John L. Davie, "China's International Trade and Finance," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Chinese Economy Post-Mao*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 707-41.

[4] Unless otherwise noted, these and other data on China's aggregate economic indicators presented in this article are taken from National Foreign Assessment Center, US Central Intelligence Agency, *China: A Statistical Compendium*, ER 79-10374, Washington, DC, July 1979. Chinese officials and publications have recently begun to release a considerable quantity of economic data on the past few decades. With few noticeable exceptions, these data tend to confirm the statistical picture of the Chinese economy contained in the estimates prepared annually by the National Foreign Assessment Center.

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nomic policy.[5] Thus, the consensus mix proved unstable and would soon (in 1976) trigger a leadership crisis. However, even if the "compromise" policy mix arrived at over the period 1969–73 had proved to be stable politically, the continued predominance of left-wing policies in it, I would maintain, precluded sustaining growth rates at levels above those recorded for the period 1957–70.

In this context, one is reminded of the pragmatic words of Zhang Wentian, a veteran CCP member and economist, who wrote in 1973:

In the long run of history, an incorrect political line will be tried and eventually condemned by economic laws instead of changing the inevitable trend predicted by economic laws. The struggle between a correct and incorrect political line always explicitly or implicitly and directly or indirectly reflects the contradictions between economics and politics. A correct political line will eventually win out because it adapts itself to economics. . . .[6]

In 1974–75, an economically "incorrect" political line continued to resist the emergence of a "correct" line.

One could cite voluminous evidence from reports of visitors or items in the Chinese press that the policy changes made in these years failed to modify the basic thrust and purpose of the economic policies adopted during or as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Despite Deng's return to power, there was no widespread rehabilitation and restoration to power of other leading right-wing figures purged during the Cultural Revolution (this occurred only after Mao's death in 1976). Moreover, for all the statements about the need to restore "rational rules and regulations" in economic administration and control, such a restoration was not noticeable either at the production level or in the priorities guiding central control of resource allocation. Instead, measures to devolve economic decision-making to low-level units on the basis of economic costs and benefits and to assure implementation of these decisions through incentive systems relating individual labor to its economic results continued to be restricted and attacked as examples of capitalist or bourgeois tendencies.

In agriculture, revolutionary committees at the commune level and leaders of production brigades and teams continued to impose cropping and production plans on lower levels and pursued egalitarian schemes of income distribution prompted by ideological considerations rather than individual, task-oriented systems of rewards. There was also continuation of nationally-launched campaigns that disregarded local circumstances and costs, requiring labor which had to be mobilized and requisitioned from production teams without compensation or regard for opportunity costs.[7]

A similar picture existed in industry. Revolutionary committees remained in control of plants and were not replaced by an administrative hierarchy with well-defined responsibilities and authority. Workers continued to participate in decision-making discussions and in technological innovation. Losses continued to be made up by allocations from the budget, and there was no increase in specialization among enterprises. Permanent workers were paid a guaranteed wage regardless of productivity or absenteeism; wage differentials were reduced; and the work-gang approach to production processes was not replaced by specialization. Indeed, according to reports published recently,[8] efficiency actually declined during 1974–75 in many industrial enterprises, and levels of inputs per unit of output rose above levels recorded in the early 1960's.

It is true that during 1974–75 central planning authorities acquired greater control over the allocation of rising investment and over the production planning of an expanding number of commodities.[9] However, they did not use this increased control to alter significantly the existing means and pattern of resource allocation, either to correct the most serious inefficiencies or wastes associated with the traditional system of Soviet-style planning or to change fundamentally the related set of investment priorities.[10] Thus, the imbal-

[5] The economic factors discussed here are viewed by the author as the more immediate and significant reasons for the failure of the consensus economic policy mix of 1969-73. This is not, of course, to deny the significance of the pre-1970 history of the political struggle or of its many ideological and noneconomic aspects.

[6] Zhang's words were from an article, "Politics and Economics under Proletarian Dictatorship," drafted in 1973 but not published until Aug. 25, 1979, on the same day that Deng Xiaoping delivered a eulogy to him at a memorial service. Ironically, Zhang died only a month before the ouster of the "gang of four" in 1976.

[7] In some areas, peasant resistance supported by party cadres was able to thwart implementation of these measures dictated by higher levels. It should not be overlooked that there were also some areas in which implementation of these measures resulted in higher yields.

[8] See "Communiqué of the State Statistical Bureau of the PRC on Fulfillment of China's 1978 National Economic Plan," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), June 27, 1979, p. L/14.

[9] See Bruce Reynolds, "Two Models of Agricultural Development: A Context for Current Chinese Policy," *The China Quarterly* (London), December 1978, esp. pp. 855-66.

[10] The emphasis in state investments remained on certain producer goods sectors—in particular, steel and machine-building—to the neglect of consumer goods, transportation, and agriculture. There was, to be sure, a rapid increase in the number of rural small-scale industries (a self-help measure spawned in the Cultural Revolution) created from local resources in 1974-75. Yet many were inefficient, wasted scarce resources (particularly energy), and suffered financial losses.

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ances and bottlenecks plaguing the economy continued to worsen.

All this is not to argue that China's economy was in a state of chaos in 1974 and 1975, or to suggest that the inadequacies of Soviet-style planning should be blamed solely on the left wing of the CCP. Rather, it is to demonstrate that the basic system of economic control and decision-making in 1974 and 1975 continued along the lines established as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

In addition, developments in these two years saw no departure from the Cultural Revolution's basic strategy for achieving two of China's most crucial objectives of modernization: high and stable yields in agriculture, and the generation, dissemination, and absorption of modern technology. In agriculture, the focus remained on the Dazhai brigade, which had been selected by Mao for emulation in 1964 and had—over time—become the model for a complete package of programs designed to increase the labor intensity of agricultural production.[11] While greatly increasing the labor effort required, not all of these programs proved feasible or sufficiently productive in other settings or under different circumstances. Consequently, even though total agricultural output did increase in 1974 and 1975, labor productivity in the sector declined, and per capita grain availability was no higher in 1975 than it had been in the 1950's. Nonetheless, the Dazhai campaign for the modernization of China's agriculture was adopted as national policy at a national conference chaired by Hua Guofeng in the fall of 1975 at Dazhai, with lower-level rural cadres instructed to copy the Dazhai model in their counties and communes. The right-wing's failure to block this decision, which they voluminously criticized and then abandoned once they came to power, attests to their relative inability in 1974–75 to influence economic policy—especially in the agricultural sector.[12]

In the area of technological change and innovation, too, little was accomplished during 1974–75 to undo the negative results of the Cultural Revolution. One need not deny the positive results of mass participation in the development and dissemination of technology to stress the severe disruption wrought by the Cultural Revolution's attacks on the "elitist" system of advanced education—the closing of universities, the shift to on-the-job training, and the scattering of the educated to work assignments throughout the country. Thus the gains made in China's educational system in the 1950's were reversed, and a whole generation of Chinese were cut off from access to the latest developments in science and technology abroad and acquisition of the knowledge and skills necessary to serve as middle-level problem solvers and supervisors in the use of modern technology.

It was only in the area of foreign trade that right-wing gains (already noted in the 1969–73 period) continued. Extensive imports of technology and complete plants from abroad continued in 1974. Yet, even this advance provided the left wing ammunition in the "two-line struggle" when China found itself faced with a balance-of-payments problem and a sizable short-term debt.[13] The left-wing critique of reliance on foreigners and the transfer of technology from abroad intensified when Deng argued for exporting China's raw materials and petroleum to repay these debts. According to the radicals, this solution would restore China to its former position of a "hyper-colony" vulnerable to exploitation by the Western imperialist powers. Political pressure from the left wing and simple economic necessity led to a reduction of imports from the non-Communist countries in 1975 and an even sharper reduction in 1976. As a result, the import surplus in the balance of commodity trade was eliminated and replaced by an export surplus of over US$1 billion in the latter year.

The most telling evidence of the right wing's failure to regain control over economic policy or even a modification of the basic theme of the economic policies resulting from the Cultural Revolution was Deng's inability to secure the adoption and implementation of two major policy documents drafted under his direc-

[11] The essence of Mao's original model was the guerrilla-style mobilization of labor for a self-reliant, "up by the bootstraps" assault on nature within the context of advanced socialist ownership and distribution systems. It was subsequently modified to a program involving farmland reconstruction, rural small-scale industry, increased application of both organic and chemical fertilizers, electrification, mechanization, increased double- and intercropping, increased water-storage and irrigation facilities, use of new seeds, etc.

[12] Another symptom of the perpetuation of the Cultural Revolution era strategy in agriculture was the low priority attached to large-scale irrigation projects in North China, in particular the Yellow River Project, technical problems of which were not tackled until 1979. Instead, emphasis continued on construction of county- and commune-level storage and diversion projects à la Dazhai or digging of tube wells to tap a water table of only limited potential. Drought in the first half of the 1970's intensified the impact of this neglect.

[13] China's import surplus with non-Communist countries amounted to almost US$500 million in 1973 and more than US$1 billion in 1974, when imports from these countries (in current values) increased 40 percent. While technology and producer goods figured heavily in this surge of imports (contracts for US$1.25 billion in complete plants were signed in 1973 and for US$800 million in 1974), China was also importing foodstuffs to maintain domestic consumption and experienced rapid increases in import prices due to world inflation. As a result of Beijing's practice of financing imports by deferred payment schedules, China's outstanding short- and medium-term debt in 1974 rose to more than US$1 billion. Batsavage and Davie, loc. cit., p. 740.

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

During the years immediately before and after Mao Zedong's death in September 1976, Chinese economic policy wavered between two emphases—one on the self-reliance typified by the peasant from the Dazhai Production Brigade pictured at the right and the other on the rapid modernization symbolized by the imported oxygen conversion equipment at the Anshan iron and steel complex, which is being demonstrated by a representative of the Japanese manufacturer in the photo at the left.

—Eastfoto and Vincent Mentzel.

tion in 1975 for securing China's rapid modernization. These were "Some Problems Concerning the Work of Science and Technology" and "Some Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development."[14] Prepared for the consideration of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Council, they were related to the prospective long-run plan for developing China's science and technology and the 10-year economic development plan also being considered by those two bodies at the time. The reports and plans advocated by Deng were subjected to extremely hostile criticism from the left wing and were shelved. It was not until 1978 that the post-Mao leadership "rehabilitated" and adopted them.

Thus, in the first half of the 1970's, the right-wing faction in the two-line struggle over economic policy neither removed the economic legacy of the Cultural Revolution nor achieved a new "consensus" policy mix promising long-run growth trends at levels above those achieved in the 1957–70 period. Rather, as present reports in the Chinese press confirm, China's economy and economic policy remained in the control of the radical left wing, and the prospects for economic growth were not very promising.

In a last clear show of dominance, the left wing ousted Deng from his positions of power shortly after the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976.[15] Throughout the summer of 1976, a nationwide campaign criticized Deng and the right-wing policies he had advocated. Having removed their most powerful right-wing opponent, the extreme left wing led by the infamous "gang of four" then posed a serious threat to other elements of the leadership, especially Hua Guofeng. When Mao died in September of 1976, however, Hua was able to forge an alliance with these threatened elements of the leadership and with the military to prevent an attempt by the "gang of four" to seize the reins of power. The result was the arrest of the "gang of four" and the downfall of extreme radicalism at the highest levels of decision-making in China. Thus, in 1976 the long-awaited succession crisis unfolded very rapidly, leaving China in the

[14] See "Why Did the 'Gang of Four' Attack 'The Twenty Points'?" *Peking Review* (Beijing), Oct. 14, 1977; and Chung Ko, "The Struggle Around the Outline Report on Science and Technology," ibid., Oct. 28, 1977.

[15] On April 7, Deng was removed from all party and government posts by the CCP Central Committee, allegedly for instigating massive popular demonstrations in the memory of Zhou Enlai that occurred in Beijing and elsewhere on April 4 and 5. At the same meeting, Hua Guofeng, designated by Mao as his heir apparent, became First Vice Chairman of the CCP and Premier of China.

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hands of an unstable coalition under the leadership of Hua, a relative newcomer to the highest levels of the party and government, and with the foremost advocates of both the right and left wings in the two-line struggle over economic policy out of office. Outside observers had few clues as to the nature of the economic policies and strategies which would govern China's future economic course.

Developments in China's economy during the years 1973–76, however, provided considerable support to the right-wing approach to solving China's economic problems. In fact, the record of the previous two decades had shown that while the radical economic policies may have promoted the social, political, ideological, and economic (i.e., income distribution) objectives they were designed to achieve, they did not promote sustainable high growth rates. Moreover, their consequences for efficiency of production and resource allocation and their failure to come to grips with some very important obstacles to China's growth seriously threatened the country's economic development and the already low level of material well-being of the Chinese people. With the serious political disruptions created by the succession crisis and the damage caused by a major earthquake, China's economy appears to have experienced no growth in 1976. Thus, in the decade beginning in 1966, the first year of the Cultural Revolution, the annual growth of GNP, industrial production, and agricultural production had averaged 5.7 percent, 8.0 percent, and 2.8 percent respectively, while in the last three years of that decade, the rates of growth had declined to 3.5 percent, 4.8 percent, and 1.4 percent respectively.

Emergence of the Right Wing

During 1977 there were growing signs of a shift in favor of right-wing economic policies and strategy. The widespread and highly publicized attack on the policies of the "gang of four" that dominated political debate in 1977 was an occasion to stress that extreme left-wing errors were as great a threat to China's economic future as right-wing errors.[16] Followers of the "gang of four" were exposed and criticized at all levels of the party and government, as Hua moved to consolidate his position of power.

Further indications of a significant shift in favor of right-wing economics appeared in the latter part of the year. The fifth volume of Mao's complete works, edited by Hua and released in the spring of 1977, included several speeches which supported the right-wing approach to China's economic development.[17] The first anniversary of Mao's death saw the publication of a lengthy report by the State Planning Commission which, while praising Maoist economic policies, hinted at the need to modify some of them to meet China's immediate needs.[18] In the fall, the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China not only reaffirmed Hua's position as leader of the party but even returned Deng to power by reappointing him a Vice Chairman of the CCP. Equally important, right-wing economic policymakers who had not been rehabilitated and restored to positions of power or influence in the first half of the 1970's, reappeared in 1977.[19]

Despite these favorable signs in terms of changes in personnel and in the general tone and argument of policy statements or reinterpretations of Marxism-Leninism, however, few specific economic policies or institutional changes were announced in 1977. In fact, the economy and economic policy were lapsing into a state of considerable confusion and disorder.[20]

The situation was only partly clarified at the long-delayed Fifth National People's Congress, convened in Feburary 1978. Hua was elected Premier, and Deng Xiaoping was named First Vice Premier. These and

[16] In the words of a member of a county revolutionary committee in Wuxian, "the super-revolutionary slogans seemed attractive, but practice in a decade has shown things don't work that way. These slogans have brought harm to the county and calamity to the people." "Economic Policies in Rural Areas," *Beijing Review* (Beijing), Apr. 20, 1979, p. 17.

[17] The most important of these, as far as providing support for right-wing positions, was "On the Ten Major Relationships," delivered by Mao to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on Apr. 25, 1956. This speech was soon overtaken in policy terms by the Great Leap Forward of 1958. See "On the Ten Major Relationships," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 5, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1977.

[18] "Great Guiding Principles for Socialist Construction," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 12, 1977.

[19] For example, Chen Yun, a critic of Maoist economic policies in the 1950's, was made a member of the CCP Central Committee and a Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. On the first anniversary of Mao's death (Sept. 28, 1977), Chen published an article in *Renmin Ribao* emphasizing the need to "seek truth from facts" rather than browbeat others with quotes from Marxist and Maoist classics.

Xue Muqiao, head of the State Statistical Bureau in the 1950's and a critic of Maoist economic policies in the late 1950's and early 1960's, resurfaced as a "noted economist" with republication of the lengthy article, "The Two-Line Struggle in the Economic Field During the Transition Period," *Peking Review*, Dec. 2, 9, 16, and 26, 1977.

[20] Elimination of the serious political turmoil of the previous year did facilitate a 14 percent gain in industrial production. But a continued drought and the uncertainties in the rural areas, where it was harder to "weed out" followers of the "gang of four," brought a 2.7 percent drop in agricultural output. Although imports from non-Communist countries increased by 20 percent during 1977, China still maintained an export surplus of over US$500 million. However, purchases of complete plants declined to less than US$100 million. National Foreign Assessment Center, US Central Intelligence Agency, *China: International Trade, 1977-78*, ER 78-10271, Washington, DC, 1978.

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other appointments left the right wing in a position of dominant control in both the party and government. In his "Report on the Work of the Government," Hua made clear that China's economic development and stability were to take priority over the objectives of Mao's continuing revolution. In short, whereas politics had been in command in the previous decade, now economic objectives would be in command. As confirmation of this, much of Hua's report was devoted to a discussion of the 10-year plan (1975–85) for the modernization of China's economy.[21]

This program, stemming from the "grand concept" presented by Zhou Enlai at the Third and Fourth National People's Congresses calling for the "all-round modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology by the end of the century," and based on proposals prepared under Deng's direction in 1975, has come to be known as the "program of four modernizations." While speeches on the details of the plan have not been released, Hua's report indicated that the targets for 1985 were only slight modifications of those included in the plan shelved in 1975.[22] Moreover, Hua left no doubt that, with the left-wing obstacles removed, the party intended to carry out the 10-year plan in the 8 years that remained.

The plan called for more investment in the following 8 years than had been realized in the previous 28. This investment program included 120 large-scale projects for creating 14 industrial bases. As a result of this investment, industrial production was scheduled to increase by "over 10 percent" each year from 1978 through 1985. In agriculture, the annual rate of growth was to be between 4 and 5 percent, with the development of 12 commodity grain commercial crop bases to serve as the main source for the state supply system. Other than these, there were surprisingly few quantitative details in Hua's report. For example, no rate of growth for GNP or national income was even mentioned.

Even more surprising was the absence of a program for specific new economic policies representing an explicit rejection of Maoist economic policies in favor of those advocated by the right wing. Rather, Hua's report represented a statement of general principles blending Maoist economic development slogans, objectives, and strategies with right-wing arguments, the latter being justified as the correct interpretation of Mao's ideas, which the "gang of four" had supposedly corrupted and distorted. For example, agricultural producers were still to "rely mainly on learning conscientiously from Dazhai," and efforts to introduce pay differentials or to permit peasants to sell products from private plots at rural trade fairs were contingent on insuring "the absolute predominance of the collective economy." There were calls for strengthening and rationalizing lines of authority and responsibility in industry, but no details concerning the system of planning, management, resource allocation, and pricing. Similarly, there was a call for increased exports, but no acknowledgment of the role of imports in meeting investment and other goals of the program. Hua emphasized restoration of diversified theoretical research and university training, yet it was a socialist labor emulation drive that was to be relied upon to make a "great leap forward" in technical innovation for production. China was to study advanced science and technology of all countries but be critical in selecting things from abroad to be sure that they served Chinese interests.

The nature of Hua's report indicated that a comprehensive right-wing program of economic institutional and policy changes had yet to be formulated and adopted. To the extent that such a program could be foretold at the time, the general assumption was

Chinese Vice Premier and Minister in Charge of the State Planning Commission Yu Qiuli (right) drinks a toast to Chinese-American friendship with then US Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal in Beijing on February 25, 1979. Yu, eclipsed during the Cultural Revolution, was restored to his planning post by China's current leadership.

—UPI.

[21] Hua Guofeng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country," *Peking Review*, No. 10, Mar. 10, 1978. (The speech was delivered on Feb. 26.)

[22] The new leadership had had neither the time nor the reconstituted and adequately staffed planning and statistical organs to redraft the plan.

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that the Chinese would return to the institutional and economic policies that the right wing had advocated in the 1950's and early 1960's. There was little basis, in short, to expect the extensive institutional and policy changes that have been discussed and introduced in China's economy since Hua's report.

Yet, by the fall of 1979, discussions about and actual implementation of institutional and policy changes were occurring on an ever-growing scale; hence, the new economic system and strategies of the post-Mao era still remain in a state of flux. The next section of this article will summarize the changes that have occurred thus far, but it is important to point out here that these institutional and policy changes have been strongly influenced by developments in the economy since Hua's report.

In an article written soon after Hua's speech was released,[23] the author and David Fasenfast argued that elimination of the "gang of four" and their left-wing economic policies would not in itself remove a number of crucial long-range obstacles to Chinese economic growth. The obstacles reviewed in that article (and not addressed in Hua's speech) included serious inter- and intrasectoral imbalances in China's economy; problems in increasing yields in agriculture, especially in irrigating the North China plain; the need to solve the competing demands for investment (Hua's speech promised more for all sectors of the economy—agriculture, industry, defense, transportation, and the consumer); difficulty in increasing the rate of investment and in coping with rising capital/output ratios; and problems in financing import requirements of the plan without large-scale borrowing from abroad. Assuming that the right wing had gained control of economic policy and would pursue the policies that they had endorsed in the late 1950's and early 1960's, we derived an alternative set of projected growth rates for China's economic development through 1985 which, while considerably lower than those implicit in Hua's report, were not that different from the rates implicitly forecast by Perkins in the

[23] Robert F. Dernberger and David Fasenfast, "China's Post-Mao Economic Future," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Chinese Economy Post-Mao.* Vol. 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Nov. 9, 1978, pp. 3-47.

Members of the Huanglu People's Commune in Anhui Province draw water from a lake to combat the severe drought that threatened the 1978 wheat harvest in this portion of the North China plain.

—UPI.

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early 1970's. Specifically, we forecast that over the period 1978–85 China's GNP would grow at an average annual rate of 6.5 percent (compared to 8.4 percent derived from Hua's report); industrial production, at 8.5 percent (vs. Hua's 10–11 percent); agricultural production, at 2–3 percent (vs. Hua's 4–5 percent); and GNP per capita, at 4.7 percent (vs. 6.5 percent derived from Hua's report).[24]

At first glance, the surge in the aggregate indicators for the Chinese economy in 1978 suggested that the plan's targets for 1985 were feasible: GNP increased by 11.6 percent; industrial production, by 13.4 percent; and agricultural production, by 8.3 percent. While these rates represented a promising start in achieving the targets for 1985, a fair portion of the gains—especially those in agriculture—were probably attributable to recovery from the disruptions of 1976–77. Indeed, economic problems experienced while achieving this economic revival in 1978 made it clear to the Chinese that the plan announced by Hua in February 1978 would prove to be unfeasible. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, held at the end of the year, publicly admitted that these problems would require a reassessment not only of the plan itself, but of the economic system and policies being relied upon for its achievement.[25]

The results of this reassessment were not long in coming. In June 1979, at the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Hua reported that the leadership, as a result of its review of economic progress over the preceding two years of "economic recovery," had concluded that the next three years had to be devoted to putting the Chinese economy back onto the path of sustained economic growth.[26] Therefore, these three years would be devoted to "readjusting, restructuring, consolidating, and improving the national economy." Readjusting the economy would involve revising the production and investment targets of the 10-year program — mostly downward (downward revisions in investment targets for 1979 were mentioned in Hua's report) — to make them more balanced or more compatible with one another. Restructuring the economy would entail reforming the entire system of economic administration and control, from central planning organs to low-level management, and would include determination of the proper mix of market forces and planning decisions in the allocation of resources. Consolidating the economy would encompass eliminating economic units that continually suffered losses and wasted resources, basing investment and production decisions on calculations of costs and benefits, and rewarding enterprises for making profits and penalizing them for incurring losses. Improving the economy would involve the adoption and effective utilization of modern technology and management techniques in production throughout the economy.

Although Hua's June 1979 report still blamed much of China's economic problems on the damage done by the "gang of four," it was considerably more realistic and frank than his 1978 report to the NPC, and it relied very little on Maoist slogans or principles. More important, it formally put the full weight of the party and government behind the wide variety of discussions being held and the proposals being made for major changes in China's economic system and development strategy.

Whither the "Four Modernizations"?

It should be noted that the many discussions and proposals for changes in China's economic system and development strategy that have appeared in the Chinese press over the past year do not provide us with a specific economic system that can be described in detail.[27] Some are clearly labeled "academic" reports; some offer contradictory arguments; some have led to trial experiments. In short, the final form that changes in China's economic system will take remains to be chosen. Yet, the general direction and nature of the changes in institutions and policies being proposed or adopted are becoming clearer. Let us look at the proposals in the four areas mentioned.

"Readjusting" the economy. Developments in the Chinese economy during 1978 evidenced sharp inter-

[24] Ibid., Table 1, p. 33. Derivation of the figures is explained in the footnotes to that table and the accompanying text. Perkins was not explicit in his predictions for the rates of growth of GNP, industrial production, and agricultural production for the remainder of the 1970's, but he strongly implied that the 1957-70 rates of roughly 5 percent, 8-9 percent, and 2 percent respectively would be exceeded. See Perkins, loc. cit.

[25] See "Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review*, Dec. 29, 1978.

[26] Hua Guofeng, "Report on the Work of the Government," *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1979. (The speech was delivered on June 18.)

[27] Articles in the Chinese press have been so numerous that the following analysis does not refer the reader to specific sources. Almost every issue of *Beijing Review* and of *FBIS-CHI* over the past year contains relevant articles. The ensuing discussion summarizes the overall thrust of articles by individuals, policy statements by government and party officials, or official documents adopted by the government that have appeared in these sources.

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

"Readjusting" the economy: a Japanese-designed chemical fertilizer plant in Sichuan, one of a number of plants purchased to bolster the nation's agricultural production.

—Eastfoto.

and intrasectoral production imbalances and inconsistencies in planning. Serious shortages of energy and building materials resulted in urban blackouts, suspended production, and construction delays. Industry produced too many multipurpose and too few specialized machine tools, too much crude and too little finished and rolled steel. All of this argued for more detailed and balanced planning. As one Chinese planner claimed, the nation's plans, including that announced by Hua in 1978, existed only on paper, with material balances worked out for only a few dozen commodities, and even those did not represent a balance of supply and demand at any particular place or time.[28]

What seems to be emerging is a realignment of growth priorities in favor of such items as energy and building materials, with reduced emphasis on production of steel, except for certain specialty steels. When combined with a rising interest in such sectors as agriculture, light industry, housing, and transportation—all seriously neglected for 30 years—this realignment strongly implies a slowdown in overall growth, since all of the areas stressed tend to yield less output per investment input than areas traditionally favored.[29]

In addition to material shortages, the investment sector suffered from considerable waste and inefficiency. Too much capital was tied up for too long in projects which often lacked adequate transportation for proper operations or even clearly thought-out final "markets" for their output. Thus, the Chinese perceived the need for a complete rationalization of individual investment projects on the basis of both direct and indirect economic costs and benefits.

The economic readjustments which have received the greatest notice in the Western press have been in the foreign trade sector. Hua's 1978 speech launched an explosion of Chinese negotiations with Western firms for purchase of complete plants and other technology imports, and the Chinese even indicated a willingness to abandon the left-wing principle of not incurring any long-term foreign debt. However, as 1978 and then 1979 wore on, the contracts actually signed fell short of the agreements reported. In early 1979, Chinese officials spoke of a moratorium on new contracts, as it became obvious that the Chinese economy would not be able to finance the level of foreign debt implicit in earlier import projections.[30] At the same time, the overall readjustment and planned slowing of domestic investment and growth lowered import requirements.

In sum, readjustment of the economy involves more realistic and coordinated planning in order to bring investment, output, and foreign trade targets more in line with a new set of growth priorities dictated by economic necessity.

"Restructuring" the economy. Unlike the proposals for readjusting the economy (which have come largely from China's political leaders and economic administrators), those for restructuring have come mostly from

[28] Xue Muqiao, "How Can We Effect Planned Management of the National Economy?" *Renmin Ribao,* June 15, 1979, translated in *FBIS-CHI,* June 20, 1979, p. L/10.

[29] The new priorities can be seen in the June 21, 1979, speech on the 1979 draft national economic plan delivered by Yu Qiuli, Vice Premier and Minister in charge of the State Planning Commission, to the June NPC meeting. Yu indicated that agriculture was to receive 14 percent of investments (compared to 10.7 percent in 1978); light industry, 5.8 percent (compared to 5.4 percent); and heavy industry, 46.8 percent (compared to 54.7 percent). He also confirmed that the overall level of investment budgeted for 1979 was lower than that for 1978. See *FBIS-CHI,* June 27, 1979, p. L/7. (fn. continued in next column)

More recently, the Sept. 25-28, 1979, meeting of the CCP Central Committee called for raising the share of agriculture in state investment still further, to 18 percent, within the next two or three years. See Frank Ching, "Chinese Will Be Hit With Big Increases In Prices of Daily Necessities Next Month," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Oct. 10, 1979, p. 19.

[30] Yet, the Chinese have begun to work out a variety of schemes to import technology and complete plants without immediate offsetting exports or incurrence of foreign debt. These include allowing direct foreign investment in China with a guaranteed rate of return, joint Chinese-foreign projects, compensation trade, and establishment by foreigners of processing facilities in special areas set aside by China.

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academic specialists. While no one advocates abandonment of central planning and control over resource allocation, the general thrust of the specialists' arguments—as was the case in the 1950's and again in the early 1970's—is toward what is essentially a form of market socialism. Like academics in most countries, the Chinese specialists vary widely in the problems they select for analysis and the solutions they offer. While some of their proposals have been tried out on an experimental basis, one cannot predict with any certainty what institutional and policy changes will be adopted. The best one can do is summarize the range and nature of the proposals being circulated.

Although there seems to be no desire to weaken central control over the general pattern of resource allocation (indeed, the inclination is to strengthen and perhaps even extend it), there is expressed the need to allow the lowest-level units greater freedom to react to the plans they are given. In agriculture, the production team over the past two years has consistently been assured its right to make its own production and distribution decisions. The teams have been encouraged to specialize in whatever income-earning activities happen to be available to them. Outside authorities are not to requisition labor or output from teams without proper compensation, and the prices of purchases by or deliveries to the state over and above the plan have been increased significantly. The team leader is to be democratically elected, private plots are to be guaranteed, and household sideline activity is to be encouraged.

In the industrial sector, the factory, after fulfilling its plan, is to be free to produce and sell, even by means of advertising, any output that will increase its income. Foremen are to be elected democratically, while piece rates, bonuses, etc., can be used to stimulate production. Specialization is to be encouraged by incorporating into a single entity all plants in a particular area that produce a similar product, and by discouraging factories from producing their own parts. Groups of workers are encouraged to form their own cooperatives to produce and sell any commodities or services they identify as being in short supply on the market. They can retain any profits they earn, and are exempt from those operational regulations which in the past prevented their income from rising above that of workers in state enterprises.

Although the need to meet planned targets and to

"Restructuring" the economy: increased reliance is to be put on the production independence of units such as this work team winnowing wheat after the 1978 harvest in Jiangsu Province. The teams are to be rewarded according to their productivity.

—Klaus Weizman/Camera Press.

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work out a proper balance between central, local, and individual interests is also stressed, the discussions of reforms in the economic system continue to emphasize the role of profits. The profit motive is deemed to encourage the cutting of costs and waste, and to spur responsiveness to market needs. Profits are to be used as a source of accumulation in the state's budget. To create an incentive mechanism for achieving these objectives, state enterprises are to retain a larger share of the profits they earn. Simultaneously, enterprise access to nonrepayable investment fund allocations through the budget as a result of negotiations within the administrative bureaucracy is to be restricted and require greater documentary evidence of need, utilization, and results. In addition, preliminary steps have been taken to finance some investment by means of bank loans which require similar justification for approval and which must be repaid with interest on schedule.

Whereas the readjustment of the economy entails strengthening and improving planning, restructuring clearly requires an increase in the role of market forces and local initiative in reaction to these forces. How to balance these contradictory goals is a problem that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe tried to solve a decade ago. Although the Chinese have studied East European economic systems with an eye to adopting at least some of their features, the Chinese appear not to have come to grips yet with the problems those countries have encountered in their economic reforms.[31] It is, therefore, not surprising that published proposals reveal no consensus on the future shape of the Chinese economic system.

"Consolidating" the economy. Proposals for consolidating the economy are relatively simple and straightforward, although their implementation could prove to be very difficult. Given the change in priorities resulting from the readjustment program, it is advocated that low-priority investment projects requiring scarce inputs and capital be suspended or eliminated. Economic units already in operation but

"Consolidating" the economy: China's new stress on production efficiency and profitability is typified by the publicity recently given to the savings effected by the pictured managerial and technical personnel of the Capital Iron and Steel Company in Beijing in iron smelting operations. Less profitable units are to be accorded lower priority.

—Eastfoto.

suffering losses covered by budget allocations are to be given a period of several years to become profitable or be closed down. In a direct attack on the "ultra-left" policies of more egalitarian income distribution, the proposals for consolidating the economy maintain that there is nothing in Marxist economics that dictates that wage scales should be equal throughout the state sector during the period of transition to communism. Rather, it is contended, wages in profitable enterprises should be higher than in enterprises suffering losses, unless those losses can be attributed to factors beyond the control of the enterprise.

Exceptions to the ultimate closing down of unprofitable state enterprises, however, are advocated in the case of those enterprises whose operations serve a high-priority objective of the state. Thus, some question remains over the extent to which unprofitable economic units are to be closed down. The primary targets appear to be small-scale and local enterprises in the state sector.

"Improving" the economy. The campaign for improving the economy is aimed at making most economic units "profitable"—i.e., more efficient—by promoting technological innovation and reducing input-output ratios throughout the Chinese economy. While such improvement clearly envisions acquisition of modern technology from abroad, the fundamental problem being addressed really is the need for the "typical" economic unit to catch up with the advanced units

[31] In April 1979, a conference of over 100 Chinese economists met to consider (a) the degree of free decision-making that should be granted to low-level economic units, (b) the proper mix of planning and markets, and (c) what the "law of value" should be, i.e., how prices should be determined and controlled. While the conference denounced "ultra-left" elements for distorting correct Marxian analysis by labeling the use of low-level initiative, profits, and market forces as bourgeois behavior, it did not resolve the three central questions posed. See *FBIS-CHI*, June 22, 1979, p. L/15. A special issue of *Jingji Yanjiu* (Beijing) published in June 1979 and entitled "Symposium on the Problem of the Law of Value in a Socialist Economy" (in Chinese) contains papers presented at this meeting. A copy of this special issue was obtained by the author during his October 1979 visit to China.

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

China's domestic technology gap: at the left, a scene from the metallurgical complex at Wuhan; at the right, farm machinery repairs being carried out in a commune workshop.

—Liaison and Audrey Topping/Photo Researchers.

that already exist in the Chinese economy. The latter, frequently visited by foreigners, are model units utilizing a level of technology and achieving levels of productivity which, although perhaps lower than those in the developed countries in the West, would bring a considerable increase in total output if realized nationwide.

The campaign to transfer technology domestically within sectors and to raise efficiency in input use is one of the most important aspects of the current economic program. The technological gap among units engaged in similar economic activities and the relatively low level of efficiency in the average economic unit in China constitute some of the most serious obstacles to long-run growth that the country's present leadership inherited as a legacy of the Cultural Revolution and left-wing policies.

As a whole and in its various dimensions, China's new economic modernization program represents a refutation and direct attack on the principal economic arguments of Maoism, especially the version of Maoist economics that was being advocated and implemented by the extreme left-wing leadership of the party over the decade before 1976. Although it is still too early to determine the extent to which, or the particular form in which, the new economic program will be implemented, it is possible to offer some opinions on whether it will enable the Chinese economy to achieve sustained, stable growth over the foreseeable future at a rate higher than that achieved in the period from 1957 to 1970.

Prospects

As indicated earlier in this article, the Chinese now admit the 10-year plan announced by Hua in February 1978 has been proved unfeasible by the developments that occurred throughout the remainder of that year. Although they are now working on a new 5-year economic plan for 1981-85—to be based on more comprehensive and complete balancing of interindustry flows—this new plan is not expected to be ready for at least another year.[32] The implication of devoting 1979-81 to readjusting, restructuring, consolidating, and improving the economy is that economic growth through 1985 will be somewhat less than that forecast in the original plan announced by

[32] See Hua Guofeng, "Report on the Work of the Government," *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1979, p. 21.

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Hua. The Chinese claim that the current economic program will not lead to a reduction in economic growth but rather will allow the economy to grow even faster, will likely turn out to be valid only in the sense that "faster" means in comparison with the actual results that would have been achieved under the 10-year plan without these measures.

Inasmuch as the program of readjusting, restructuring, consolidating, and improving the economy seeks to address many of the fundamental problems in the economy I cited a year ago in making my forecast of China's potential growth through 1985, the natural temptation is to maintain that this lends weight to that forecast. One might even argue that my somewhat "pessimistic" forecast at that time should be raised a bit.

Yet, the qualifications Perkins added to his optimistic conclusions in 1973 apply with equal, and possibly even greater, force today: namely, China could encounter difficulties in achieving high and stable yields in agriculture as well as disruptions of its existing economic program because of political instability and disagreements among its leaders. The new economic program for agricultural modernization relies heavily upon efforts of the Chinese peasants, spurred by a significant increase in material incentives, by policies to encourage peasants to undertake income-earning activities on their own, and by an expansion of the degree of freedom and control that peasants can exercise over production decisions in the collective sector. Furthermore, the state budget is to include much larger allocations for investments in the agricultural sector, and major projects for securing adequate and regular sources of water for irrigation in North China are now being promoted. But, while the latter are critical for the achievement of high and stable yields in North China, they are beyond the capabilities of the peasants themselves or of the units to which they belong. In addition, there remain unsolved technical problems relating to these projects. Finally, the investment costs and construction work involved mean that the results of these investments will not be realized in the near future. Thus, there is a real chance that the Chinese will fail to increase agricultural production by more than 3 percent a year. If this is the case, agriculture will continue to be a major constraint on growth in other sectors of the economy.

As for the threat of political disruptions, the situation has changed since 1973. Then, Perkins was concerned with possible instability in what he interpreted to be a consensus between the right-wing and the left-wing forces in the "two-line struggle over economic policy." Today, the makeup of the present leadership and the economic program they are introducing adds up to an overwhelming and rather sweeping victory for the right-wing faction. Yet, the very success of the right wing, the scope of its economic policies, and these policies' explicit contrast to the most fundamental economic principles and arguments of the Maoist interpretation of Marxism may constitute an even greater threat to political stability than the one Perkins correctly foresaw in 1973.

The new leadership is convinced that economic problems are serious enough to require drastic changes in China's economic system and policies, and they are counting on the economic results obtained to prove their wisdom. Failure to achieve the promised results obviously could create serious political tensions in China. Moreover, the new economic program is bound to increase income inequalities, create a new structure of elite classes, revive the administrative bureaucracy, widen the rural-urban gap of social and economic benefits, and promote exchanges with and dependence upon foreigners—in short, surface explicitly the whole host of consequences of "revisionist" modernization that Mao was fighting. Will a generation brought up learning the teachings of Mao readily accept these consequences? Keeping these consequences within acceptable limits, lest they "prove" the contention by Mao's left-wing followers that they have been the ones who have had true wisdom and have represented the best interests of a major portion of the Chinese masses, will impose a heavy burden on the new leadership and the new economic program that they espouse.

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New "Revolution" in China's Social Policy

by David M. Lampton

The human condition is such that wants and needs exceed the capacity of social and economic systems to fulfill them, and in few places has the imperative to choose imposed more difficult and divisive choices upon political leadership than in China. Beijing's leaders perennially have had to consciously decide how to distribute material goods, education, and health care. As William Parish and Martin Whyte observe in their *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, "equality" and "equity" can each provide the rationale for allocation, but the consequences of choosing one value over the other can be important. A distributive policy anchored in the value of "equality" seeks to allocate material goods, medical services, and education "to everyone, regardless of effort or ability. Equity exists when people are rewarded according to their contribution to an endeavor."[1]

While few analysts would argue that the People's Republic of China (PRC) pursued exclusively egalitarian policies during Mao Zedong's lifetime, or that all such policies have been eliminated in the wake of his passing from the scene, many of the attempts of the late 1960's and early 1970's to equalize income, educational opportunity, and health care are currently being reassessed, modified, and in some cases abandoned. The rationale for the changes being made is the pursuit of greater equity. Individual and collective rewards are increasingly being determined by assessing the individual's and the collective's contribution to economic growth and distributing scarce goods in proportion to that contribution. Past oscillations in Beijing's policy declarations, of course, frequently have been more dramatic than the actual changes produced in the daily routines of institutions and individuals. Nevertheless, there is mounting evidence that as China enters its fourth decade under Communist rule, something akin to a revolution is under way in the country's welfare system.

What have been the most important and conspicuous policy departures from Mao's heritage affecting the distribution of material goods, health services, and education? Which segments of society have gained, and which have been the losers? While both space and data limitations make it impossible to provide exhaustive answers to these questions, it is feasible to identify some of the consequences of present policy for the distribution of material goods and income, medical care, and education within the rural sector of Chinese society, among provinces, and between the countryside and the cities.[2] This analysis makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that in each policy area inequalities will increase despite Beijing's initiatives to impede the widening of the urban-rural income gap by raising the price of grain, lowering the prices of agricultural inputs, and lowering the real burden of ag-

[1] William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 47.

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[2] It is important to consider inequalities *within* the urban sector also. Because of both data and space limitations, however, inequalities within cities will receive limited attention in this analysis.

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ricultural taxes.[3] It is less obvious how rapidly this will happen and what the political consequences will be. Inevitably, however, China's elite will have to deal with those segments of the society which feel that the burdens of modernization have fallen disproportionately upon their shoulders. How well Beijing's leaders handle that challenge will be an important determinant of future stability.

Away From Income Equality

In looking in some detail, first, at the issue of income variations among rural households, production teams, brigades, communes, and counties, it is important to recall at the outset that the economic and sociological literatures agree on two fundamental points. First, there are and always have been significant income and material differences among households, production teams, brigades, communes, and counties in the PRC. There is some argument about whether or not these gaps have been meaningfully narrowed during the last three decades, but few would dispute that significant gaps still persist.[4] Second, income differences between units at every level of rural society are "embedded in natural differences in terrain, water supply [and] access to urban markets . . . ."[5] Income differences among households are

[3] Yu Qiuli, "Report on the Draft of the 1979 National Economic Plan," Beijing *Xinhua* in English, June 28, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), July 2, 1979, pp. L/16-17; Beijing Domestic Service, Feb. 4, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 6, 1979, p. E/6; and *Beijing Review* (Beijing), Mar. 16, 1979, pp. 11-12.

[4] See, for example, Marc Blecher, "Income Distribution in Small Rural Chinese Communities," *The China Quarterly* (London), December 1976, pp. 797-816; also, Martin King Whyte, "Inequality and Stratification in China," ibid., December 1975, pp. 684-711.

[5] Parish and Whyte, op. cit., p. 71.

In some parts of China, a living must be scratched from most unhospitable surroundings, as at the famous Dazhai Production Brigade in Shanxi Province.

—Vincent Mentzel.

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The rich rice fields of South China.

—Georg Gerster/Photo Researchers.

largely a function of variations in the number of able-bodied family members who work, in relationship to the family's total size.[6]

The Chinese government has recently released scattered income data for various rural administrative and production units which confirm these views. As Table 1 indicates, significant per capita income differences do indeed exist among production teams, brigades, communes, counties, and provinces. Even if one makes allowances for ambiguities in statistical coverage and reliability and for regional price variations, the figures testify to the fact that the egalitarian policies of the tumultuous 1967–76 decade by no means eliminated disparities in material welfare between units at all levels in rural society. In addition, the data in Table 1 show a close relationship between local resources and income level. Units situated along rivers, in deltas, and near cities, or blessed with useful natural resources, have higher levels of per capita income than production units located in hilly, isolated, or resource-barren locales.[7]

[6]Christopher Howe, *China's Economy*, London, Elek Books, 1978, p. 190; and Parish and Whyte, op. cit., p. 72.

[7]Parish and Whyte explain this phenomenon in depth in ibid., p. 71.

What is Beijing's present attitude toward these disparities? While the 1967–76 decade was saturated with denunciations of inequalities of every variety, the present leadership of the PRC views at least limited income inequalities as a useful spur to production. *Hong Qi* (Red Flag), the main theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has provided the most unvarnished account of present policy:

Increasing the workers' personal interests will invariably lead to differences among them. This is because they do different amounts and quality of work and because conditions in the units where they work differ from each other, such as in natural conditions and levels of management. Under such different conditions, equal amounts of labor will produce different results . . . . Some people will be first to receive a larger income and live a better life. Such a situation will encourage or stimulate others to contribute more to the state . . . . Some units always live to "have people eat the same rice from the same big cooking pot." . . . They do not allow relatively rich production teams to increase their members' income, no matter how much the latter have developed their production. Such a practice only serves to suppress the advanced and

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Table 1. Per Capita Income and Geographic Character of Various Rural and Provincial Economic/Administrative Units in China

Place	Year	Economic/ administrative level	Per capita income (yuan)[a]	Geographic character
Jilin Province	1976	province	40	—
Jilin Province	1978	province	70	—
Xinjiang Province	1977	province	73.60	—
Xinjiang Province	1978	province	85.60	—
Zhejiang Province	1978	province	102.54	—
Dangtu Xian, Anhui Province	1977	county	101	river bottom
Dangtu Xian, Anhui Province	1978	county	131	river bottom
Huixian, Henan Province	1978	county	109.4[b]	hilly
Four poor xian, Zhejiang Province	1978	county	40	—
Ten high-yield xian, Zhejiang Province	1977	county	130	river bottom
Ten high-yield xian, Zhejiang Province	1978	county	161	river bottom
Huangcheng Commune, Zhangdao Xian, Shandong Province	1970	commune	203	island
Huangcheng Commune, Zhangdao Xian, Shandong Province	1978	commune	256	island
Jukou Commune, Jiangyang Xian, Fujian Province	1978	commune	over 130	hilly
Yi Liu Commune, Kunming, Yunnan Province	1978	commune	242	suburban
Yi Liu Commune, Kunming, Yunnan Province	1979	commune	270	suburban
Huaxi Production Brigade, Jiangyin Xian, Jiangsu Province	1978	production brigade	220	river bottom
Wugui Production Brigade, Xindu Xian, western Sichuan Province	1978	production brigade	126	suburban
Daozhuang Production Team, Sanshui Xian, Guangdong Province	1978	production team	755	river bottom[c]
Number 12 Production Team, Xinan Commune, Xiapu Xian, Fujian Province	1978	production team	220	river bottom
ALL CHINA	1977		65	
ALL CHINA	1978		73.9	

[a] The coverage of these per capita income figures is generally unclear from the original sources. In addition, one cannot be sure that the same accounting method was used in deriving all figures. However, in a recent visit to Yi Liu Commune near Kunming, Yunnan Province, the author was informed that per capita income figures include both cash income and the value of distributed grain. A Beijing *Xinhua* broadcast in English on June 13, 1979, reported that such figures do not include household sideline and private plot income. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), June 14, 1979, p. L/9.

[b] 14 percent of the population here had annual incomes over 150 yuan.

[c] With limestone deposits.

SOURCE: *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 23, 1979, p. G/6; Feb. 8, 1979, p. L/5; Apr. 10, 1979, pp. P/1-2; Apr. 30, 1979, pp. 0/1 and 0/5; May 11, 1979, p. T/1; and July 2, 1979, p. L/4. Also *Beijing Review* (Beijing), Jan. 26, 1979, p. 6; Mar. 2, 1979, pp. 5-6; and Apr. 20, 1979, p. 27. And a mimeographed information handout obtained in June 1979 on a visit to Yi Liu Commune, Kunming, Yunnan Province.

encourage the backward . . . . Is there any contradiction between the interests of the individual worker and those of the collective? Yes, there is. When, of a given amount of funds, a large portion is used to improve individual workers' interests, the portion of the funds that can be used for collective purposes will naturally be reduced.[8]

We are now witnessing in China the implementation of pay, tax, investment, manpower, and budgetary policies which, in all probability, will increase the material disparities between households, production teams, brigades, communes, counties, and provinces. Although the regime still seems to be hoping to control the substantial rural-urban income gap, it is unclear how such an effort can succeed in the face of the initiatives about to be described.

With regard to material and income disparities among rural households, both Chinese and foreign observers agree that the primary determinant of household income is the quantity and vigor of a family's labor power. But some payment systems favor

[8] See Li Guangyuan, "Socialism and Workers' Personal Interests," *Hong Qi* (Beijing), No. 3, 1979, excerpted by Beijing Domestic Service, Mar. 18, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 20, 1979, pp. L/7-8. Emphasis added. *Guangming Ribao* also recently observed that, "in our country where existing productivity is so low, any idea of 'to each according to one's needs' is just a cover for small production egalitarianism." See *FBIS-CHI*, June 29, 1979, p. L/14.

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families endowed with numerous and vigorous laborers more than others. *Time-rate* payment schemes tend to produce fewer intravillage income gaps than *task* (or quota) systems. The difficulty with time rates, however, has been that they generally fail to elicit maximum output from the individual and do not take into account variations in skill. In the current drive to boost agricultural output as rapidly as possible, there has been a centrally sanctioned drive to use task (or quota) or mixed time and task payment systems wherever possible.[9] As the following passage indicates, this course will favor households with skilled, vigorous, and numerous able-bodied laborers and, thereby, widen intravillage income differentials:

Since the criteria used . . . to assess wages is the amount of the commune members' actual labor, the commune members' strong or weak work performances, their high or low technical skills, the amount of time they have spent on their work and their attitude toward labor will all be reflected in the amount of work they have actually done, and the number of work points a commune member deserves can be effectively assessed according to the fixed production quota and payment systems . . . . For a farm job with a high skill level, one is given more work points and therefore more pay . . . . The "gang of four" attacked the calculation of work points based on work done as having the inevitable consequences of "enlarged differences" and "polarization."[10]

In addition, the regime has sanctioned the contracting out of farm work to sub-production-team units called "job groups." Job groups are rewarded according to output, and bonuses are given for extra production.[11] It is likely that such groups will come to be organized around traditional lineage relationships and that, at a minimum, relatively vigorous and ecologically favored groups will be able to enrich themselves more rapidly than others. One candid Chinese newspaper article noted that dividing production teams into job groups had caused "difficulties in production for certain households with little or weak labor forces."[12]

Not only can material and income differences within villages be expected to increase; it is likely that economic differences among production teams and production brigades will grow as well. Mechanisms which previously required relatively well-off production teams to subsidize their less fortunate neighbors apparently are now being scaled down or eliminated. In the past, for instance, production teams with numerous able-bodied laborers frequently found some of their manpower requisitioned by the production brigade or commune to perform work which was not necessarily of direct or immediate benefit to the unit from which the labor came. This practice is now being denounced. If it is terminated, the degree to which labor-rich teams aid impoverished neighbors would obviously decline.[13] Similarly, authorities in some counties and communes previously kept per capita incomes in particularly well-to-do areas artificially low by requiring that the income from production increases be put in "public accumulation" funds to support a broad range of welfare activities at the commune and brigade levels. Such efforts are no longer looked upon with favor by national authorities either,[14] being critically referred to as "eating from the common bowl."

One corollary of efforts to reduce the disincentive effects of public accumulation at the brigade and commune levels has been an attempt to reduce the numbers of "nonproductive" personnel supported at levels above the production team.[15] This may have serious negative consequences for brigade-level programs such as the cooperative medical system, as we shall see later, in our discussion of developments affecting medical care.

Still higher in the administrative hierarchy, present policies will almost inevitably exacerbate already sizable economic disparities among communes and among counties. Perhaps the most important factor here is that Beijing's unmistakable desire to concentrate *expanded*[16] agricultural investment in high- and stable-yield areas[17] means that modern inputs such as fertilizer and farm machinery will go to already advantaged areas. The Chinese have been straightforward in specifying what it means in terms of material welfare to be in a high- and stable-yield area. Referring to Zhejiang Province, one report noted:

[9] Guangdong Provincial Service, Mar. 19, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 21, 1978, pp. H/4–5; also *Xinhua* Domestic Service, Feb. 15, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 17, 1978, pp. E/12–14.

[10] Beijing Domestic Service, July 19, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 24, 1978, pp. E/17–18.

[11] *Renmin Ribao*, Mar. 30, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 10, 1979, pp. L/14–15.

[12] *Nanfang Ribao*, Mar. 1, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 2, 1979, p. H/1. Also, division into work groups has led to competition for animals, manure, and manpower. See Hainan Regional Service, May 21, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 25, 1979, p. P/1.

[13] *Beijing Review*, Apr. 20, 1979, p. 16.

[14] Ibid., Mar. 2, 1979, pp. 5–6.

[15] *Renmin Ribao*, Feb. 15, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 17, 1978, pp. E/12–14.

[16] Beijing *Xinhua*, Apr. 17, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 2, 1979, pp. L/9–10.

[17] *Beijing Review*, May 18, 1979, p. 6.

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

Life is often more prosperous for peasants living near China's large cities, as in the case of this silk-producing commune near Shanghai.

—James Andanson/SYGMA.

Last year [1978], per capita income from collectives was 161 yuan for peasants in ten high yield counties in the Hangzhou-Jiaxing-Huzhou area, 31 yuan more than in 1977 and ***57 percent higher than the provincial average.*** *Allowance of food grain in the ten counties averaged 324 kilogrammes per capita, as opposed to 271 kilogrammes the year before . . . . In contrast to the richest counties,* ***peasants of four other counties in Zhejiang last year received an income of only 40 yuan, with which they were barely able to make ends meet.***[18]

Present policy also encourages suburban communes to grow more of the lucrative agricultural sideline products required to meet the needs of the cities and to build small-scale industries to help meet the subcontracting needs of large metropolitan enterprises. The "profit" rate on such subcontracts can be quite high. In order to stimulate the growth of small-scale industries, limited and temporary tax exemptions have been extended.

After its 1975 trip to China, the American Rural Small-scale Industry Delegation observed that "counties which have ample supplies of raw materials and ample markets by virtue of their location in prosperous regions or near cities are likely to support more industry."[19] Clearly, geographically convenient and relatively well-endowed suburban counties will once again be able to make the most rapid gains. Indeed, the inegalitarian effects of the policies just described already seem to be in evidence. In 1978, the average per capita income for China's rural population rose by about 13 percent. But the per capita income of peasants on the outskirts of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai rose by 27.1, 24.4 and 39.0 percent respectively.[20]

Finally, it is difficult to avoid concluding that present investment and budgetary policies portend a departure from the egalitarian thrust of previous investment strategies and, if actually implemented, will aggravate interprovincial income inequalities.[21] Beijing, for in-

[18] Beijing *Xinhua*, Apr. 29, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 30, 1979, p. 0/5. Emphasis added.

[19] The American Rural Small-scale Industry Delegation, *Rural Small-scale Industry in the People's Republic of China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 212 and 216. For a typical report on one subcontracting relationship, see *Peking Review* (Beijing), Sept. 29, 1978, p. 30.

[20] Beijing *Xinhua*, June 13, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 14, 1979, p. L/9.

[21] Nicholas R. Lardy, "Centralization and Decentralization in China's Fiscal Management," *The China Quarterly*, March 1975, pp. 25–60.

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

Despite significant investments, the Jiuchuan Iron and Steel Company in out-of-the-way Gansu Province was long a production laggard in the Chinese economy. Recent reports suggest some improvements in output during 1978.

—Eastfoto.

stance, *seems* to be gingerly questioning the wisdom of its practice of controlling the collection and allocation of all revenues at the center:

In terms of the relationship between the central and local authorities, there is much to be desired. Our provinces are larger than certain countries. However, the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions are not financially independent because all income and expenditures are centrally handled. This management system is not conducive to developing the initiative of various areas, departments, and enterprises, because their production and construction are not related to their economic interests. On the contrary, this encourages the mentality of "sharing a big pot of rice." Although different areas, departments and units are keen about getting hold of projects, investments and materials, they lack the motivation and responsibility to make the investments give good economic returns.[22]

This practice, Nicholas Lardy argues, has previously worked to the advantage of poorer provinces because of the center's conscious policy of utilizing some of the revenues generated in relatively productive areas for investment in backward provinces. Since income, education, medical services, and other welfare benefits are closely tied to levels of urbanization and industrial production, any significant movement away from such a redistributive investment strategy would have potentially important welfare consequences for the poorer provinces.[23]

In addition to providing hints that alterations in the PRC's fiscal system are being contemplated, China's mass media are being candid about the costs of having made industrial investments in backward or iso-

[22] *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 10, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 25, 1979, p. L/10.

[23] For Lardy, see fn. 21. See also David M. Lampton, "The Roots of Interprovincial Inequality in Education and Health Services in China since 1949," *The American Political Science Review* (Pittsburgh, PA), June 1979, pp. 459-77.

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lated areas. As Western scholars such as Nicholas Lardy have observed, "The cost of rapid development of backward areas, in terms of national growth forgone, appears to have been quite high."[24] Chinese sources have recently mentioned the relatively isolated northwestern province of Gansu, for example, as having had a bleak record with respect to productive use of capital construction funds:

Our correspondents have discovered that waste of state funds by many capital construction units in Gansu is quite serious . . . . According to statistics by departments concerned, in the 28 years between 1950 and 1977, only 36 percent of state investments in Gansu's capital construction actually yielded new production capacities . . . . In the past 8 years, 12 iron works built in Gansu not only have failed to earn back 1 cent since their operations began, but have incurred losses amounting to 8 times the original investments.[25]

Because of problems like those of Gansu, the central authorities are advocating, on an experimental basis, the allocation of investment funds through banks. Areas with the brightest prospects for repaying the loans would be the first recipients of credit. It is still unclear how this arrangement could work effectively when prices on products and raw materials do not reflect market forces, but the calls for such a system are loud and clear.[26] In the absence of compensatory mechanisms, such a method of allocating industrial investment would further widen interprovincial gaps in the distribution both of income and of material goods.

Thus, present Chinese policies are likely to increase income and material inequalities at every level of the rural hierarchy, from the household level through the province level. Certainly, Beijing has not been equally firm in its commitment to each of the policies discussed above. The basic doctrine undergirding all these efforts, however, is unmistakable: use income disparities in the rural sector to spur production, and concentrate scarce investment where it will yield the greatest economic return.

When one turns to the issue of income and material inequalities between the urban and rural sectors, it is more difficult to assess the net impact of present policies. Some government efforts are clearly designed to narrow urban-rural gaps, while others would seem likely to have the opposite effect. Examples of policies aimed at narrowing the disparities between town and country are the decisions of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (December 18–22, 1978) to raise the purchase price of quota and above-quota grain, to lower the prices of farm inputs from the industrial sector,[27] and to boost the share of state investment going into agriculture.[28] The restoration of rural free markets ("trade fairs"), increased industrial subcontracting, and more local discretion in what crops shall be grown should also have the effect of boosting many rural incomes.

On the other hand, several recent policies have had, and will continue to have, the effect of raising urban material and income levels still further above rural levels. First, in 1977 some 64 percent of urban wage earners received monthly pay increases of approximately 10 percent. This was achieved by raising 46 percent of the wage earners one wage grade, while an additional 18 percent were granted "an upward adjustment in pay."[29] As a result, urban savings deposits rose 20 percent during the first half of 1978, while those in rural areas climbed only 10 percent.[30] Second, there has been an increase in the level of pension benefits provided some urban retirees.[31] And finally, some urban workers are now benefiting from an expanded state effort to provide them better housing and recreational opportunities. In late 1978, it was announced:

Concentrated efforts are to be made between 1979 and 1985 to solve urban housing problems according to a 7-year plan prepared by the State Capital Construction Commission. Housing conditions will be considerably improved by 1985.[32]

[24] Nicholas R. Lardy, "Regional Growth and Income Distribution: The Chinese Experience," Economic Growth Center, Yale University, Center Discussion Paper No. 240, November 1975, p. 45.

[25] Beijing *Xinhua* Domestic Service, Mar. 8, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 12, 1979, pp. E/12–13.

[26] Beijing *Xinhua* Domestic Service, Apr. 11, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 17, 1979, pp. L/6–7. It was apparently decided at the March 1979 National Meeting on Capital Construction to try out this policy on an experimental basis. In his June 21, 1979, report to the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Vice Premier Yu Qiuli talked about "experiments in granting special funds for the enterprises' own use." *Xinhua* News Agency, *News Bulletin* (Beijing), No. 11116, June 22, 1979, p. 49.

[27] *Peking Review*, Dec. 29, 1978, p. 13; also Beijing *Xinhua* in English, Apr. 17, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 2, 1979, pp. L/9–10.

[28] *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 28, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 31, 1979, pp. E/15–18. These policies were ratified by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (June–July 1979). See Zhang Jingfu, "Report on the Final State Accounts of 1978 and the Draft State Budget for 1979," in *FBIS-CHI*, July 3, 1979, pp. L/6–19.

[29] *Peking Review*, May 5, 1978, p. 13.

[30] Ibid., Aug. 25, 1978, p. 31.

[31] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, June 14, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 15, 1979, p. R/1.

[32] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, Sept. 19, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 20, 1978, p. E/16.

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Within the 190 cities included under this plan, a housing boom is under way.[33] More housing was built in Shanghai during 1978, for instance, than during any other single year for the previous 20 years.[34] This emphasis on the cities stands in marked contrast to the substantial efforts of the late 1960's and early 1970's to improve rural housing.

Moreover, industrial employees in major cities may now hope for more than simply better housing. The regime has also reopened vacation sanatoria which are accessible to eligible trade union members. The Chinese media candidly noted in mid-1978:

During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Piao, the "gang of four" and their followers attacked the sanatorium vacation system as "welfarism." . . . The sanatorium [near West Lake in Hangzhou, Zhejiang], closed to workers for 12 years as a result, is now functioning again.[35]

In sum, it is unclear whether or not present policies will rapidly and significantly increase disparities between urban and rural income and material welfare levels, though one can suspect that widening gaps are likely. At the same time, however, Beijing is clearly making greater efforts to reduce disparities *between* urban and rural income and material levels than it is making to diminish inequalities *within* the rural sector itself. There is little mystery in this. At least limited inequalities within the rural sector provide incentives for production and permit investment of scarce capital in the most productive areas. Urban-rural inequalities, on the other hand, do not so directly serve these purposes and have two conspicuous drawbacks: they feed migration into cities, and they promote political instability.

Precisely because of these drawbacks, current policies in the medical and educational realms take on added significance. For if a shift away from "equality" and toward "equity" has been apparent in policies regarding the distribution of income and material goods, it has been even more obvious in these realms. Medicine and education are now being harnessed to the service of economic growth, and the impact of recent decisions in both areas will be to enlarge urban-rural disparities.

Medical Care for the Cities

The core value undergirding medical policy in China during the 1968–76 period was expressed in Mao's June 26, 1965, admonition, "In medicine and health, put the stress on the rural areas." To this end, the Chinese medical and public health system was modified in a number of dramatic ways. Medical education was reduced to no longer than three years; rural cooperative medical care was popularized, with about 1.8 million paramedical personnel ("barefoot doctors") constituting the foundation of the production-brigade-level program; pure medical research was deemphasized; urban medical personnel were rotated through the countryside; and financial resources were committed to the improvement of peasant health.[36]

Now, though, many of these policy initiatives are being modified, if not eliminated, owing to the adverse effects the policies had on urban areas and leadership groups and on the professional medical community, and also owing to village funding and supply problems. The current line for medical and public health work was spelled out by Minister of Public Health Qian Xinzhong at a meeting of provincial and municipal health officials held from March 21 to April 2, 1979. Qian not only failed to give meaningful attention to the changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution, but he went on to say:

To modernize China's medical work, we must proceed from actual conditions, be self-reliant and draw on advanced techniques from foreign countries. . . . Modernization requires people versed in modern science and techniques, equipment for hospitals and research institutes and scientific management of the medical system.[37]

The minister is also reported to have called for increased quality of service, better equipped hospitals, more exchanges with foreign specialists, and the construction of several modern hospitals and research centers.

Why has there been this reorientation in medical policy away from the rural focus of the 1968–76 period? And what have been the tangible consequences of such rhetorical changes? While much of Cultural Revolution medical policy will doubtless en-

[33] Laurence J. C. Ma, "Urban Housing Supply and Structure in the People's Republic of China," paper presented to the Tristate Modern China Seminar, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, Apr. 14, 1979, p. 29.

[34] *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 8, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 12, 1979, p. L/6.

[35] *Peking Review*, Aug. 4, 1978, p. 28.

[36] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, June 25, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 28, 1976, pp. E/1–2. For documentation of the 1.8 million paramedic figure, see Beijing *Xinhua* in English, June 5, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 7, 1978, p. E/11.

[37] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, Apr. 11, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 11, 1979, p. L/14.

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China's Minister of Public Health, the rehabilitated Qian Xinzhong, exchanges a protocol on scientific and technological cooperation in medicine and public health with then US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano, on June 22, 1979, in Beijing. At the left rear is author David M. Lampton, who was in the Califano delegation.

—Eastfoto.

dure, three mutually reinforcing sets of factors have caused the Chinese to move away in their rhetoric from some of the core policies of that era: leadership changes, the costs imposed on specific urban constituencies by Cultural Revolution policies, and the concrete administrative and financial problems encountered in trying to provide curative medical care to an enormous and poor peasantry.

With respect to the leadership factors, there has been a remarkable restoration in Beijing of pre-Cultural Revolution personalities. Their policy preferences are well known. Restored Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, for instance, was repeatedly denounced by leftists during the turmoil of 1976 for being critical of the quality of rural paramedics and the rural cooperative health care system.[38] Similarly, Dr. Qian Xinzhong, the pre-Cultural Revolution Minister of Public Health and a longtime advocate of basic biomedical research, regained his ministerial portfolio in early 1979.[39] Present policy is almost identical to that pursued under his tutelage prior to the Cultural Revolution. In addition, other pre-Cultural Revolution medical officials such as Huang Jiasi, Huang Shuze, and Fu Yicheng have regained their positions and are playing prominent roles in rebuilding research and professional structures. In fact, Huang Jiasi, a noted surgeon and longtime advocate of quality medical education, recently visited the United States to solicit philanthropic support for medical centers in the PRC.

Of course, personnel turnover in the PRC since Mao's death has also reflected the social and political pressures stirred up by previous policies. For while the efforts of the 1968–76 period did provide some benefits to rural areas, they also imposed burdens upon certain politically potent groups, most notably party officials and cadres, health professionals, and urbanites. Now, with Mao no longer able to speak out on behalf of the relatively powerless peasantry and with the national focus of attention on economic growth and technological modernization, the health system is coming to be viewed in terms of its capacity to meet the needs of social groups which contribute most to those endeavors.

Thus, the "gang of four" now stands accused of having "persecuted" party cadres, who had previously enjoyed favored access to relatively good medical facilities, by having either denied them privileged access to elite institutions or by having capriciously shortened their hospital stays:

As a result, medical treatment was denied to many leading cadres in Shanghai. . . . A veteran Red Army cadre who took part in the revolution in 1929 became an outpatient because hospitalization was no longer available to him. Wang Hung-wen and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao even went so far as to personally order some hospitals to discharge certain numbers of responsible comrades from other provinces and cities.[40]

In fact, the "gang" is said to have sabotaged hospital work entirely.[41] One could argue that if health resources were to be distributed more equally, it was essential to minimize the length of hospital stays, move the focus of medical delivery out of select urban facilities, maximize outpatient care, and minimize the flow of cadres from all over the country into premier

[38] Hangzhou, Zhejiang Provincial Service, July 3, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 8, 1976, p. G/1; also, Beijing *Xinhua* in English, May 21, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 24, 1976, pp. E/8–12.

[39] For the background and policy orientation of Qian Xinzhong, see David M. Lampton, *The Politics of Medicine in China: The Policy Process, 1949–1977*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977, pp. 23, 80, 173, 194–96, 209–11, and 239–44.

[40] Shanghai City Service, Jan. 12, 1977, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 18, 1977, p. G/10.

[41] Nanjing, Jiangsu Provincial Service, Jan. 24, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 30, 1978, pp. G/4–5.

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

Scenes from a rural commune hospital near Guangdong: at the left, prescriptions are dispensed at the pharmacy; at the right, patients await medical care.

—Florita Botts/Nancy Palmer.

institutions in Shanghai and Beijing. However, such considerations are not determining policy in China today.

In order to accomplish the shift of medical resources out of the cities during the 1968–76 era, the quality and accessibility of medical care for urban workers and students was allowed to deteriorate. Now, however, in order to motivate students and workers to bring about greater industrial progress and technical advance, the regime is calling for a recognition that urban areas have health problems that were ignored by previous programs.[42] Medical care is being viewed as a benefit which can be provided to valued groups in society. Indeed, initiatives in this direction have created serious problems for the state budget, as some local leaders, in an effort to pacify and motivate staff and workers, have extended unauthorized medical benefits to large numbers of people. One radio broadcast reported, for example:

The regional commerce bureau decided on 17 January to . . . give health allowances to workers for the first quarter of 1979, 7 yuan for each male worker and 8 yuan for each female worker. . . . If all units followed the example of the regional commerce bureau, the state would have borne an additional burden of at least 4.2 million yuan. . . .[43]

In this case, the central authorities demanded that all unauthorized benefits be refunded to the state.

The final group that was dissatisfied with Cultural Revolution health policies was the Western-style medical community. Many of China's foremost medical authorities had been trained in Japan, the West, or in Western-style medical schools in China. Professionally, they found intolerable the deemphasis of hospital care, the three-year medical curriculum with no specialty training, the isolation from the international scientific community, and the damage inflicted on basic biomedical research during the 1968–76 period.[44]

Aside from the "subjective" complaints of these groups about the policies of the last decade, recent policy changes also reflect the "objective" difficulties which were encountered in trying to provide decentralized (paramedical) health care using the production brigade and people's commune as the base unit. While space restrictions preclude comprehensiveness in our treatment, at least four interrelated problems deserve mention. First, mismanagement of cooperative health funds, excess demand for services and drugs, and waste all resulted in the chronic insolvency of many cooperative health programs.[45] Second, paramedics frequently were alleged to have been inadequately trained, with misdiagnosed diseases and unnecessary referral of large numbers of patients to urban facilities the results.[46] Third, care was poor at times because rural medical programs were to be vol-

[42] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, Mar. 15, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 16, 1979, pp. E/8–9.

[43] Urumqi, Xinjiang Regional Service, Mar. 14, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 15, 1979, pp. M/2–3.

[44] See Minister of Public Health Qian Xinzhong's spring 1979 speech reported in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 11, 1979, p. L/14.

[45] David M. Lampton, "Development and Health Care: Is China's Medical Programme Exportable?" *World Development* (Oxford, England), May 1978, pp. 622–27.

[46] See *Chinese Medical Journal* (Beijing), Vol. 1, No. 3, 1975, p. 160.

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untarily financed by a combination of individual and collective contributions, and peasants, particularly in lean agricultural years, frequently decided that the quality of services did not warrant the expenditure of their limited funds. Comparatively young and healthy families, for instance, were often less willing to support programs for which they anticipated little need than families including older and/or more infirm members. Finally, the egalitarian nature of the programs created disincentives to production. Because the regime is now trying to maximize the incentives given to productive rural households, there have been repeated calls throughout 1979 to minimize redistributive programs managed at the brigade and commune levels.

In broad terms, how have the pressures and leadership changes described above been reflected in present medical policy? Perhaps the program most closely associated with the effort to equalize access to curative medical care was the cooperative medical system. Under this program, *locally* raised funds were to be used to build a small clinic, train a paramedic or two, and purchase necessary pharmaceuticals and instruments. This system is still being promoted (and in all probability will continue to be). But important changes and retrenchments are taking place, in accordance with the regime's desire, on economic grounds, to limit the redistributive functions of production brigades and communes.

After the adoption of cooperative health care as national policy in 1968, Chinese provinces began to document their progress in implementing this program by referring to the percentage of their production brigades covered by cooperative health services. Table 2 shows, by year, the number of provinces (out of a total of 29) for which we have been able to locate such statistics. The decreased stress laid on the program is indicated by the fact that during 1975 and 1976, these data were most plentiful, while no provincial-level performance data seem to be available for 1978. Moreover, when the State Statistical Bureau announced in June 1979 that nationally "around" 80 percent of China's production brigades provided these services, it was in fact issuing a figure which indicated that more than 10 percent of the previously existing programs had suspended operation.[47]

There have been strong indications as well that the number of "barefoot doctors" has declined, and while part of the apparent shrinkage may reflect the additional training and subsequent upgrading to another professional status of some paramedics, the elimination of many positions is likely as well. Previously, the regime was careful and consistent in stating that there were 1.8 million barefoot doctors nationwide.[48] Now health authorities claim that the number of such personnel is "more than a million." In a recent visit to the Ministry of Public Health in Beijing, I was specifically told there were 1.6 million barefoot doctors. But in other conversations I got the sense that the decline may have been even more dramatic.[49] Reinforcing the sense that a reduction in numbers is under way is the fact that provincial and national medical conferences, the mass media, and national leaders have called for improvement in the *quality* of rural paramedics.[50]

Table 2. Provinces with Data Available on the Percentage of Production Brigades with Cooperative Health Care, 1971–78

Year	Number of provinces
1971	6
1972	12
1973	9
1974	5
1975	18
1976	15
1977	7
1978	0

The deemphasis of rural health care which seems to be taking place on the ground has been reflected in markedly less attention to the subject in the *Chinese Medical Journal.* It carried 10 articles on rural health care in 1976; 13 in 1977; and only 4 in 1978.

A correlate of this reduced stress on health care in the countryside has been increased attention to the hospital system, "with the county hospital as the center. . . ."[51] Indeed, the Ministry of Public Health now plans to modernize one third of China's county hospitals by 1985. Nowhere, however, has the move toward hospitals and institutional care been more conspicuous than in the military, which, prior to 1978, closely identified with and supported the paramedic program. In early 1978, Nanjing People's Liberation Army units held a well publicized hospital work conference which

[47] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, June 27, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 27, 1979, p. L/19.

[48] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, June 5, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 7, 1978, p. E/11.

[49] *Beijing Review*, May 4, 1979, p. 5. During June 1979, I had extended conversations concerning present health policy with Ministry of Public Health officials and medical doctors. The 1.6 million figure has been released publicly. See Beijing *Xinhua* in English, June 27, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 27, 1979, p. L/19.

[50] See, for example, *Renmin Ribao*, June 9, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 16, 1978, pp. E/1–3. One report actually noted that some areas had "improperly reduced the number of barefoot doctors." See *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 25, 1978, p. H/1.

[51] Lhasa, Xizang Regional Service, Jan. 5, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 12, 1978, p. J/3.

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A "barefoot doctor," symbol of China's approach to health care during the Cultural Revolution, administers first aid to a rural worker.

—UPI.

. . . commended the advanced and discussed and formulated plans for technical construction of hospitals. . . . Technical construction of hospitals suffered seriously from the gang of four's interference and sabotage. The conference stressed the importance of hospital technical construction and the need to constantly raise the level of medical science and technique. . . .[52]

Similarly, in the sparsely populated and rural western province of Xinjiang, emphasis has shifted to county hospitals as the site where quality curative care can be provided.[53] In short, stress at all levels is shifting to hospital care and to the idea of moving patients to centralized facilities. But all health administration studies agree that when health delivery focuses on the hospital, the closer one is to that facility, the greater one's utilization of it. Isolated peasants, therefore, will probably find the benefits of modernized medical care less apparent than urbanites and suburban villagers.

Predictably, the current emphasis on institutional care, modern equipment, and high quality medicine has been reflected in medical school curricula, with the universal three-year curriculum of the Cultural Revolution era being replaced by a five-year program in which basic theoretical knowledge occupies a prominent place.[54] This increased duration of training will have consequences for urban-rural equality. First, more highly trained and specialized doctors will be increasingly reluctant to leave the urban technical infrastructure upon which they have become dependent. Second, increased exposure to basic medical research and longer medical education will mean more doctors will be needed just to staff medical schools and research institutes. Hence, there will be a temptation to make the argument that scarce medical personnel can most effectively be used in urban settings, where each doctor can play several roles, where patients come to the practitioner, and where the physician has institutional support which can enable him or her to do the job more efficiently.

The increasing professionalization of the Chinese medical community becomes an important factor here as well. Chinese biomedical workers are now participating in international medical conferences, holding increasing numbers of national medical conferences,[55] and signing biomedical agreements with the World Health Organization and the United States. Thus, in June 1979, Minister of Public Health Qian Xinzhong and then US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano signed an agreement whereby a Joint Committee for Cooperation in Medicine and Public Health was established. The Joint Committee is responsible for setting priorities for cooperative research projects and scientific exchanges in the areas of infectious diseases, cancer, cardiovascular diseases, recombinant DNA, immunology, medical genetics, and several other specific subject areas. Equally indicative of the shift toward research and interest in the medical frontiers has been the recent convening of conferences on surgery[56] and artificial hearts.[57] The medical literature is carrying increasing numbers of reports about kidney and heart transplants and brain surgery, and China's first heart transplant operation recently took place at Ruijin Hospital in Shanghai.[58] It will be some time, obviously, before such advances on the medical frontiers trickle down to residents of China's hinterlands.

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[52] Nanjing, Jiangsu Provincial Service, Jan. 24, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 30, 1978, pp. G/4–5.

[53] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, Sept. 8, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 13, 1978, p. M/2.

[54] Ronald Louie et al., "China's Med Schools: Tradition and Change," *The New Physician* (Chantilly, VA), January 1979, p. 43.

[55] In June 1978, a National Conference on Medical Science convened in Beijing. See *Chinese Medical Journal*, September 1978, pp. 411–12.

[56] Ibid., January 1979, pp. 1–6.

[57] Guangdong Provincial Service, Nov. 30, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 1, 1978, p. E/15.

[58] *Chinese Medical Journal*, January 1979, p. 6.

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

The medical college in Beijing, where five-year training has now resumed.

—EUPRA.

Finally, industrial health and environmental protection policies have changed in ways which have potential implications for China's peasantry. The State Council has issued staff directives on industrial safety,[59] and the State Planning and Economic Commissions have threatened to close down 167 industrial enterprises if they fail to meet urban pollution standards by 1982.[60] In some areas, offending plants have already been forced to suspend operations or close down entirely.[61] While one should have sober expectations about how rapidly progress can be made, the reasons for these policies are clear. Workers want safer conditions, and pollution has reached serious levels in some major cities, even threatening tourism in such scenic spots as Guilin. What is significant from our perspective is that no comparable effort is under way in the rural areas.

In sum, substantial departures from the medical and public health policies of the 1968–76 period have occurred. While some continuities persist, with mass campaigns, barefoot doctors, cooperative medical care, and traditional Chinese medicine still receiving attention, the new emphases on hospital care, longer medical education, more basic research, and increased professionalism will invariably widen inequalities of access within the rural sector, among provinces, and between urban and rural areas. Suburban villagers will have greater access to hospitals than individuals in more isolated locations, residents of relatively prosperous areas will be better able than less fortunate neighbors to sustain and improve health programs (or afford to go to the nearest county town), and provinces in which industrial investment is concentrated will witness the most rapid expansion of hospital facilities.[62]

Thus, in the Chinese health care system, as in the economic realm, egalitarian values are giving way to considerations of "equity"—albeit for the sake of promoting economic and technological progress. Much the same tendency can be seen in the new Chinese leadership's educational policies.

Revolution in Education

Since normative values and disparities in opportunity are two universal sources of conflict in human society and because schools transmit values and provide

[59] Beijing Domestic Service, Dec. 5, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 11, 1978, p. E/22.
[60] *Peking Review*, Nov. 24, 1978, p. 31.
[61] *Beijing Review*, Mar. 2, 1979, p. 28.
[62] Lampton, "The Roots of Interprovincial Inequality . . . ," loc.cit., p. 470.

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or withhold opportunities for mobility, education has always been the subject of political controversy. But this has been so in the extreme in China during the last decade and a half. Mao and his allies argued that education should be the servant of generalized social equality, especially urban-rural equality, and while equality did not always result from their efforts, Cultural Revolution policies did emphasize universalization of primary education (shortened in duration to insure that this was achieved), as well as labor for students at all levels, unity of theory and practice, admission to institutions of higher learning *only* after service in the countryside, affirmative efforts to move scholastically less qualified social groups up the educational hierarchy, elimination of favored ("key point") schools, and less attention to formal higher education. As these goals indicate, education, in the eyes of the "leftists" of the late-1960's and the first half of the 1970's, was to

create conditions in which it is impossible for the bourgeoisie to exist or for a new bourgeoisie to arise . . . . For this reason, the proletariat should occupy the education front in order to use it to train revolutionary successors who can persist in the dictatorship of the proletariat and strive for the realization of communism.[63]

It is clear, of course, that sharp disagreements over the wisdom of this vision punctuated the 1970–76 period of conflict between advocates and opponents of Cultural Revolution policies, and some modifications were made during those years of intense factional infighting. Still, a wholesale departure from policies so closely identified with Mao had to await his demise.

Since the downfall of the "gang of four," education in the PRC has come to be judged according to the degree to which it retards or facilitates economic and technical progress. Speaking at the spring 1978 National Conference on Education, both Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and then Minister of Education Liu Xiyao gave straightforward accounts of the purposes which education was to serve. Deng said:

Our schools are places for training competent personnel for the proletariat. The demands to bring up workers with high standards in science and culture and create a mammoth contingent of red-and-expert working class intellectuals are in the interests of proletarian politics. . . . Today's speedy economic and technological development demands rapid improvement in the quality and efficiency of education and constant new developments in the content and methods of combining education with productive labor.[64]

And Liu added:

The education front bears a major part of the responsibility to fulfill the general task in the new period. We must train millions upon millions of workers so they have socialist consciousness and modern production skills . . . and train experts and cadres able to manage a modern economy and handle modern science and technology.[65]

With the immediate purposes of education thus redefined, policies pertaining to admissions, curriculum, methods of evaluation, "key schools," student-teacher relations, and discipline have been altered accordingly. Each of these changes merits detailed discussion, but two policy areas are particularly germane to our consideration of equality in today's China—"key schools" and admissions procedures. Present policies in both areas will serve to exacerbate differences within the rural sector, between urban and rural areas, among provinces, and within cities. Indeed, the inequalities which are already resulting from these practices may prove to be among the most dangerous by-products of the modernization effort as presently conceived. For there is little reason to suppose that the Maoist goal of social equality through educational equality has lost all its appeal among the Chinese populace, especially among that portion of the population which perceives itself to have lost opportunities as a result of the policy shifts which have occurred.

In the first area, the 1967–76 decade had witnessed the abandonment of the formal designation of specific schools (at all levels) as focal points for educational excellence. "Little treasure pagodas," as these "key schools" were derisively called, were criticized not only for their inherent elitism, but also in some cases for pre-1949 ties to foreigners. In early 1978, however, the "key schools" concept was revived. Predictably, many of the same institutions which had been "key schools" before the Cultural Revolution were so designated once again.[66] The regime's educational officials have been unabashed in

[63] Liang Xiao, Beijing Domestic Service, Mar. 17, 1976, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 18, 1976, p. E/4.

[64] Beijing *Xinhua*, Apr. 22, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 24, 1978, pp. E/1–2.

[65] Ibid., p. E/3.

[66] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, Mar. 1, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 1, 1978, p. E/19. This broadcast noted that of the first group of 88 key institutions of higher education, 60 had been key facilities prior to the Cultural Revolution.

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

Upgrading China's secondary education: audiovisual equipment at the Shibei Middle School in Shanghai in December 1978.

—UPI.

defending the "key schools" idea, and Shanghai's CCP first secretary and member of the Politburo, Peng Chong, has been nationally praised for his accomplishments in promoting "key schools."[67] A secretary of the Inner Mongolian Party Committee explained the role the schools were to play as follows:

150 middle and primary schools throughout the region have been initially designated as the first group of key schools which should be run well. We should make up our minds to give priority to equipping these schools with a leading force, a level of teachers, a quality of students and condition of facilities which will enable these schools to become a real backbone force of the new education system.[68]

Not only do "key schools" receive preferential treatment in funding, allocation of qualified staff, modern equipment, and "bright" students; those under provincial control are further favored by being granted precedence over key institutions subordinate to lower-level prefecture, county, or district authority.

Implemented in this way, the "key schools" idea has a number of consequences. In the wake of her 1978 trip to the People's Republic, Susan Shirk reported that "the chances of winning college admission were ten times better for a student from an urban key point school . . . than for a graduate of an ordinary rural school I visited."[69] Furthermore, the graduates of key middle schools have a much greater chance of attending key universities. Finally, key primary and middle schools are located predominantly in urban areas and recruit their students for the most part from the immediate environs of the schools. Thus, in 1978, only four of 25 key primary and secondary schools in Beijing were situated in suburban counties.[70] In addition, at the province level of comparison, Beijing, with 25,[71] had more key primary and secondary schools under provincial control than the enormous province of Sichuan, which had only 9 such schools.[72] To illustrate what this means to the individuals residing in the two provinces, one need only point out that there was one provincially-administered key primary or middle school for every 332,000 persons in Beijing, while only one existed for every 11.1 million residents of Sichuan Province. In short, within provinces, urban areas have an advantage; and between provinces, those that are more highly urbanized fare better than their more agrarian counterparts.

It is precisely these effects which have led many cautious Chinese cadres to drag their feet in implementing "key schools" policies. One broadcast from Anhui Province frankly observed:

. . . a fierce struggle is also taking place over the issue of whether or not it is necessary to run key middle and primary schools and over how to run them. A small number of people stubbornly hold that running key schools means taking the old revisionist road. . . . Many comrades in education departments and schools still have lingering fear and their thinking has not been completely liberated from the gang of four's spiritual shackles.[73]

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[67] Beijing *Xinhua* Domestic Service, May 16, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1978, p. E/3.

[68] Hohhot, Nei Monggol Regional Service, Sept. 17, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 22, 1978, p. K/6.

[69] Susan Shirk, unpublished manuscript distributed by the China Council of the Asia Society, New York, NY, p. 12.

[70] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, May 1, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 2, 1978, p. K/1. Mr. Han of the Peking Municipal Education Bureau said in an interview that "Peking has designated 25 key schools, primary and secondary . . . ." While one cannot be certain, this almost surely refers to schools run at the provincial level.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Chengdu, Sichuan Provincial Service, Mar. 3, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 9, 1978, p. J/7.

[73] Hefei, Anhui Provincial Service, June 7, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 12, 1978, p. G/3.

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Finally, it is also possible to predict that the capital investment policies described earlier in this article will aggravate even further the interprovincial and urban-rural inequalities promoted by the "key schools" idea, unless potent efforts are made to prevent this from happening. In China, the availability of both primary and secondary schooling is closely associated with degrees of urbanization.[74] Therefore, if capital investment is concentrated in fewer and more developed regions, leaving more distant rural provinces and localities to their own devices, interprovincial gaps, especially at the secondary school level, will widen.

Regarding the second area of major concern to us here, one can say that current enrollment policies, especially as they pertain to institutions of higher learning, will also produce conspicuous inequalities in all sectors of society. Prior to Mao Zedong's death, the Chairman's own proclamation of July 21, 1968, was the basic directive governing admissions:

Students should be selected from among peasants and workers with practical experience and they should return to production after a few years study.

But today, increasing numbers of students are admitted directly to institutions of higher education from middle school, thereby avoiding the period of manual labor that had previously intervened under Mao's guidelines. At Shanghai Teachers' University, for example, I was told that about 25 percent of the class admitted in 1978–79 had entered directly from middle school. Moreover, affirmative efforts to recruit from disadvantaged social groups have been greatly curtailed. Emphasis is now on using rigorous examinations to select students who can make the best intellectual contribution to the modernization drive. The present leadership candidly acknowledges that such a policy will favor urban dwellers, but argues that this will be inevitable until rural primary and middle schools improve their quality:

Some people say that to select those with the best qualifications will widen the gap between town and country. . . . But a socialist society is still not a communist one. Differences between town and country, worker and peasant, and mental and manual labor, as well as actual inequality, invariably exist. . . . The only way to narrow this gap is to develop primary and secondary education in rural areas and raise their educational standards — all this on the basis of growth in production.[75]

The long-term scenario envisaged by today's leadership is to choose the intellectually gifted for advanced education, accelerate economic growth using this talent, utilize some of the resulting economic surplus to strengthen rural education, and then move toward urban-rural educational equality.

Within urban areas as well, ominous cleavages are evident. There is an enormous difference between life opportunities available for urban youth who enter colleges and universities and those who do not. Urban middle school graduates who are unable to matriculate face the prospect of being sent to the countryside or, at best, securing industrial employment. Consequently, motivation to do well on higher education entrance examinations is high. Nevertheless, because of the limited number of places available, the success rate is low. For instance, it was reported in 1978 that "of the 5.7 million youths who applied for college admission, 278,000 were enrolled."[76] Even more startling, more than 17,000 students applied for a few more than 130 openings at the Central Conservatory of Music.[77] In early July 1979, about 4.7 million young

[74] Parish and Whyte, op.cit., p. 83; also, Lampton, "The Roots of Interprovincial Inequality . . .," loc. cit., fns. 3 and 5, pp. 464 and 468.

A young Chinese student sits for college entrance examinations in Beijing in 1978.

—Eastfoto.

[75] Beijing *Xinhua* Domestic Service, May 11, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 17, 1978, p. E/7.

[76] Ibid., p. E/6.

[77] Beijing *Xinhua* Domestic Service, Jan. 19, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 20, 1978, p. E/16.

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people competing for no more than 300,000 positions took college entrance exams.[78] One can only wonder how youth nurtured on a diet of equality will respond to this stark reality.

Political Implications

Although the trend away from equality in Chinese social policy is unmistakable today, the political consequences of the changes which are being implemented are less certain. After the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, there was a tangible desire to "get back to the business of business" and an audible societal sigh of relief when the post-Mao leadership moved in this direction. However, while few Chinese oppose economic growth, "modernization," and political stability per se, disagreement and conflict can arise (and are arising) over *how* to achieve these objectives, what values should predominate, and which social groups "ought" to pay the immediate costs. If the deprivations are widespread, the benefits few and concentrated, and the progress slow, then Mao's populist belief that economic growth can be achieved *with equality* could provide a rallying point for the discontented.

Two questions, therefore, are of paramount importance for the future. First, what will be the balance between those social sectors which perceive themselves to have been the beneficiaries of present policy and those groups which believe that they have been asked to shoulder an unfair burden, and what politically useful resources do these groups have at their disposal? The preceding analysis suggests that support for present trends ought to be substantial among many politically effective groups (professionals, regular industrial workers, many older cadres, academically successful students, and elements of the peasantry which are making economic strides). On the other hand, peasants in poor areas can expect to see their more fortunate country cousins increase their economic lead, and less well-endowed and more remote provinces may come to see themselves as backwaters in the modernization drive. Also, "the lost generation" of Cultural Revolution students relegated to the countryside is already restive, and workers displaced by the closure of inefficient firms can be expected to be lukewarm (at best) in their support of present policy.[79] On balance, however, the potentially disgruntled groups seem to lack cohesiveness, resources, *and* leadership.

Second, will the post-Mao leadership coalition hold together, composed as it is of both beneficiaries and victims of the Cultural Revolution? There are indications that some members of the elite are timid about moving rapidly away from Mao's legacy along such a broad front. One presumes that if sustained economic expansion occurs and social order is maintained, those leaders dissatisfied with present policies would find it inopportune to argue with success. On the other hand, if the economy fails to respond adequately, or if disgruntled groups begin to create significant social unrest, then the temptation for at least some elite members to mobilize sympathetic sectors of the society would be increased. Certainly, the current economic retrenchment, reported leadership jockeying, bureaucratic lethargy, cadre skepticism, and student disruptions make it imprudent to take leadership or social cohesion for granted in China.

It is perhaps ironic that as China embarks upon its fourth decade of postrevolutionary rule, there still seems to be no widespread agreement as to the revolution's moral purpose. The debate between equality and equity will continue, with concrete circumstances determining at what level and with what means the debate is carried on.

[78] Beijing *Xinhua* Domestic Service, July 10, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 12, 1979, p. L/12; see also *Xinhua* News Agency, *News Bulletin*, No. 11117, June 23, 1979, p. 42.

[79] See, for instance, Beijing *Xinhua* in English, Apr. 17, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 2, 1979, p. L/10.

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Military Modernization in China

by Angus M. Fraser

The turning outward of the People's Republic of China and the vigor of its attack on the "four modernizations" (the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology) have begun to produce significant actions toward military force improvements. Not surprisingly, Beijing has made no public announcement of formal, complete force improvement programs or goals; moreover, there has thus far been more discussion than acquisition. Nevertheless, some movement has taken place. In their talks with foreigners at home and abroad, for example, Chinese leaders have shown a remarkable consistency with regard to the type of military equipment in which they have displayed interest. Beijing has also taken a number of internal steps that relate to the desire for a more modern People's Liberation Army (PLA).[1] While the Maoist canon of "people's war" has not been repudiated, its place in the strategic and tactical outlook of China is being subtly altered through important changes in the structure and functioning of the military establishment.

This article will attempt to demonstrate Beijing's new interest in military modernization in the realms of both weapons systems and policy actions. More significant, it will seek to lay out the elements of the new military posture that China seems to be assuming. This, in turn, will afford insights into not only the future capabilities of the PLA but also the likely role of military force in China's foreign policy in the years ahead.

[1]Throughout this article, the total military organization of China will be referred to as the People's Liberation Army. Individual services will be designated as such where appropriate.

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The Historical Context

To understand the nature of present Chinese concerns with military modernization, it is essential to recognize that the issue is by no means a new one in the annals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As Mao Zedong saw from the very early days, the essence of "people's war" is the commitment of the Chinese people as a whole to doing *all* things necessary to the prosecution of war. "People's war," in the Maoist vision, can involve efforts to obtain better equipment, but it embodies the notion that one cannot always delay action until that equipment is in hand. At times, one must simply fight or quit! "People's war" thus provides a method of maximizing resources and using to good purpose whatever elements of power may be at hand. It envisions dealing with a foe through a mixture of activities running from sabotage or small guerrilla actions to the full-scale management of major campaigns, thereby immersing him in a continuously hostile environment.

In keeping with this conceptual framework, the Chinese Communists during the Civil War years did whatever they could to improve the supply of weapons at their disposal, but in practice their main source of weapons was defecting soldiers and units and equipment captured on the battlefield. For example, the Shanghai uprising of March 22, 1927, led to the acquisition by insurgents of 4,000 rifles and pistols and more than 100 machine guns.[2] Communist sources have claimed that by the end of the Civil War the PLA

[2]*Beijing Review* (Beijing), June 8, 1979.

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

Key figures in the Chinese defense establishment: at the left, Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, member of the Politburo's Standing Committee, Vice Chairman of the Party's Military Commission, and at the time Minister of National Defense, addressing a 1977 Beijing rally celebrating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army; at the right, the current Defense Minister, Xu Xiangqian, pictured in May 1979.

—Camera Press and Eastfoto.

had captured 54,000 artillery pieces, 219,000 light and heavy machine guns, 1,000 tanks and armored cars, 20,000 motor vehicles, and great quantities of other arms and equipment, including 189 aircraft.[3] A good part of the latter haul consisted of weapons that the United States had furnished the Nationalist forces.

This sort of acquistion enabled the Chinese Communists to keep forces operating in the field during the Civil War, but it meant that the leadership had little experience in the design of weapons and the logistics of their production when the CCP came to power in 1949. Furthermore, the Korean war, coming so soon after the Chinese Communists had displaced the Nationalists, denied Beijing the luxury of going back to first principles and building a modern army in keeping with a coherent, long-range defense posture—if, of course, it had any desire to do such a thing in the first place. To be sure, as Samuel Griffith has observed, "the PLA infantry divisions of late 1952 bore little resemblance to their primitive predecessors which crossed the Yalu in October and November, 1950."[4] In addition, the Chinese air force had become the world's third largest, and a formidable air defense system was in place. But the overall force structure of the mid-1950's was one conditioned by the exigencies of the war and by China's dependence upon the Soviet Union as its sole source of military supplies.

It was on this post-Korean war base that Beijing set out to fashion military forces tailored to what it perceived as its longer-range needs. Over subsequent years, however, there was extensive debate about exactly what should be done in this regard. Some individual leaders argued for building weapons *now*, while others favored the development of an adequate industrial base as the first priority. Some pushed for substantial modernization, and others saw the PLA as adequate for its primary function as a domestic force. Indeed, as Harry Harding has shown, Chinese military policy in the remaining years of Mao's life can best be viewed in terms of a shifting balance between the latter two groups.[5]

These disagreements, nonetheless, did not result in

[3] See Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1967, p. 103.

[4] Ibid., p. 178.

[5] Harry Harding, Jr., "The Making of Chinese Military Policy," in William Whitson, Ed., *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1972, pp. 361–65.

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complete inattention to improvement of the military capabilities of the PLA. According to the Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, Chinese military spending remained more or less stable until the late 1960's. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslavakia in 1968 and the fighting between Soviet and Chinese troops on the Ussuri River in March 1969, it rose to a peak in 1971. But it fell substantially in 1972 and thereafter stayed at a plateau roughly equal to the 1969 level for the remainder of Mao's life.[6]

These expenditures went into, among other things, the production of items for the Chinese military inventory. China's indigenous arms industry, based largely on the technology and plants furnished by the USSR before the Sino-Soviet break in the early 1960's but sometimes embodying modest advancements of Chinese origin, turned out destroyers, aircraft, some electronics, and a range of general equipment. However, these systems, though sturdy and reliable, almost universally failed to measure up to systems of Soviet and American manufacture in terms of performance. In addition, the Chinese developed nuclear weapons on their own—of necessity, because Moscow failed to provide the level of support that Beijing had anticipated.

Intensified Commitment

By the mid-1970's, however, signs began to emerge of heightening Chinese concern about the deficiencies in the national defense structure. Speaking at the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, Zhou Enlai defined China's task for the 1980's and beyond as "to accomplish comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology so that our national economy will be marching in the front ranks of the world."[7] This statement, to be sure, did not depart in principle from much that had been said before. Moreover, moving the nation forward from its original "poor and blank" position—to use Mao's formulation—was a task to which all could subscribe. Nevertheless, in combination with such subsequent actions as the conclusion in late 1975 of a deal to purchase Spey airplane engines from Great Britain, Zhou's remarks did suggest increased attention to the shortcomings of the PLA.

This attention intensified after the death of Zhou in January 1976, the death of Mao the following September, and the ensuing power struggle that produced the downfall of the "gang of four" and the ascendance of Hua Guofeng and his associates—most particularly the return of twice-purged Deng Xiaoping. On January 1, 1977, *Peking Review* republished, with some editing, an important 1956 speech by Mao.[8] This marked the beginning of significant movement toward modernization of the PLA. Mao's subject was the "ten major relationships" in socialist revolution and socialist construction. The third of these relationships was that between economic construction and defense construction. On this issue, he argued for a reduction of military and administrative expenditures from 30 to 20 percent of the total budget. Such a policy, he contended, would produce plenty of planes and artillery and probably China's own atomic bomb. Moreover, he described this line as a matter of strategic principle and asserted that it would be followed if there was a really keen desire for the atomic bomb.

Exactly why the leadership chose to republish this particular document at that time is obscure. Certainly, whatever Mao's ultimate position as a military strategist may be, there was a need to invoke his scriptural authority by presenting him as an advocate of military modernization. At the same time, it could be that Beijing was well aware of the staggering costs of modern military hardware and took this means to warn against unrealistic hopes. Or perhaps the Chinese leadership, for all its animosity toward the Soviet Union, favored a military posture that was adequately served by something less than a forced-draft modernization of the PLA.

In any event, republication of the speech signaled a step-up in interest in improvement of the military capabilities of the PLA. During February 1977, Hua Guofeng and other leaders met in Beijing with delegates attending four simultaneous conferences on military affairs—dealing specifically with air defense, machine building (military hardware), science and technology, and research and planning. Mao's precept that defense construction should follow industrial modernization was repeated, as were his pronouncements on reduction of the administrative and defense budget from 30 to 20 percent of the total budget and

[6] See his testimony to a subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, in *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1977*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, Part 3. He gave no actual values, but he indicated that on a basic index of 100 in 1966, the spending level was 190 in 1971 and stood at about 150 from 1972 onward.

[7] See "Report of Work of the Government," in *Peking Review* (Beijing), Jan. 24, 1975.

[8] "On the Ten Major Relationships." The speech was originally made by Mao to an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Apr. 25, 1956.

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on the need for the atomic bomb. Then in March 1977, Hua outlined a plan for a smaller, more streamlined PLA, with more advanced weapons, tougher discipline, and a more centralized line of command.[9] Under the post-"gang of four" leadership, moreover, there was a visible easing of inhibitions about going abroad for assistance and technology.

In April 1977, there were several appeals for improved weapons. Two came from military elements in Guangdong Military Region,[10] the stronghold of Xu Shiyou, then generally reckoned to be one of the most powerful military figures in China and subsequently the commander of Chinese forces that fought in Vietnam in early 1979.

These appeals, plainly, did not meet with universal favor, for a few weeks after they came out, a piece by a member of the Beijing Military Region appeared presenting the case for people's war.[11] By early 1978, there were recurring signs of an attempt to reconcile "people's war" with the nature of modern conflict. An article by the Theoretical Group of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission dealt at some length with the integration of "millet plus rifles" and modernization.[12] The central idea and message may be sensed in this paragraph:

In waging war we have relied and will continue to rely on people's war. However, we must realize that any future war against aggression will be a people's war under modern conditions. The suddenness of an outbreak of modern war, the complexity of coordinating ground, naval and air operations, the extreme flexibility of combat units and the highly centralized, unified, planned and flexible command structure—all these factors make it necessary for our army to have appropriate modern equipment.

Meanwhile, Hua Guofeng's call for the tightening of training and discipline and the reduction of the length of meetings was reflected in, among other things, a change in propaganda role models. For years, the Good Eighth Company in Nanking Road had been praised for its ideological zeal and devoted study of Mao's thought. In 1977, however, a new star arose—the Hard Bone Sixth Company. This unit was lauded for its military skill, including live firing practice, rather than for political virtue.



A 1979 photo of the Hard Bone Sixth Company of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

—Liaison.

In a speech to a PLA rally in June 1977, too, Wei Guoqing, Director of the General Political Department of the PLA and an ally of Deng Xiaoping, rationalized the need to be both red and expert and to master powerful modern weapons.[13] Then on May 2, 1978, at an All-Army Political Conference, he warned, in elaborating on the need for military rectification, discipline, and training, against overemphasis on the political-ideological aspects of people's war.[14]

About the same time, the Military Affairs Commission handed down three important decisions bearing upon military training. The first, issued on April 10, 1978, focused on preparation for a war fought with modern weapons and with high mobility requiring a strict sense of timing and a high level of discipline.

[9] From information available to the author.

[10] Beijing Domestic Service, Apr. 10, 1977, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Apr. 14, 1977; from information available to the author.

[11] From information available to the author.

[12] See Beijing Domestic Service, Jan. 20, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 23, 1978.

[13] From information available to the author.

[14] From information available to the author.

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The second, on April 23, urged the use of the military experience of others. And the third, on May 13, dealt with the content of training programs in light of the previous decrees.[15]

In June 1978, Deng Xiaoping, in a speech to an All-Army Work Conference, urged the PLA to hold aloft Chairman Mao's principles, to "integrate them with reality, analyze and study actual conditions, and solve practical problems," and he described the army's most important task as to "enhance our combat strength. . . under new historical conditions."[16] Xu Xiangqian, Minister of National Defense and another ally of Deng, reinforced Deng's pronouncements at the celebration of the 51st anniversary of the PLA on August 1, 1978, by pointing to the need to adapt the form of people's war to modern conditions.[17]

During the last part of 1978, there seemed to be signs of reduced enthusiasm for military modernization insofar as it competed with the other three types of modernization. Symptomatic was a wall poster seen in Guangzhou in October 1978. A large, rather well-done piece of socialist art showed four figures, each depicting one of the four modernizations. The military program, as represented by a PLA man, occupied fourth place (a change from earlier depictions, in which he was third). Furthermore, the soldier figure was substantially smaller than the others.[18] Confirmation of this implicit message came from US Senator John Glenn, who said that Vice Premier Deng told his delegation that "defense modernization has a lower priority than the other three modernizations."[19] (It should be underscored, however, that these apparent signals of reduced interest came before the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation of early 1979.)

Nonetheless, the general *idea* of modernization of the PLA has endured and received concerted support. Thus, while there may be disagreements about competing military programs and systems priorities, the process of modernization seems likely to go forward at a respectable pace.

The PLA's Current Profile

In seeking to assess what Chinese leaders have in mind with respect to improvement of the PLA's present force structure and what this implies about China's military posture in the years ahead, it is essential to have a clear picture of the PLA's present force structure. Table 1 sets forth a general breakdown. The figures here are derived from *The Military Balance, 1979–1980,* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Estimates published by the IISS in its annual *Military Balance* compilation enjoy widespread recognition for authoritativeness. Although there are other open sources of information on armed forces around the world—e.g., the Jane's series of publications, the US Defense Intelligence Agency's handbooks, and such documents as the Annual Posture Statement of the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff—random checks of these indicated only small, not major, differences.

Table 1. Force Structure of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, 1978–79

Ground forces

115 infantry divisions
11 armored divisions
3 airborne divisions
40 artillery divisions
16 railway and construction divisions
150 independent regiments

Naval forces

68 "Whiskey" and "Romeo" class submarines
2 "Ming" class submarines
1 "Golf" class submarine
1 "Han" class (nuclear-powered) submarine
7 Luta class destroyers (with STYX SSM)
4 Gorky class destroyers (with STYX SSM)
18 frigates
19 patrol escorts

Air forces

90 TU-16 bombers
300 IL-28 bombers
3,700 MiG-17's and MiG-19's (in fighter units)
80 MiG-21's (in fighter units)
Some F-9's (in fighter units)
500 MiG-15's and F-9's (in fighter-bomber service)
350 helicopters (all types)

Nuclear forces

2 CSS-3 (limited-range ICBM, 3,500 miles)
30–40 IRBM
30–40 MRBM

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979–1980,* London, 1979.

[15] See Beijing Domestic Service, Apr. 8 and 23, 1978, and Beijing NCNA Domestic Service in Chinese, May 20, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 10, Apr. 24, and May 22, 1978, respectively.

[16] See Beijing NCNA in English, June 5, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 6, 1978.

[17] Xu Xiangqian "Heighten Our Vigilance and Get Prepared to Fight a War," *Peking Review,* Aug. 11, 1978.

[18] Information available to the author.

[19] *Sino-American Relations—A Trip Report,* Washington, DC, US Senate, January 1979.

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Several aspects of the table require some supplementary comment. As for the ground forces, it should be remembered that aside from the main force units listed, there are regional forces which consist of 85 divisions and 130 independent regiments. The armaments for all the main forces include some 10,000 tanks and 3,500 armored personnel carriers. The tanks are either old Soviet models or Chinese modifications of them, while the armored personnel carriers are home-designed and appear similar to the American M-113. Artillery weapons number some 18,000 of all types, from 122 mm to 152 mm. There are 20,000 mortars, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft guns. China has apparently not yet fielded anti-tank weapons of the latest types, and the best weapon in the service is the RPG/7, a Soviet-type launcher.

With regard to the navy, there are in addition to the main fleet units a sizable number of missile-firing gunboats and conventional types of gunboats, including more than 120 hydrofoil patrol craft. The amphibious forces are equipped largely with old US types of vessels and are usually discounted by Western commentators. It is interesting, however, that the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff has recently recognized some capability. He says that the Chinese navy "has a sufficient number of conventional amphibious vessels to lift a force of over 30,000 men and equipment in a regional (less than 30 hours transit) amphibious assault."[20] The navy operates about 700 aircraft in 4 bomber and 5 fighter divisions. There are also reconnaissance, search and rescue, and transport units. The fighter units are integrated into the overall national system in time of war.

In the air force, there are probably enough transport aircraft to land and support, with some assistance from the growing civil air fleet, a division-size airborne operation at light scales. The national air defense system consists of some 4,000 aircraft, 10,000 anti-aircraft guns, and about 100 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles—all included within the general PLA structure but assigned this particular role.

As for the nuclear forces, there appears to be a limited-range weapon (CSS-3) in place that reaches perhaps 3,500 miles, and the advent of a full-range ICBM is promised for the near future. Although there had been predictions of the latter's arrival as early as the mid-1970's, there has not yet been a test firing.

One additional point should be mentioned. Egypt has recently provided China with small numbers of modern Soviet equipment. These include MiG-23 aircraft, T-62 tanks, and late-model surface-to-air and anti-tank weapons.[21]

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[20] General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman, JCS, *United States Military Posture for FY 1980—An Overview*, Washington, DC, prepared by the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.d., p. 60.

[21] *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Jan. 19, 1978.

A T-59 tank of China's 6th Armored Division, photographed in February 1979.

—Liaison.

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The military establishment just described is numerically the world's largest. It has some 4,325,000 men, of whom 84 percent are ground troops. However, while there has been some selective modernization, it is not incorrect to say that the common characteristic of all PLA formations is some significant level of obsolescence.

This should not, it must be hastily underscored, lead to any easy conclusion about the effectiveness of the PLA in the functions assigned to it. It is obvious that to date China's use of its military power has been successful in carefully controlled undertakings. Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership is aware of the PLA's weaknesses and problems. As General George Brown, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in his military posture report for FY 1979, China since the mid-1960's had been engaged in a broad-based effort to expand and modify military research and development as well as production facilities, and despite the shortage of trained manpower, there had been growth. In particular, he cited advances in army matériel and aerospace.[22] A year later, his successor summed up the situation thus:

The impressive size of the PLA attests China's recognition that, for the time being, perceived threats must be deterred by numbers rather than by superior quality. The PRC leadership is determined to modernize and increase the professionalism of the PLA. However, in light of technological deficiencies, these qualitative improvements can be accomplished only slowly.[23]

Immediate Concerns and Goals

Beijing, of course, has not announced publicly its near-term goals with respect to military modernization, but there is evidence that permits us to draw some inferences about them. One body of data has to do with Chinese expressions of interest in, and perhaps plans to buy, specific weapons, equipment, and technology. These expressions of interest have been extensively reported. Table 2 shows the principal types of weapons, equipment, and technology in which the Chinese have indicated an interest since January 1977. They are ranked in terms of the frequency with which they appeared in 85 reports that the author compiled from 23 separate press and journal sources, plus three discussions with recent military visitors to China. A number of references clearly relate to the same item (most notably, the Harrier VSTOL aircraft), but this sort of reinforcement is testimony to the genuineness of the Chinese interest. While the sample is not massive, it is of significant size, and since it is culled from a wide range of sources, it probably reflects Chinese priorities in at least approximate terms.

Table 2. Types of Weapons, Equipment, and Technology in which China Has Expressed Interest Since January 1, 1977

Type	Percent of sample
Whole aircraft (26) and spares	34.1
Anti-tank weapons	17.6
Shelter, nuclear attack	9.5
Anti-submarine warfare gear	7.1
Computers with military applications	5.9
Reconnaissance and communications satellites	5.9
Anti-aircraft weapons	4.7
Tanks and armored personnel carriers	4.7
Nuclear weapons and missiles	3.6
Naval engines	2.3
Submarines	1.2
Equipment for ships of over 10,000 tons	1.2
Laser applications	1.2
Bridging equipment	1.2
	100.1[a]

[a] Discrepancy due to rounding.

SOURCES: 85 press reports from 23 separate press and journal sources and 3 discussions with recent military visitors to China.

This list has an impressive logic of its own. More than half of the items look directly to defense against an invader. Interest in aircraft did not include any apparent interest in long-range bomb-delivering systems. The single item most frequently mentioned was the Harrier AV-8—an aircraft capable of vertical and short takeoffs and landings. Although difficult to maintain, this highly sophisticated machine can operate from primitive forward airfields. Other items on the list indicate recognition of a need for significant improvement in tactical defense: anti-submarine warfare and anti-aircraft systems, anti-tank performance against large armored formations, and improvement of battlefield mobility by new forms of transport.

Some of the desired items such as satellites, naval engines, and laser applications have legitimate—perhaps major—civilian application. However, these things can clearly perform important military tasks. By the same token, the 700 trucks that the Chinese have bought from Ford for oil-field use have high battlefield utility by virtue of the characteristics required in basic missions.

[22] General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman, JCS, *United States Military Posture for FY 1979*, Washington, DC, prepared Jan. 20, 1978.

[23] Jones, op. cit.

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

The British Harrier, a versatile VSTOL (vertical and short take-off and landing) aircraft, in which the Chinese have recently shown considerable interest.

—Keystone.

With respect to nuclear missiles and warheads, inquiries have been low-key and easily attributable to a professional desire to exchange scientific information in such areas as advanced physics. There definitely has not been any indication of a vigorous search for help in the production of nuclear weapons.

It should be emphasized that what is *not* on the list may be as significant as what is. To be sure, one cannot say with certainty that China is genuinely uninterested in these systems or activities. It could, for example, be quietly pursuing independent programs in such areas. Much less likely is the possibility that Beijing is seeking undercover arrangements with arms suppliers, for the risks to the supplier from either of the superpowers would be great indeed if evidence of secret activity surfaced—as inevitably it would. Nonetheless, it is a fair presumption that the Chinese do not have a primary interest in at least most of the things missing from the list.

Aside from the kinds of weapons, equipment, and technology in which the Chinese have displayed an interest, there are a number of visible secondary and supporting activities and expressions of policy on Beijing's part that afford insight into the immediate concerns and goals of China's military modernization efforts. These fall under several headings:

Passive air defense. In a speech to the Third National People's Air Defense Conference on November 1, 1978, CCP Vice Chairman Ye Jianying stressed the Soviet Union's continuing scheme to subjugate China and the need for concentration on preparedness and air defense, invoking the authority of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to bolster his argument. While he made some references to modernization, he clearly indicated that the digging of tunnels was the principal task of the people.[24]

The "dig tunnels deep" injunction is being heeded, and systems are reported in Dairen, Nei Monggol, Nanjing, Hohhot, Hangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. Two American visitors with excellent military and journalistic credentials have toured one kilomenter of the Beijing system. Although they caution that this was a very small sample, their impressions are nevertheless enlightening.[25] The system was built on three levels, but the visitors were not shown the lowest one, where command and control would probably reside. Briefings and replies to questions established that the system was designed to resist tactical, rather than strategic, nuclear weapons. The system was said to be tied into the subway tunnels and to provide for the evacuation of the elderly and children to the city's perimeter. While the effort to construct effective systems was plainly sincere, there were some obvious deficiencies: air-tight doors without the special wrenches nearby needed to seal them; paint (apparently only for

[24] Ye Jianying, "People's Air Defense," *Peking Review*, Nov. 17, 1978.

[25] Interview with Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.), and Nancy Gordon Heinl, Nov. 23, 1978.

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appearance) on the door gaskets; no forced-air ventilation system working; no blast mountings on vital machinery. A guide indicated that it would take 30 days to stock the system for prolonged occupancy. He also said that people could be cleared from the streets into the shelters in six minutes, but he admitted that no drills had been held for several years. The two observers in general got the impression of a beginning effort still in need of much more work. In addition, they were told that rock and soil problems had been encountered and that water table conditions had been troublesome in other places.

Other passive measures of air defense upon which the Chinese have been working include a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System and a radar network. To date, the former covers about 90 percent of the approach arc available to the Soviet Union. The latter needs both expansion and modernization.

Military training. As has been noted in preceding accounts of official statements, training has obviously been a serious matter to the new Chinese leadership. The basic toughness and skill of the Chinese soldier have made individual training a straightforward undertaking, but large-unit operations have been a somewhat different matter. In regard to the general quality of large-unit activity, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff recently stated:

In August 1977 the PRC forces conducted a joint service exercise opposite Taiwan. During the exercise, attack aircraft were reported bombing and strafing in support of parachute assaults, with the entire force protected by interceptors. Although the exercise was elementary by U.S. standards, it did show increased sophistication in the use of tactical air power in the PRC.[26]

Deployment. Troop deployments suggest immediate concerns and intentions rather than the implementation of long-term plans on the part of the Chinese. For example, the press reported in early 1979 that China was reinforcing its troops on its borders with both Vietnam and the USSR.[27] This reinforcement was not surprising in light of the other signs pointing to a Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which took place a few days later. Over recent years, the PLA has shown a consistent posture in the north. According to an authoritative Japanese publication, Chinese deployments

[26] Jones, op. cit.
[27] See, for instance, *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 2, 1979.

Chinese forces from Yunnan launch rockets toward Vietnamese positions in March 1979.

—Eastfoto.

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facing the Soviet Union stayed at one and a half million men in some 75 divisions during 1977 and 1978.[28]

Vietnam as a learning experience. "Experts" in Hong Kong have reportedly contended that it would take a decade of work for the PLA to apply the lessons in terms of the weapons and combat techniques needed to cope with the Soviet Union learned in a month of battle on the hills of Vietnam in early 1979.[29] Visitors to the front heard what was thought to be the sound of the Soviet "Sagger" wire-guided anti-tank missile, which would give a small foretaste of a modern battlefield. Some analysts also cited the poor coordination of PLA divisions as compared to that of formations in the Soviet army.

It is true that the PLA is in general armed with weapons of early 1960's design, while Hanoi's troops enjoy the use of newer matériel, either left behind by the United States or recently supplied by Moscow. However, the actual effect of this state of affairs on the course of events is not absolutely clear-cut. Nor is it entirely apparent what, if any, "lesson" Beijing had in mind to "teach" Hanoi that it failed to convey—thereby causing Chinese leaders to reassess China's military capabilities.

Apropos of these points, one should note a number of considerations: (1) While the Chinese evidently took substantial casualties, the Vietnamese seem to have taken even more. According to French officials visiting China, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiuchuan stated that the Chinese had suffered 20,000 casualties, while the Vietnamese had suffered 50,000.[30] As history suggests, Beijing appears to be willing to pay a high price when the occasion demands. (2) The nature of the actual fighting—classic toe-to-toe ground fighting in rugged and restricted terrain—left little room for subtlety. Moreover, objectives were seemingly limited, and no breakthroughs or deep penetrations were planned. (3) The space involved and the time span of the fighting were not great enough to test the logistics or mobility of the PLA. (4) While some tanks were present, they were employed as assault support weapons and not in far-ranging mass operations. (5) Apparently neither side used close air support as a major element in combat. (6) There is some evidence that Hanoi *did* indeed move troops from southern reserve areas and from Kampuchea. (7) In the strategic sense, China demonstrated a willingness to engage in limited combat with a client and ally of the USSR.

Although the PLA may well have discovered some weaknesses in its forces and found itself in situations where more modern equipment would have been highly welcome, then, the comparative circumstances of the two countries did not deter the Chinese from vigorous action. Thus, there does not seem to be any massive aspect of this experience that would significantly alter the force modernization pattern that has been emerging in the late 1970's.

Nuclear weapons and satellite tests. It does not appear that force improvement plans and programs have resulted in a significant acceleration of the production of nuclear weapons or satellites, although the mechanics of production are such that not enough time may have elapsed to discern changes in progress. Since October 16, 1964, China has tested some 25 nuclear devices of various types. Four of these tests have come since January 1, 1977. Since launching their first satellite on April 24, 1970, the Chinese have sent a total of eight aloft, with the last launching that has taken place occurring in January 1978. These vehicles have included weather, reconnaissance, and scientific models. It should be noted that Chinese interest in satellites for both civilian and military use will likely increase as a natural product of broad-front modernization.

Arms control and disarmament. On May 15, 1979, Lai Yali, the Chinese representative at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, offered a comprehensive program that would require the superpowers to make heavy reductions in both conventional and nuclear weapons, after which others would join in a general further reduction. He also called for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, prohibition of all new weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of zones of peace, to include the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. In laying out these proposals, Lai condemned the United States and the USSR for starting a new round in the arms race and clearly identified China as a spokesman for "the people of the world."[31] The thrust of this speech and the nature of the programs put forward tend to suggest that Beijing foresees no real movement toward disarmament.

Arms traffic. Although Chinese imports and exports of arms both rose modestly in the mid-1970's as com-

[28] See the 1977 and 1978 editions of Japanese Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, Tokyo. The deployment of air and nuclear forces is not treated in either document, however.

[29] *The Washington Post*, Mar. 12, 1979.

[30] See ibid., May 4, 1979.

[31] Reprinted in *Beijing Review*, June 1, 1979.

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pared with earlier years, imports exceeded exports. In 1976, the former amounted to US$118 million dollars (in current prices), while the latter totaled US$112 million. By way of comparison, the figures for the USSR were US$241 million and US$3,747 million respectively.[32]

For a long time, China has maintained a modest military assistance effort. Help has been extended to a variety of revolutionary groups, but the comparative cost has not been high. Military assistance of a more significant size has gone to such clients as Tanzania and Pakistan. Even in some of these cases, however, China has ultimately found itself "priced out of the market" by other donors. It should be noted, however, that China has recently become a party to a weapons arrangement that could alter this situation, although the new management in Beijing has not announced any massive changes in policy. In June 1979, nevertheless, President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt announced that China would supply weapons to Egypt. (As early as 1976, it will be recalled, Egypt had furnished samples of Soviet equipment to Beijing.) Some Western observers in Cairo believe that under this program Egypt may receive as many as 60 MiG-19's.[33]

Assessing the Effort

In attempting to evaluate what the force modernization program that emerges from this evidence means in qualitative terms, it is useful to employ the program budget mechanism used in the US defense planning process as a tool. Adopting such a tool, it should be stressed, in no way implies that the Chinese follow a similar approach in looking at their armed forces. Rather, the mechanism is a convenient analytical device for organizing and examining the data.

During the 1960's, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara introduced a program budget format designed to provide him with a view of defense programs that transcended the customary service lines, and that format remains in use.[34] The basic document lists major missions and programs and five-year funding. This document is supported by a "summary of active military personnel," which shows service strengths and distribution of personnel to the major military programs.

By distributing the Chinese forces and armaments in being in this fashion and then superimposing the preceding catalogue of current interests in weapons and programs on them, we can arrive at a fairly clear qualitative picture of the PLA's current and projected shape. For our specific functional categories, we will rely on those listed by Richard Burt in his discussion of the American defense budgeting process.[35] These include:

Major mission forces: strategic forces, general purpose forces, land forces, tactical air forces, naval forces, and mobility forces.

Other missions: intelligence and security, communications, research and development, and support of other nations.

General support: base and individual support, training, command, and logistics.

Table 3 provides a rough breakdown of existing major PLA forces in terms of these categories. A number of features emerge plainly from this table. First, the PLA is infantry-heavy but lacks the means for tactical and strategic mobility that characterize modern armies. It might be noted, parenthetically, that the national railway system, the growing truck fleet and road system, and the foot-mobility of the Chinese soldier would offset some disadvantages under particular conditions. However, the PLA cannot approach the helicopter, airborne, or mechanized capabilities of the superpowers.

Both air force and navy are strongly oriented to close-in defense. Air defense and fighter-bomber aircraft in hand do not appear to have extended range and endurance qualities. The TU-16 and IL-28 bombers that can be used for the delivery of nuclear weapons in the region do not have the speed that would be necessary to survive the trip to target if opposed by a modern and alert air defense. Although the destroyers and patrol craft that the naval forces possess and are still turning out have high value in close-in work, they are of little worth in extended operations at sea. The continued production of relatively obsolescent submarines is something of a mystery, and progress in more modern boats is deliberate.

While the nuclear weapons inventory now in hand may be rationalized in a number of ways, in terms of

[32] US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-1976,* Washington, DC, July 1978.

[33] *The Washington Post,* June 6, 1979.

[34] See "National Need: Defense, Military," in the *U.S. Budget for Fiscal Year 1980,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979.

[35] Richard Burt, *Defence Budgeting: The British and American Cases* (Adelphi Paper, No. 112), London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Winter 1974-75.

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Table 3. Distribution of PLA Forces Into Program Budget Categories

MAJOR MISSION FORCES

Nuclear war

2 CSS-3 (limited-range ICBM, 3,500 miles)
30–40 IRBM
30–40 MRBM
90 TU-16 bomber aircraft
1–2 submarines (questionable)
Urban tunnel systems
Electronic warning systems (obsolescent)

Conventional war

Ground forces

129 combat divisions (including 11 armored and 3 airborne)
150 independent regiments
56 support divisions—artillery, engineer, etc.
Sizable regional forces

Air forces

4,000+ jet aircraft—dedicated to air defense and ground support
300 light bombers
350 helicopters
AA artillery, surface-to-air missile units, warning network

Naval forces

68 submarines—snorkel, diesel-powered
4 advanced submarines (including 1 nuclear-powered)
11 destroyers with surface-to-surface missiles
14 frigates
19 patrol escorts
Large numbers of patrol craft, many well-suited to close-in and coastal operations
Amphibious elements of the navy, composed largely of superannuated vessels of World War II vintage

Mobility forces

Airlift for 1 division at light scales
Amphibious lift for short-range lift of 30,000 men
Trucks and APC in modest supply
Improving but still modest railroad and road transport systems

OTHER MISSIONS

Generally speaking, there is little basis for lodging intelligence and security, communications, research and development, and support for other nations in any exclusive category of use. The efforts and capabilities in these areas suggest broad programs that seek modernization of all relevant functions.

GENERAL SUPPORT

Activities in the specified areas—base and individual support, training, command and logistics—reflect some shift in policy toward professionalism in the PLA, but the underlying goal of force modernization appears to activate efforts across a very broad front. Visible activity would seem to suggest attempts to improve defensive capabilities.

pure numbers it generally resembles the nuclear force of France. In no way can it be compared physically with the forces of either the United States or the USSR.[36] There is little open evidence of great fear, as manifested in expanded production or in the development of such specialized weapons as the anti-ballistic missile.

These features of the PLA suggest that China's armed forces have been designed for defense of the homeland, with limited excursions over the borders a necessarily included capability. The underlying strategic aim has evidently been to raise the threshold of military effort required of a would-be opponent to a forbidding level by preparing to fight a war of attrition and constant action to the maximum extent. China's modest nuclear force can enter into the strategy only as a retaliatory tool since first use of nuclear weapons by Beijing would invite a devastating response.

How would the new equipment and technology in which the Chinese have shown an interest affect this state of affairs? Does their nature, in short, indicate a basic desire to improve war-fighting capabilities now in hand or an attempt to endow the PLA with new capabilities?

When one adds the matériel listed in Table 2 to the functional breakdown in Table 3, one is struck by two things. First, the apparent force improvement program of the PRC indicates a recognition of the need to engage modern ground forces and air attacks with weapons better than those which the PLA now has. Second, a number of the elements of the seeming program relate to broad considerations of science and technology rather than to straightforward military procurement.

Significant signs of the new Chinese attitudes cropped up during the recent visit of a high-ranking American group to aerospace installations in China.[37] Although the US government forbade any discussion of military matters and the visitors did not see some things, the 10-day trip was nevertheless most revealing. Nineteen facilities were toured, including a booster assembly facility, a rocket engine test facility, a rocket engine production plant, a satellite control facility, and the Aerodynamics Research Institute. The group even saw a long-range rocket constructed for

[36] The SALT II treaty, for example, permits both the US and the USSR to have 2,250 strategic missiles of all kinds. See *Christian Science Monitor*, June 19, 1979. Moreover, this figure does not take into account the thousands of tactical weapons not covered by the treaty.

[37] For an account of this visit, see Craig Covalt, "U.S. Team Tours China Space Facilities," *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (Washington, DC), June 25, 1979.

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

Elements of China's naval defenses: at the left, a 1979 firing of a ship-to-ship missile from a naval unit; at the right, a submarine photographed in 1971.

—Eastfoto and EUPRA.

satellite launch. According to a subsequent account of the visit, "virtually all aspects of Chinese space technology were displayed."[38] Team members said that they found the Chinese to possess all the basic elements for a vigorous space program. The group was impressed, too, by the almost total absence of hardware made outside China. The digital computers and solid-state electronic equipment that they saw were of Chinese design and manufacture.

Even though the group was forbidden to have discussions of military matters, the military applications of much of what the group looked at would permit the conclusion that China, while probably behind the superpowers in many areas, is prosecuting programs in the military realm with intelligence and vigor. Satellite communications, equipment for space vehicle launchings, and medical laser uses, in particular, are among the activities that suggest very strongly Beijing's awareness of China's need to catch up. This judgment is reinforced by the fact that high-ranking Chinese telecommunications officials have visited the United States recently to try to work out arrangements for acquiring satellite communications systems.

Paying the Bills

There remains one further issue to be dealt with—the financial constraints on any Chinese military modernization program. In June 1977, the Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency reported an intelligence estimate that China's defense expenditures amounted to 8–10 percent of gross national product (GNP).[39] Dr. Arthur Ashbrook, in a recent publication of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, calculated China's GNP for 1976 to be US$342 billion.[40] Subsequently, Dr. Ashbrook has revised his calculations and gives a GNP of US$444 billion and a population of 1,002 million for China in 1978. If one uses the 8–10 percent budget allocation suggested by the CIA Director, the revised estimates would mean a defense budget of between US$35.5 and 44.4 billion, in 1978 dollars. By way of comparison, the budget authorization for US military spending in 1978 was US$115.3 billion.[41]

It should be noted that Beijing has recently produced somewhat different figures. At the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress in June 1979, Minister of Finance Zhang Jingfu announced a national budget for 1979 of US$71.8 billion, with US$13 billion going into military expenditures.[42] Thus, military outlays would constitute something over 18 percent of the budget, and if Ashbrook's estimate for GNP in 1978 in reasonably close to the mark, such outlays would represent only about 3 percent of China's GNP.

There are problems, however, in working with

[38] Ibid.

[39] *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1977.*

[40] *Chinese Economy Post-Mao,* Vol. 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 208 and Appendix A.

[41] Conversation with Dr. Ashbrook, Nov. 3, 1979.

[42] John Sharkey, *The Washington Post,* June 30, 1979.

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Chinese numbers. First, one confronts the issue of simple accuracy. China has not published official statistical data for military expenditures, and there are few base points to which an outsider can refer. No line item breakdown of the Chinese defense budget has appeared; hence, program costs cannot be determined. Consequently, it cannot be said whether the announced figure includes such things as the nuclear program. Second, there is no indication of the pricing techniques in use in Beijing and therefore no solid basis for comparing costs. It is important to remember in this regard that personnel costs, some 50 percent of the US military budget, are much less in China; thus, more money is available for other activities. For all these reasons, then, the US$35.5–44.4 billion range for the military budget seems a plausible estimate for our purposes.

In any event, it is clear that the funds that the Chinese can channel into a military modernization effort are distinctly limited. Moreover, Beijing cannot circumvent the growing cost of military items. The United States, for example, has entered the era of the $1.5 billion capital ship, the $25 million aircraft, and the $1 million tank. New technologies and new applications of existing ones move costs upward. Under such circumstances, $13 billion or $40 billion, no matter how well husbanded, will not provide the broad-front modernization that military leaders would tend to desire.

To some small extent, it is true, the Chinese can manage to keep the costs of the modernization program down by encouraging international competition for their arms trade, and they have already displayed an awareness of this consideration. PLA officials have had serious discussions about modern weapons systems with the French, the Swedes, the West Germans, the Italians, and the British. To date, France has been perhaps the most important outside supplier. It has furnished a number of helicopters, and it has signed a contract for US$700 million worth of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. In addition, Paris has arranged to sell Beijing two nuclear reactors. Promoting international competition in this fashion, however, will by no means eliminate all the difficulties that the Chinese face.

This is particularly true in light of the magnitude of the task of refitting the PLA overall. Such an undertaking will require heavy commitments of not only money but also men and plant. Problems of pace and priority, the maintenance of combat readiness in transition units, and competition with civilian enterprises for support will also be troublesome. Not only must programs include tables of equipment packages for designated units; they must likewise take into account the need to produce, maintain, and furnish on call matériel required to keep the pipeline filled with replacement items. In this connection, some figures from the 1973 round of Arab-Israeli combat provide a measure of insight into the costs of modern combat that the Chinese will have to anticipate. During the 19 days of battle, 16 engagements in the Sinai, involving brigade- and division-size units, produced a net loss of 304 tanks by the Israeli forces and 799 by the Arabs. Fighter aircraft losses were 103 and 390 respectively.[43]

Western analysts generally agree that the initial Chinese enthusiasm for the four modernizations was somewhat euphoric, reflecting a failure to examine hard economic realities carefully. The experience of making procurement and financing plans for so large a venture, however, has resulted in selective reduction of the size and number of new enterprises and arrangements for foreign involvement in the Chinese economy. In light of Vice Premier Deng's remark to Senator Glenn about military modernization having a lower priority than the other three kinds, the PLA must probably look forward to having to absorb a large share of the cutbacks in expectations.

The condition thus generated has been well described in a recent study:

The defense budget cannot be regarded as a significant source of transferable funds. Cuts in defense spending in the early 1970's (with no evidence of substantially larger expenditures since) and the real need for a costly program to modernize conventional forces have probably been cited in arguments for an increase in military budgets. However, in the debate last year [1977] on military spending the regime argued that a strong defense requires a modern industrial base. The debate apparently ended with a consensus (1) to hold the military spending at a level which allows for the most essential aspects of defense modernization and (2) to make underutilized resources controlled by the military partially available for civilian industry. The impression is that much of the resources which are transferable to civilian use has already been—or soon will be—tapped, lessening the possibility for significant resource transfer during 1981–1985.[44]

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[43] "Assessment of Arab and Israeli Combat Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973 Wars," an unpublished study made by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (Dunn Loring, VA), June 1977, Part One.

[44] National Foreign Assessment Center, US Central Intelligence Agency, *China: In Pursuit of Economic Modernization*, Washington, DC, December 1978.

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The Chinese Finance Minister's justification for a modest defense budget increase in 1979 tends to reinforce this general assessment. He spoke of the cost of the "limited counterattack in self-defense" against Vietnam in February and March 1979 and of the need to strengthen border defense.[45]

Prospects and Implications

Recognizing the impediments that China must overcome to carry out military modernization in the years immediately ahead, let us, in conclusion, assume that substantial modernization takes place over the next five to seven years along the lines suggested by this examination. What would the PLA look like? Or, to use an ancient military cliché that describes what a fighting force should do, what improvements will it have made in its ability to "shoot, move, and communicate"?

The systems and technologies that seem to have attracted the most Chinese interest would enhance existing PLA capabilities for vigorous and aggressive defense against massive intrusion into China's territory. By their very nature, these capabilities would also increase Chinese capacities to operate at modest distances beyond China's borders. Unless new programs not now visible are undertaken, however, the ability to to conduct airborne and amphibious ventures would remain limited.

These capabilities will have an obvious and continuing deterrent function. Every improvement—conventional or nuclear—of the PLA raises the price of an attack on China and thus the threshold of provocation. As Beijing is in all likelihood aware, of course, the effectiveness of deterrence is measured by Soviet perceptions rather than the Chinese arsenal, and Chinese activities toward force improvement must be alarming to Moscow. At the same time, the generally defensive stance of the PLA mitigates some of the concern, although the recent Chinese undertaking in Vietnam was a dangerous test of the USSR's level of tolerance. Since similar activities in the future cannot be entirely ruled out, Chinese adventurism might conceivably undermine the deterrent impact of improved capabilities.

Nonetheless, it can still be safely asserted that satisfactory completion of current programs will leave the PLA better prepared, in terms of firepower and mobility, to conduct a defense in depth of the Chinese homeland. Such preparation would include development of some capabilities to defend against tactical nuclear weapons but not to mount an offensive nuclear attack. There is little evidence of a PLA program to build offensive weapons. Indeed, the rate of progress so far in the nuclear strategic realm suggests continuation of effort along established lines.

Evaluating the significance of such force improvements is complicated by the possibility of shortfalls and failures in the attempt at modernization. The PLA's posture today represents a series of choices forced on the leadership by a complex set of circum-

[45] *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1979.

Chinese jet fighters on a runway in Inner Mongolia.

—Vincent Mentzel.

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stances. One of these is poverty. Furthermore, the enormous cost of modernizing a major portion of the PLA has already been noted, and the evidence suggests that the leadership in Beijing will tend to give lower priority to the financing of military programs than to the financing of civilian ones. Thus, Beijing faces some very trying allocation problems with respect to men, money, plant, and raw materials. This is especially true for two reasons. First, the acquisition of large numbers of military items with foreign currencies would intrude seriously on other types of modernization. Second, agreements for Chinese manufacture under license (as in the Spey engine deal) are not likely to become too frequent.

On balance, the physical conditions of the Chinese economy and industrial system render it probable that some of the goals of force improvement will not be achieved for a fairly long time. Recognizing this possibility, Beijing has made what appear to be reasonable choices. It seems to have emphasized improvement of basic conventional defenses—fighter defense aircraft and associated equipment, anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, and naval patrol craft. With regard to its nuclear program, it has evidently steered a careful course between lack of any deterrent on one hand and provocative growth on the other—at least for the time being. In keeping with its pursuit of general growth, China has displayed a high interest in science and technology and in research and development. While the possible military uses for the products of this interest may or may not have been of primary concern, the desire for improvement in national conditions has in any case been sufficiently strong to drive the effort.

Nevertheless, China must face the cruel truth that while it is moving forward, so are the superpowers. In many cases in the past, it is true, the Chinese have been the beneficiaries of lateral entry into systems development. For instance, much of the essential preliminary work on making nuclear weapons was in the public domain when Mao first ordered Chinese development of such weapons. Although this phenomenon may recur to some degree in the future, the benefits are not likely to be so great. Meantime, even as the PLA seeks, for example, current anti-tank weapons, the Soviet Union is beginning to deploy a tank designed to defeat such systems. The Chinese must run very fast to stay in the same place.

One final point should be recorded with regard to the implications of the Chinese program of military modernization. The military posture being sought by Beijing does not menace the Western powers directly. Nothing in the Chinese weapons array at present can significantly affect their homelands, and while the appearance of a Chinese ICBM would alter the situation somewhat, it is quite unlikely that the Chinese will possess anything beyond a very modest deterrent in the foreseeable future. Should China and the USSR compose their differences sufficiently to restore close mutual cooperation, of course, the addition of China's forces to the Asian order of battle on the Soviet side would be quite disturbing, but most observers tend to discount such a contingency.

The PLA's modernization, however, could conceivably have an impact on China's Asian neighbors. Taiwan and South Korea, for example, might seek strengthened military assurances from the United States or some other source. Japan, although likely to be much more confident of its ability to deal with China politically, might nevertheless reassess the adequacy of its Self-Defense Force. The continental nations of Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam, would probably evince heightened apprehension. Although the Southeast Asian nations separated from the mainland by water barriers have less to fear from the force structure depicted here than do their continental counterparts, they too might react negatively to the prospect of a China better prepared to conduct aggressive military action in pursuit of its Asian goals. Whether any of these possible developments actually materialize, though, may depend at least as much on the evolving Asian context as upon what happens in China itself.

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Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations

by Harry Gelman

Three years after the death of Mao Zedong, the Sino-Soviet conflict has entered a period of transition and a time of testing. Against a background of profound changes in China and even more dramatic recent transformation of the international environment in which the two leading Communist powers contend, a symbolic milestone was reached in the spring of 1979, when the Chinese announced their intention to abrogate the long-dormant 1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty and simultaneously proposed talks with the Soviets about the fundamental issues of the Sino-Soviet relationship. These talks, which began in September 1979, provide a concrete test of the geopolitical momentum the conflict has acquired after two decades. In the absence of the dominant personalities who gave the conflict its initial impetus—Mao and Nikita Khrushchev—how far are the competitors constrained by a mutual perception of fundamentally irreconcilable national interests? How far can either side carry an effort to reduce tensions without in fact injuring what it regards as a vital national interest? How far does each side now mean to try?

The Duality of Soviet Purpose

As the Brezhnev era nears a close, Soviet policy toward China continues to be characterized by a striking dichotomy of purpose, an internal contradiction of aims inherited from the Khrushchev era. On the one hand, the Soviets would like to do everything possible to weaken, subdue, or isolate the Chinese; on the other hand, they would like to reduce Chinese hostility. For the better part of two decades, the Soviets, while maintaining growing pressure against Chinese external interests in an incessant struggle around the world and close to home, have been the *demandeurs* in repeated attempts to get the Chinese to respond to proposals to improve diverse aspects of bilateral relations. In effect, the Soviets have sought to persuade Beijing to agree to divorce the bilateral relationship from all other considerations, including all the adverse effects on China of Soviet behavior elsewhere.

Over the years, the Soviets have regularly professed bewilderment and sadness that the proposals of this sort which they have intermittently sandwiched among their periodic endeavors to intimidate the Chinese leadership have been considered unacceptable. It will be recalled, for example, that in October 1962, as the Cuban missile crisis developed, Khrushchev vainly asked the Chinese ambassador to open a "clean new page," to return to the relationship "that existed up to 1958."[1] The following year, in November 1963, Khrushchev sent a letter to Mao proposing, among other things, to resume Soviet technical assistance to China—and, in particular, to send back Soviet experts to help in the oil and mining industries.[2] He reminded the Chinese of his desire that they reopen negotiations to buy entire Soviet plants. And he proposed that new

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[1] "Marxism-Leninism, the Basis of the Unity of the Communist Movement," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 15, October 1963.

[2] See this Soviet letter, the Chinese reply of Feb. 29, 1964, and the Soviet response of Mar. 7, 1964, in *Seven Letters Exchanged Between the Central Committees of the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (hereafter *Seven Letters . . .*), Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1964, p 30.

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

The first plenary meeting of the government delegations of the USSR and the PRC on October 17, 1979, in Moscow. Leading the respective teams are Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid F. Il'ichëv, third from the left, and Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yuping, third from the right.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Sino-Soviet commercial and other ties be woven into the five-year plans of the two countries. No part of this program, the Soviets complained, was accepted.

In November 1964, soon after Khrushchev had been ousted, his successors held talks with Zhou Enlai in Moscow and among other things made what the Soviets have subsequently termed "concrete proposals" for expansion of trade and technological cooperation. These were coupled, however, with what the Soviets apparently regarded as modest proposals for "coordinating the foreign policy activities of the PRC [People's Republic of China] and the USSR." The Soviets professed to be surprised and grieved that these met with "obstinate resistance from the Chinese leaders."[3]

Finally, eight years later, in 1972, Moscow, according to Soviet claims, advanced through a variety of channels a new series of "concrete proposals" including, among others, renewed suggestions for the resumption of complete-plant deliveries, the signing of a long-term trade agreement, and the organization of cooperation between Soviet and Chinese academies of sciences. These proposals, too, were allegedly "frozen or rejected by Beijing on various pretexts."[4]

The dual Soviet approach toward China—the unrelenting competitive pressure and the unabashed effort to improve selected aspects of bilateral dealings—has in fact been characteristic of Soviet policy toward a number of other powers, and in these cases such a policy has met with some success. Consequently, although Soviet tactics toward Beijing may vary considerably from time to time, neither element in the Soviet posture is likely to be abandoned by either Leonid Brezhnev or his heirs. It is therefore worth asking what the specific impediments have been to a positive Chinese response to Soviet overtures in the past, and whether the Chinese attitude is now likely to change as China moves further away from the Maoist era.

The Three Chinese Walls

In broadest terms, Soviet attempts to build an improved relationship with the Chinese leadership have

[3] *The New York Times*, Mar. 24, 1966.

[4] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 16, 1974.

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confronted three fundamental barriers in the minds of the Chinese. These three concentric walls around the Forbidden City will be considered in order of increasing importance.

The vanishing "ideological dispute." The first and by far the *least* important today is the ideological dimension—the line of distinction in principles that Mao had sought to draw between China and the Soviet Union. This area of differences includes, for example, Mao's long-standing charges that the USSR is in the hands of "fascist" renegades who have restored capitalism, that certain Soviet practices such as the use of material incentives are anathema, and that the Khrushchev and Brezhnev leaderships have betrayed an allegedly consistent and ideologically pure set of past Soviet domestic and foreign policies identified with Yosif Stalin.

Today, by far the most important and frequent Chinese charges against the Soviet Union are that the USSR is a power which everywhere practices "hegemonism" and "expansionism"—an assertion that flows from perceptions of concrete national interest rather than ideological dogma. These charges relate directly to China's primary preoccupation, i.e., its foreign policy concerns.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the Maoist rhetoric which seemed so important two decades ago has been blown away by the winds of time, by China's changing foreign policy needs, and by shifts in China's leadership personnel. Whatever it may have been expedient to say during Mao's lifetime, it is unlikely that men such as the late Premier Zhou Enlai, Chairman Hua Guofeng, or Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping have genuinely believed that the Soviet Union is led by capitalist renegades or have felt pious horror at Soviet reliance on material incentives. This is particularly evident in view of the pragmatic policies that have been implemented in China in connection with the "four modernizations" program. In any case, no Chinese leader can be unaware that over the last decade certain of the gravest Chinese ideological charges leveled at the Soviets in the early 1960's have become discordant with Chinese foreign policy. Instead of eternal truths, as originally described, these dicta have now been revealed to have been ephemeral reflections of momentary and long-vanished Chinese needs. Thus, the attacks on Yugoslav "revisionism" as a surrogate for Khrushchev in the late 1950's and early 1960's have been followed, in the late 1970's, by restoration of party relations with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and even by renewed intimations of some Chinese interest in Yugoslav economic practice.[5]

In sum, it is conceivable that some "ultra-leftist" members of the "gang of four" purged immediately after Mao's death—notably, the propaganda specialist Yao Wenyuan—might, had they remained in power, have been confirmed as the Maoist fundamentalists they had often seemed in the past (although even this is by no means a foregone conclusion). It is possible that such men might have sought to orient China's policy along consistently ideological lines. But, it is clear that so pronounced an ideological perspective has been at best highly exceptional among Mao's heirs, and that there will be a broad consensus within the Chinese leadership to weigh future policy toward the Soviet Union largely according to perceptions of hard-and-fast Chinese national interests.

Memories of the past. The second factor is the collective Chinese memory of all the Soviet Union has done with respect to China in the past—not only the benefits Moscow has provided but the injuries it has inflicted. In this regard, the impact of the former is fading, while the latter remain quite vivid. A highly selective list of the injuries would include Soviet demands in 1958 for what the Chinese regard as Soviet extraterritorial rights;[6] the final Soviet refusal in 1959 to furnish atomic weapons to China; the devastating withdrawal of Soviet economic experts in 1960; the movement of large Soviet forces to the Chinese border to intimidate China in the mid-1960's; and the use of some of these forces to defeat and humiliate China at Damanskiy (Zhenbao) Island in 1969. One could add to this list innumerable smaller instances of what the Chinese view as past Soviet efforts to bully China and what the Chinese remember as specific Soviet betrayals of Chinese national interests in the way in which the USSR dealt with third parties—for example, in the

[5] The expressions of interest in the Yugoslav workers' councils which appeared in the Chinese press in the fall of 1978 (e.g., the accounts of Ye Jianying's speech to the fourth session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress on Sept. 13, 1978, in *Peking Review* [Beijing], Sept. 22, 1978, and by the New China News Agency [Beijing—hereafter NCNA], Sept. 13, 1978) evoked memories of Chen Yun's heralded visit to the Yugoslav party congress in the summer of 1956.

[6] *Renmin Ribao-Hong Qi* (Beijing), joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963. Also, Mainichi News Service (Tokyo), Jan. 26, 1972, quoting statements made by Chinese officials to a visiting Japanese delegation, spoke of Soviet demands for (a) a Sino-Soviet military radio system in China, with majority control vested in the Soviet Union, and (b) a combined naval squadron. An article by China's Minister of National Defense in July 1978 referred explicitly to this "malicious" Khrushchev proposal to "establish a 'joint fleet' and a 'long wave radio station' in China." See Xu Xiangqian, "Heighten Vigilance, Be Ready to Fight," *Hong Qi,* No. 8, 1978, as reported by NCNA, July 30, 1978.

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Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 and in the growing Sino-Indian conflict in 1959–60.

All of these events are likely to be resented by the great majority of Chinese who recall them. Such resentments will tend to merge with older resentments over matters such as the Comintern's mismanagement of the Chinese revolution in the 1920's and 1930's, the Soviet army's despoiling of Manchuria after World War II, and Stalin's extraction of extraterritorial concessions from Mao in 1950. And for some present Chinese leaders, these generally-shared grievances will be augmented by many other past Soviet offenses, such as the attempts over the years to interfere in Chinese party affairs.

This combination of resentments will almost certainly have an important impact on Chinese behavior for a long time to come. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely to be enough to keep Chinese antipathy toward the Soviet Union at past intensity unless past grievances are reinforced by fresh ones.

The ongoing geopolitical struggle. The third and by far the most important factor promoting continued Chinese hostility toward the Soviets is Beijing's sense that China confronts and must respond to an ongoing, long-term Soviet effort, not only political but to some extent military, to "encircle" it in the world and in Asia. The genesis and evolution of this geopolitical struggle are worth examining in some detail.

Over the last decade, the central reality of Chinese foreign policy has been Beijing's attempts to reach out into the world—particularly the bourgeois world—to build political bulwarks against the Soviet Union and constraints against the expansion of Soviet influence. This focus was imparted to Chinese policy in the first instance by the traumatic cumulative effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the clashes between the USSR and China on their mutual border one year later. By dramatizing the USSR as a concrete threat to China, these events enabled Zhou Enlai to persuade Mao that the isolation that China had enforced upon itself during the Cultural Revolution had become a dangerous liability. As time went on, this impulse to action imparted by the sense of a specific military threat from the Soviet Union was increasingly supplemented—although not supplanted—by a Chinese perception that the USSR posed a broad-gauged geopolitical threat to Chinese interests. Beijing during the course of the 1970's argued with growing frequency that the Soviet Union had become the one aggressively expansive great power, a "social-imperialist" force intent upon incrementally widening its political and military influence and presence everywhere in the world in "hegemonistic" fashion.

As will be recalled, China, under Zhou's guidance, responded by reassuming the role of a vigorous diplomatic competitor of the Soviet Union in the early 1970's—much to the chagrin of the Soviets, who had become accustomed to an absence of such competition during the Cultural Revolution.[7] "Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomacy" emerged as a standard Chinese code-term for the process of normalization of relations with the United States and Japan, the multiplication of dealings with Western Europe, and the professed identification with Third World interests as well as cultivation of Third World governments. One common feature of all this activity was the effort to remind diverse audiences of their conflicts of interest with the Soviet Union and to persuade them to increase their resistance to what the Chinese portrayed as the advancing Soviet tide. In dealings with the West, this was summed up by the Chinese thesis that the Soviets were "feinting in the East" (i.e., toward China) while preparing to attack in the West.[8]

Since the death of Mao in September 1976, the Soviets have seen his heirs continue and significantly enlarge the scope of Zhou's diplomatic counteroffensive against them. In a number of regards—such as the rapprochement with Tito—the Chinese have displayed an increased tactical flexibility deriving from the removal of the constraints previously imposed by the presence in the Chinese leadership of the more dogmatic and ideologically-oriented "gang of four," as well as by Chairman Mao himself.

The most significant fruits to date of this post-Mao effort came in the period between August and December 1978. It was during these five months that the Chinese, in startling succession, secured the signing of a Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty with anti-Soviet overtones to which the USSR had long objected, asserted their political presence in Eastern Europe with a demonstrative and spectacular visit by Chairman Hua to Romania and Yugoslavia, and announced agreement on normalization of relations with the United States. In each succeeding case, the Soviets registered a cumulative resentment.

However, despite these 1978 achievements—which the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee

[7] For a discussion of the Soviet reaction to this change and of the mounting Soviet disillusionment with Zhou, see H. Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Soviet Eyes," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), October 1972.

[8] Zhou Enlai formally launched this theme as authoritative doctrine in his 1973 report to the 10th Chinese Communist Party Congress, as conveyed by NCNA, Aug. 31, 1973.

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China's expanding diplomatic contacts—clockwise from above: a poster of Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng and Josip Broz Tito during Hua's August 1978 visit to Yugoslavia; Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (left) and Japanese Premier Takeo Fukuda exchange toasts in Tokyo on the occasion of the October 1978 signing of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty; Deng meets with US President Jimmy Carter at the White House in January 1979; Hua with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Bonn in October 1979.

—Photos by Alain Keler/SYGMA, Kaku Kurita/Gamma-Liaison, Grace/SYGMA, and UPI.

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at the end of the year termed "important successes" in developing the "international united front against hegemonism"[9]—the Chinese have continued to convey the impression that overall they regard themselves as on the defensive against an adversary which, though it has suffered important specific setbacks, has succeeded in pressing forward at many points on the world scene. In the first place, the Chinese believe that the USSR has redoubled its efforts to constrain the scope, and even more the nature, of Western ties with China. The central thread of the unending Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign has been the contention that the capitalist industrial states have economic and security relationships with the USSR which are more important than their existing and prospective relationships with China, and the suggestion that the former should inhibit the latter. Chinese reactions have sometimes implied concern that these efforts may not prove entirely without effect.[10]

Meanwhile, there is little doubt that the Chinese have remained impressed and deeply disturbed by the spectacular growth of the Soviet-Cuban military role and the rise of Soviet political influence in Africa since 1975. One by-product of the USSR's leapfrogging efforts to improve its position in Africa and weaken that of the West through participation in and assistance to selected armed struggles has been a diminution of Chinese influence in many places, because of China's inability to compete on the new scale. While Africa is surely not a vital Chinese interest, Beijing sees alarming significance in this evidence of expanding Soviet capabilities for military intervention in the Third World.[11] Moscow's demonstration of its discovery of a new formula for more distant intervention—combining large-scale use of the USSR's logistical support capabilities, Soviet combat supervisors, and thousands of Cuban combat soldiers—has done much to reinforce the Chinese perception that the USSR has assumed what Beijing terms "an offensive posture" on the world scene.[12]

This perception is also fed by what the Chinese view as other symptoms of the incremental growth of the USSR's political and military presence in the Third World. The Chinese point, in particular, to the 1978 coups staged by strongly pro-Soviet forces in South Yemen and Afghanistan as having improved preexisting Soviet footholds in the Arabian peninsula/Red Sea area, on the one hand, and in South Asia, on the other. While it is unclear to what extent the Chinese believe their unsupported assertions that the Soviets were responsible for both coups,[13] they undoubtedly do take it for granted that the Soviets will seek to build on these advances in each area to the degree that admittedly complex local circumstances permit. And while the Chinese have ardently welcomed the difficulties that the Soviets have encountered as a result of the civil war in Afghanistan, Beijing has continued to speak of Soviet intentions "to try to consolidate its acquired position . . . and to prepare to push further forward" to the south so as to "acquire an exit to the Indian Ocean."[14]

However, Soviet accomplishments in Indochina are without question the most disturbing recent development for Beijing. From the Chinese perspective, the Soviets, in the wake of the US departure from the peninsula in 1975, have successfully sought to exploit for Soviet benefit Vietnamese conflicts of interest with China which had been submerged while the US was present but which surfaced increasingly thereafter. While the roots of this Vietnamese-Chinese friction are many and in part long-standing, the most important proximate causes were the Vietnamese confrontation with a Cambodian regime allied to China and the Vietnamese resolve to bring in the Soviet Union as a countervailing force to neutralize China and thus enable Hanoi to have its way in all of Indochina. The Soviets have in consequence been able to harness to their own interests the Vietnamese ambition to dominate the entire peninsula. In return for indispensable services to an increasingly isolated Vietnam, they have obtained unprecedented local political and military advantages.

Two landmarks stand out in this process. The first was Vietnam's entry into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in June 1978, a formal avowal of economic alignment with the Soviet Union which followed three years of increasing tilt toward Soviet political positions and growing frigidity in Sino-

[9] *Peking Review*, Dec. 29, 1978.

[10] Thus, *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 19, 1979, complained that the Soviets were "trying to blackmail the West . . . to prevent the West from developing economic relations and normal exchanges with China."

[11] See, for example, "The Source of Disturbance in Africa," ibid., Mar. 1, 1978.

[12] This reference to the Soviet "offensive posture" is a very common Chinese theme. For particularly broad-ranging Chinese assessments of that world "posture," see the Xu Xiangqian article previously cited (NCNA, July 30, 1978) and "Soviet Social-imperialism—Most Dangerous Source of World War," *Peking Review*, July 15, 1977. Both stress what they depict as a serious threat to China's security, as well as to the security of others.

[13] See, for example, "Social Imperialist Strategy in Asia," *Beijing Review* (Beijing), Jan. 19, 1979.

[14] Beijing Radio, May 8, 1979. The Chinese do not generally stress the fact that Afghanistan is a neighbor of China, or that the Sino-Soviet-Afghan trijunction in actuality adjoins the Soviet Pamir tract which has long been one of the areas at issue in the deadlocked Sino-Soviet border dispute. But these are obviously considerations for Beijing.

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Vietnamese relations.[15] The second was the signing of the Vietnamese-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship in November of the same year. In retrospect, there appears little doubt that the Vietnamese regarded this document as an instrument of deterrence which would prepare the way for Hanoi to settle its Pol Pot problem once and for all. Thus, the treaty set the stage for the Vietnamese blitzkrieg into Cambodia that began in late December.

It appears unlikely, under the circumstances, that the Soviets were surprised by this event, although neither Hanoi nor Moscow may have expected the subsequent Cambodian and Chinese responses. The emergence of prolonged Cambodian resistance to Vietnamese occupation, the intransigent Chinese reaction that became manifest in February 1979 with Beijing's effort to "teach Vietnam a lesson," the opening of what seem likely to prove fruitless and endless Sino-Vietnamese negotiations, and the acceleration of Vietnam's efforts to expel its ethnic Chinese minority have cumulatively created a situation of ongoing uncertainty, tension, and risk for all concerned, including the partners of the November 1978 pact.

Nevertheless, a geopolitical shift has occurred for the time being in the Far East which the Chinese seem to see to be largely, if not entirely, to China's detriment.[16] It is true that Beijing is likely to be gratified at the negative reactions of the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and of many other states to Vietnamese and Soviet behavior. On the other hand, these are likely to be considerably outweighed in Chinese eyes by Beijing's inability to halt Vietnam's endeavor to consolidate its hold on Indochina with Soviet assistance, by the fact that China for the indefinite future must now be concerned with two hostile frontiers,[17] and by the spectacle of Soviet warships at last in Cam Ranh Bay as the Chinese had so long publicly predicted and feared. In sum, there can hardly be a doubt that China views Soviet policy in Indochina as a genuine and irreconcilable challenge to Chinese national interests.

The Cuban-Soviet combination in Africa and the Vietnamese-Soviet efforts in Indochina appear to form a continuum in the Chinese mind. Besides reinforcing the image of broad Soviet outward pressure, these phenomena exacerbate Chinese concern about the growth of the influence of what Beijing perceives as Soviet proxies in the nonaligned movement.[18] At the same time, the Chinese profess concern that Vietnamese success, with Soviet help, in building a formal or tacit Indochinese federation may assist the USSR in reviving the notion of an Asian security system—which Beijing continues to regard as a transparent vehicle for legitimizing a Soviet relationship with China's neighbors to the detriment of Chinese influence.[19]

Finally, there is an additional factor that adds substance and endurance to all such Chinese worries about Soviet competitive activities in Asia and the Far

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[15] Among many other things, the Chinese, whatever their misgivings, had felt obliged to render increasingly public support to Pol Pot in his three years of intransigent behavior on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border; Vietnam had compelled Laos to expel China's military roadbuilders long present in northwest Laos; China had formally renounced the last vestige of economic assistance to Vietnam; and an angry Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic confrontation has taken place over Vietnamese treatment of ethnic Chinese residents of Vietnam, foreshadowing the much broader international repercussions of Vietnamese expulsion of the "boat people" in 1979. It is also clear in retrospect from 1979 Vietnamese and Chinese statements that during the second half of 1978, as Vietnam moved still closer to the USSR and prepared to oust Pol Pot, both China and Vietnam adopted increasingly assertive postures in skirmishing on the border that separated the two countries.

[16] NCNA on May 1, 1979, noted that "on March 3, *Pravda* gleefully announced that 'the balance of forces on the Asian continent has undergone a drastic change' and that 'all these countries [Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan] have formed the principal factor for peace.'"

[17] In his report to the National People's Congress on June 18, 1979, Premier Hua Guofeng said that "it is no secret to anyone as to who caused the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and where the threat along China's borders comes from." NCNA, June 25, 1979. Emphasis added. Use of the plural "borders" clearly was intended to include the southeastern border.

[18] In the same report cited in fn. 17, Hua asserted that "a superpower has been doing its utmost to exert pressure on and split and undermine the non-aligned movement and change its political direction by machinations through one or two of its lackeys." Chinese propaganda in the spring of 1979 evidenced considerable concern about Cuban preparations for the nonaligned summit scheduled for Havana in September, and warned that Cuba would probably "engage in unscrupulous sabotage activities" at the summit on behalf of the Soviet Union (*Renmin Ribao*, May 18, 1979). At a UNESCO session in July 1979, according to NCNA, "the Vietnamese and Cuban observers, at Moscow's beck and call, took the floor one after the other" to attack Western and Chinese positions, and the Chinese representative replied that this was nothing strange, "because they are twin brothers reared by the same superpower to do mischief in the world" (NCNA, July 14, 1979).

[19] The Chinese took particular note of the fact that when "on April 20, 1979, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet . . . ratified the Soviet-Afghan treaty . . ., the Soviet leaders jumped at the chance to declare that the 'creation of an effective system of collective security in Asia . . . has become of particular importance lately.'" NCNA suggested that the Soviets had become more active in trying "to breathe life into a particularly dead scheme" in part because of recent events in Southeast Asia (NCNA, May 1, 1979). Prior to the Sino-Vietnamese fighting in early 1979, in the view of *Renmin Ribao*, the USSR had "vainly attempted to push Vietnam as a Trojan Horse into ASEAN in an attempt to drag the ASEAN countries into a so-called 'Asian security system' . . ." (*Renmin Ribao*, June 22, 1979). More recently, according to statements by Vice Premier Li Xiannian to Japanese journalists, Vietnam's military actions have been designed to make the Indochinese federation a reality, and this federation in turn "is part of the Asian security system that the USSR is attempting to establish" (*Yomiuri Shimbun* [Tokyo], Mar. 5, 1979).

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

Projection of Soviet power: at the left, the aircraft carrier Minsk that in early 1979 patrolled Far Eastern waters; at the right, transports lined up at Adis Ababa airport during the 1977 Soviet airlift to Ethiopia.

—Camera Press and Coufort/Liaison.

East and makes it difficult for any Chinese government to contemplate a degree of "normalization" with Moscow which might imply acceptance of the legitimacy of those activities. This is the simple fact that the Soviet Union has a permanent territorial presence in the area. Whatever Asian setback the USSR might conceivably suffer in the future, China can never look forward to a time, however distant, when its Soviet competitor might depart. On the contrary, the economic and geopolitical weight that eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East have in Asia can only be expected to grow in the years ahead, as high-priority Soviet investment continues there, as the second trans-Siberian rail line is completed, and as Soviet forces along the Chinese border are strengthened further. The Chinese must also expect the deployment of additional Soviet naval units to Vladivostok and the Far East on a permanent basis with the increasing economic importance of the area, the progress of Soviet naval construction programs, and, perhaps most important, the increasing use of the Far East fleet as one of the sources of support for Soviet political ambitions in Asia. The last consideration has been made vivid for the Chinese by the movement of Soviet naval forces to the South China Sea during and since the Sino-Vietnamese fighting of February 1979.[20]

The Two Main Bilateral Issues

Against this background of contention across a broad geographical canvas, two issues stand out as the most serious tests of the effects of the external contest upon the bilateral relationship. One is the border question; the other is the nature of economic interaction between Moscow and Beijing. How far has improvement been inhibited in each of these areas to date, and why?

The border. The impasse here is at one and the same time the leading symbol, central issue, and prime hostage of the frozen relationship. The border question has evolved above all as an instrument of Chinese political warfare against the Soviet Union, whose increasing use by Mao and his heirs since 1963-64 has reflected the growth of the underlying hostility. At the same time, it has over the years achieved a life of its own as an important additional stimulus and independent guarantor of that mutual hostility.

In the eyes of the Chinese, the border problem involves a set of specific distant and recent inequities perpetrated upon China by Russia and the USSR which could be glossed over in the case of a friend but cannot properly or safely be evaded in dealings with the prime antagonist. These border grievances, surfaced by the Chinese in 1963 and articulated at length since 1969, have by now become inextricably bound

[20] On May 23, 1979, it should be noted, Radio Beijing reminded its listeners that "when the guns roared on the border between China and Vietnam, Soviet warships became active and caused trouble in the Beibu Gulf to support Vietnam, the small hegemonist." This broadcast demanded that "more attention" be paid "to the fact that the Soviet Union and Vietnam are now preparing public opinion to accept the establishment of permanent Soviet military bases in Vietnam." The ultimate Soviet purpose, said the broadcast, was "to counter the United States, threaten Japan, control Southeast Asia and encircle China." Many Chinese articles in the spring of 1979 similarly rehearsed Western and Japanese press reports about Soviet naval and air use of facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, as well as accounts of the arrival of the Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk in the Far East at the end of its long, well-publicized journey from the Mediterranean.

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A strategic new Soviet rail link to the Far East—the Baikal-Amur Mainline—shown under construction in December 1978.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

up in the Chinese perception of the USSR as an implacable adversary with respect to a broad spectrum of Chinese interests.

The Soviets, for their part, have evidently seen the Chinese as insisting on specific prerequisites for a border settlement which, in the Soviet view, the Chinese must know are incompatible with vital Soviet national interests and which no Soviet leadership can ever grant.[21] The Soviet sense of the Chinese attitude has evidently in turn had operational significance for Soviet economic and military choices which impinge on the Chinese. Despite overwhelming Soviet military superiority and the caution the Chinese have seemingly displayed on the borders since 1969, the impasse appears to have fed Soviet concerns about the long-term vulnerability of the USSR's thinly-populated territory in eastern Siberia and the Far East. Such concerns seem to have been at least a factor in Soviet decisions regarding very large economic and strategic investments in the Far East like the second transSiberian railroad (BAM), and they have also prompted Moscow to continue to build up the already sizable Soviet land and naval combat forces in areas adjacent to China.

The Chinese, in turn, have long perceived these very large Soviet forces stationed along the borders and in Mongolia as intended, among other things, to influence the Chinese negotiating position through coercion. In February 1978, Hua Guofeng formalized an earlier Chinese demand that as one of the prerequisites to any general improvement in the relationship, the Soviets reduce their forces confronting China in Asia to the level of the early 1960's.[22] From the Soviet standpoint, however, this is apparently out of the question under present circumstances.

The scope of the Soviet dilemma can best be appreciated in a detailed review of the points at issue in the border negotiations. First, the Chinese have long made clear that the demand Hua enunciated in February 1978 for a general withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Chinese border and Mongolia was not part of the Chinese position in the border negotiations, but rather an additional general requirement for improvement of the relationship, superimposed on the requirement that a satisfactory border settlement be achieved. Second, it is equally clear from many Chinese statements that while the Chinese identify huge tracts of Soviet territory in the Far East which, according to the Chinese, were unfairly taken from China by Tsarist Russia in "unequal treaties during the 19th and early 20th centuries," the Chinese make no claim to any of this territory. The Chinese do, however, require that the Soviets formally acknowledge that the treaties in question were in fact "unequal."[23] This may be a major sticking point for the Soviets, but it is probably not the gravest problem.

The heart of the matter appears to be the Chinese contention that Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union have at various times occupied and the USSR continues to hold certain additional Chinese territory not granted to Russia even by the "unequal" treaties. In practice, this seems to be primarily two areas: one in the west, a tract of some 10,000 square kilometers in the Pamirs in Soviet Central Asia, near the trijunction with Afghanistan; the other in the east, consisting of several hundred islands in the Ussuri and Amur border rivers. These areas are the territory China describes as "in dispute."[24] The Chinese demand that as

[21] *Izvestiya*, May 16, 1974, and *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 1, 1978, contain the most elaborate statements of this Soviet viewpoint and the Soviet versions of the facts reviewed below.

[22] *Peking Review*, Mar. 10, 1978.

[23] Chinese Foreign Ministry statement of Oct. 8, 1969 (NCNA, Oct. 8, 1969). This remains the most elaborate and authoritative statement of the Chinese position.

[24] Ibid.

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a prerequisite to joint demarcation of an agreed border, both sides must first withdraw all forces from all the territory thus identified as in dispute. Since all such territory is in fact in the hands of the Soviet Union, this amounts, as the Soviets repeatedly complain, to a demand for a unilateral, prior Soviet military evacuation of all the areas and places the Chinese claim, before concrete negotiations can begin. Both Soviet and Chinese press accounts indicate that since the day the Sino-Soviet border talks began in Beijing in October 1969, the talks have been stalemated essentially on this preliminary question.[25]

The Soviets have in particular made it clear that they will never abandon, even momentarily, the large pair of islands at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri which the Chinese call, collectively, Hei Xiazi, and which the Soviets name Tamarov and Bol'shoy Ussuriysk. As Neville Maxwell has observed, the Chinese hold that these islands lie on the Chinese side of the thalweg, the deepest portion of the main river channel, and hence should rightfully belong to China.[26]

Whatever the legal case, the Soviets have possession. As the Soviet press has pointedly noted, these islands lie immediately adjacent to the large city of Khabarovsk, through which passes the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Moreover, the islands proved vital to the defense of the city against the Japanese in the 1930's, when "the sacred blood of Soviet people" was "many times shed on the islands." The Soviets therefore describe them publicly as the "suburbs" of Khabarovsk and supply elaborate detail on plans for economic investment there.[27] In sum, the message conveyed is that the inclusion of Hei Xiazi on the list of disputed areas which must all be evacuated prior to demarca-

[25] The Chinese have for a decade contended that at the Zhou-Kosygin meeting in Beijing on Sept. 11, 1969, Aleksey Kosygin agreed to the Chinese demand for a preliminary accord on mutual withdrawal from all disputed areas prior to efforts to settle upon an agreed border. The Soviets have with equal vigor denied that Kosygin made any such oral stipulation.

[26] Neville Maxwell, "Why the Russians Lifted the Blockade at Bear Island," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Fall 1978.

[27] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Aug. 2, 1970. Against this background, a further message about the Soviet attitude toward Hei Xiazi was conveyed by General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to Khabarovsk in April 1978, where he saw a military parade and delivered a speech emphasizing the need for strict vigilance (*The New York Times*, Apr. 10, 1978). The Chinese Minister of Defense reacted to these events by writing that Brezhnev had "personally sneaked into Siberia and the Soviet Far East to encourage the Soviet troops and issue war cries" (Xu Xiangqian, loc. cit.).

Territory in dispute: a 1969 Xinhua *News Agency photo of Zhenbao (in Russian, Damanskiy) Island shot from the Chinese side of the Ussuri River. The arrow indicates what the Chinese claim is the main channel; the triangle shows the island's southern end, and the circle shows the island's northern end.* [*The indicators were included in the photo as serviced by* Xinhua; *it should be noted that the channel flows in the opposite direction from the arrow.*]

—Eastfoto.

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tion of the border is, as the Soviets see it, evidence of the intransigence of the Chinese position and a guarantee of continued stalemate.[28]

As a substitute for the preliminary pullback that the Chinese have been requesting, and as a response to the Chinese accusation that the Soviets, by refusing to move their troops, are seeking to negotiate behind an implicit threat to use force, the Soviets have repeatedly tried to get the Chinese to settle for a paper pledge of mutual good behavior. Such efforts took the form of an offer of a separate nonuse of force agreement in 1971, and a proposal for a separate nonaggression pact in 1973. Both were publicized in 1974 to demonstrate the allegedly pacific nature of Soviet intentions and the opposite character of Chinese intentions.[29]

But, as Zhou Enlai stated publicly somewhat later, the Chinese had no interest in the USSR's "profuse talk about empty treaties on the non-use of force." They wanted concrete agreement on a troop pullback (although they would accept an empty pledge along with the pullback).[30] In private dealings with the USSR, according to the Soviets, the Chinese cited the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty as rendering the new document proposed by the Soviets superfluous. However, as the Soviets tell it, when the USSR then asked China to reaffirm the continued validity of this treaty, the Chinese declined.[31] This byplay culminated in April 1979, when the Chinese finally announced formal abrogation of the 1950 treaty.

The sparring reconstructed here unfolded in the intermittent negotiations which have taken place since October 1969 at the vice foreign minister level in Beijing—negotiations led on the Soviet side by V.V. Kuznetov initially and by L.F. Il'ichëv since 1970. Ever since the positions of the two parties were staked out late in 1969, the pattern of the talks has remained a repetitious minuet. At intervals lengthening over the years, but averaging about once a year, the chief Soviet representative has returned to Beijing for a few weeks, evidently primarily to reevaluate the possibility that the Chinese might abandon the demand for a total Soviet pullback from all the disputed areas. Thus far, however, the Chinese have not budged.

The economic dimension. The other central bilateral issue between the two powers over the years has been their economic relationship. Here neither the record of recent years nor immediate prospects are nearly as bleak as those pertaining to the border question. But despite a fairly steady improvement in trade turnover since the nadir at the opening of the 1970's, Sino-Soviet trade has to date remained a secondary—

Soviet experts help the Chinese develop an open-face coal mine at Fusin in northeast China in the 1950's.

—Eastfoto.

indeed, a fairly minor—factor in not only the overall foreign trade but also the internal economic life of both countries. The reasons for this state of affairs can be summarized as (a) politically generated constraints deriving from Chinese assessments of the record of past Soviet economic behavior and (b) Moscow's and Beijing's assumptions about their present objective economic interests.

As for the first set of considerations, one burden the Soviets must overcome is the memory of what happened in the summer of 1960, the watershed year in which the central Soviet role in Chinese modernization came to an end and the Sino-Soviet economic relationship began to disintegrate. At that time, it will be recalled, Khrushchev abruptly canceled almost all Soviet technical assistance to China and withdrew some 1,400 Soviet advisers and experts. Whatever the provocation the Chinese—in the Soviet view—may have given Khrushchev for this action, it was a violation of Soviet contractual obligations, and it dealt the Chinese economy a heavy blow whose effects were felt

[28] The question of navigation around Hei Xiazi is another matter. As we shall see, after years of stalemate there has been a compromise reached on this question without prejudice to the issue of sovereignty.

[29] *Izvestiya*, May 16, 1974.

[30] "Report to the Fourth National People's Congress," NCNA, Jan. 13, 1975.

[31] *Izvestiya*, May 16, 1974.

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for many years afterward. Even if Chinese leaders do not believe their own suggestions that it was this Soviet action more than bad harvests and the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward that precipitated the depression of the Chinese economy in 1960–62, they are surely convinced that the Soviets greatly intensified China's difficulties in this period and beyond.

From this time onward, the Chinese have been obsessed with the conviction that they must never again allow the Soviet Union to achieve a position whereby it can use its economic relationship with China for political blackmail. In retrospect, the Chinese probably remember as humiliating the fright their dependence on the USSR caused them in 1960, when they were evidently very apprehensive lest the USSR follow up withdrawal of the experts by cutting off exports of petroleum, an item for which China then relied heavily upon the Soviet Union. The precedent of Stalin's economic boycott of Yugoslavia in the late 1940's was undoubtedly much on the Chinese mind at the time. Press reports of the period indicated that rationing and use of substitutes for petroleum immediately began in Chinese cities, and presumably there was crash stockpiling as well. Thereafter, the Chinese seem to have bent their efforts to reduce their petroleum dependence on the USSR as rapidly as possible. By 1965, they had achieved virtual self-sufficiency.

Past experiences have also evidently long colored Chinese attitudes on the question of whether to incur financial debts to the Soviet Union. For example, on a number of occasions Chinese leaders, including Zhou, have complained to visitors rather bitterly about the onerous burden that repaying the large credits for Soviet war matériel used by China during the Korean war had imposed.[32] The Chinese apparently thought of these credits as being in a different category from their other economic and military indebtedness to the Soviet Union and may possibly even have originally understood that they would not have to pay in full for the matériel. Soviet penuriousness over this matter was evidently one of the reasons China was determined to clear all its debts with the USSR as rapidly as possible and for all time. By 1965, the debts had been paid off, but the notion of accepting any new loans or credits from the Soviet Union remained anathema.

Meanwhile, against this background, the Soviets in recent years appear increasingly to have felt that a *fait accompli* was occurring in the orientation of the Chinese economy, that time was passing them by. In the years 1972–74, with the first great flourishing of Zhou Enlai's preferences regarding economic policy toward the industrialized capitalist world, the Chinese turned an important corner in a direction opposite to Soviet desires, by to a significant degree tying the Chinese economy to Western and Japanese inputs of technology. This trend, of course, received another strong push after the death of Mao in 1976 and the quick removal of those elements in the Chinese leadership which had been least enthusiastic about the economic engagement with the West. The "four modernizations" program of the late 1970's under Zhou's policy heirs has served to magnify each of the lines of foreign trade policy seen in the early 1970's: the massive purchase of plants and equipment from the capitalist world, the acquiescence to the presence of more Western and Japanese technicians, and the acceptance of longer-term credits.

To be sure, a substantial retrenchment of such external commitments did begin in China in the spring of 1979. This, however, was a natural consequence of the extraordinary overindulgence in foreign purchasing seen in 1977 and 1978, and of belated realization of the limits of China's ability to absorb Western technology rapidly. There is no evidence to date that the pause has in any way altered the central political fact that the "four modernizations" drive continues to move China progressively further away from China's past economic orientation toward the Soviet Union and into a closer relationship with the world economic system, in which the USSR is a minor factor.[33]

Over the same period, Soviet bilateral trade with China, while increasing substantially from the nadir

[32] The Feb. 27, 1964, letter from the Chinese to the Soviet party said that "for many years we have been paying the principal and interest on these Soviet loans, which account for a considerable part of our yearly exports to the Soviet Union" (*Seven Letters . . .*). During the Cultural Revolution a Red-Guard-published chronology of the Sino-Soviet dispute apparently drawn from official sources alleged that Khrushchev in the summer of 1960, in addition to withdrawing the experts, had "called on China to repay all loans plus interest incurred during the Korean War." "Chronicle of Events in the Soviet Revisionist Campaign Against China," US Consulate General Hong Kong, *Current Background* (Hong Kong), No. 850, Apr. 3, 1968. If this allegation has any validity, it is possible that some Chinese payments had previously been deferred. In 1975, Zhou Enlai was reported to have told a senior Japanese visitor that Chinese economic progress had been seriously hampered by a Soviet "demand" for payment of 560 million new rubles, of which 62 percent was for Korean war expenses, 26 percent for economic aid, and 12 percent for plants and harbor facilities in Port Arthur. See *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Feb. 6, 1975.

[33] Vice Premier Yu Qiuli's report to the National People's Congress on the 1979 economic plan, for example, called for US$12 billion in Chinese exports and US$15 billion in imports. These figures represented a 20 percent increase in exports and 40 percent increase in imports over 1978. Yu, furthermore, made clear that Western capital equipment would continue to play an important part in Chinese modernization, despite the adjustments in long-term economic plans. This "major policy decision" for the "energetic expansion of foreign trade" was coupled with a resolve to work to expand hard-currency earnings "by every possible means" (NCNA, June 26, 1979).

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reached in 1970, has remained a relatively small factor in the trade turnover and economic calculations of both parties. Total Sino-Soviet exports and imports in recent years have accounted for about 2 percent of total Chinese foreign trade and a smaller portion of total Soviet foreign trade.[34] This state of affairs has been partly the result of the political factors enumerated above—especially China's evident unwillingness to accept any Soviet credits, whether tacit or explicit.[35] As a consequence of this Chinese attitude, the value of annual trade must be kept in rough balance and renegotiated every year. Thus, Soviet annual sales to China must perforce be limited to the negotiated value of those items that the Chinese are willing to sell to the USSR and that the Soviets are willing to accept in each 12-month period.

These political constraints, important as they are, have been reinforced by increasingly significant considerations of Chinese economic self-interest. Even if the Soviets could get around all of China's politically imposed inhibitions, they would still face the essential economic problem of finding Soviet goods which Beijing would judge competitive in quality with what the Chinese can now obtain in the West and Japan. In this regard, the USSR is likely to continue to be handicapped by its inferiority to the capitalist industrial states in most areas of high civilian technology. Furthermore, the Soviet and Chinese economies, although still at vastly different stages of development, have already become somewhat more competitive and less complementary than they once were. For example, whereas in 1963 Khrushchev could offer superior Soviet expertise for the development of the Chinese oil industry, today the Soviets have no such technical superiority over the Chinese in this field. Moreover, while China was formerly dependent upon the USSR for much of its petroleum, today both countries are oil exporters, and hence in a sense competitors. Similarly, China and the Soviet Union have become two of the world's largest importers of both Western grain and Western technology.

The net impression is that the objective import and export needs of both countries make their trading relationship with each other necessarily much less important than their respective relationships with the industrialized capitalist world. Each has appeared to feel that it has less to obtain from the other than it could get elsewhere.

These considerations do not mean that China will not seek a considerable expansion of existing economic relations with the USSR, if it can do so without yielding what Beijing considers unacceptable political concessions to Moscow. Other things being equal, the need, that the current Chinese "readjustment" emphasizes, to conserve hard currency tends to make increased barter trade with the Soviet Union seem more attractive, and the difficulties experienced in assimilating some advanced Western technology could, in principle, persuade the Chinese of the adequacy for their purposes of some cruder but simpler Soviet manufactures, even if these are not up to the world level.[36] Chinese tendencies to think along these lines may be encouraged by the eclecticism and pragmatism visible in Beijing's search for diverse contributions to its revised model of economic development. Some voices have even been heard asking why China should not draw on Soviet experience as well as that of others.[37]

For a variety of reasons, however, there will probably be firm limits on Chinese movement in this direction. As already noted, the Chinese have publicly indicated that the planned expansion of foreign trade under the new "readjustment" will continue to be oriented largely toward the West and Japan, with the aid of new, large, hard-currency credits.[38] On economic as well as political grounds, authoritative spokesmen have attacked the suitability of the Soviet economy as a model for the new, pragmatic China in

[34] Richard E. Batsavage and John L. Davie, "China's International Trade and Finance," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Chinese Economy Post-Mao*, Vol. 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 715–16.

[35] It should be pointed out that there is no evidence of Soviet renewal in the last few years of earlier proposals concerning credits. Moscow's present willingness to extend such credits for the sake of uncertain political benefits may be doubtful.

[36] *Renmin Ribao*, May 8, 1979, stated that "even advanced technology is relative; it changes with changing circumstances. We regard as advanced those things which conform to China's specific conditions, can solve problems and achieve economic results. We cannot afford to recklessly import advanced technology while disregarding actual conditions . . . . Some enterprises are producing up-to-date products with machinery made in the 1940's or 1950's. This spirit is worth promoting."

[37] A pro-Beijing publication in Hong Kong, possibly reflecting such attitudes in China, urged the Chinese to seek "to absorb some experience helpful to the four modernizations" from the Soviet Union, arguing that "we can draw from and exploit experiences regardless of whether they are those of our friends or our enemies." *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), May 1, 1979.

[38] At the National People's Congress session in June 1979, Vice Minister of the State Planning Commission Gu Ming, in discussing the difference between the present "readjustment" and what had happened in 1962, observed that "at that time the Soviet Union perfidiously withdrew its experts, seriously damaging our national economy. Now the international situation is extremely favorable to us, because we implemented the line in foreign affairs formulated by Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou." Radio Beijing, June 20, 1979. The line in question, as mentioned earlier, was the multiplication of economic and other ties to the non-Soviet-dominated world.

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view of the Soviet economy's rigidity and overcentralization,[39] and they have emphasized distortions, dislocations, and shortages deriving from what the Chinese term the Soviet "militarization of the national economy."[40] The Chinese continue to excoriate Soviet trading practices vis-à-vis weaker trading partners. They depict the USSR as "desperately peddling its long-term cooperation programs to the developing countries" so as to exploit them by "selling technologically obsolete machinery and equipment . . . in exchange for major strategic raw materials."[41] They regularly denounce the Soviet economic relationship with Eastern Europe as calculated to strengthen dependence on the Soviet economy,[42] and they depict Soviet efforts to further the integration of CMEA-state economies as designed to promote "hegemony" in all its aspects, including military and ideological "integration" and the unification of foreign policies.[43]

These attitudes are probably genuine, because they are reinforced by long Chinese experience and bespeak a sensitivity about dependence on the Soviet Union which in all likelihood will persist. Accordingly, it is improbable that Beijing will soon change its position on those questions—such as the acceptance of Soviet credits—which in the past have been most closely associated in Chinese thinking with Soviet efforts to use political leverage. For this and other reasons, it also seems unlikely that the Soviets will be able to transcend a merely supplementary role in Chinese foreign trade for many years, even though substantial growth in Sino-Soviet trade turnover may take place over time. Meanwhile, the Chinese in 1979 appear to have begun to explore the practical limits of economic "normalization" with the Soviet Union, seeking to discover how far such normalization can in fact be pursued without the sacrifice of overriding Chinese political interests. This is part of the more general Chinese exploration of the tolerable limits of "normalization" which we will now consider.

Moderating Symbols and Symptoms

Along with the other elements in Sino-Soviet interaction discussed so far, a faintly moderating undercurrent has been detectable in Chinese behavior toward the USSR since Mao's death. From the first months after Mao's disappearance, there have been a variety of published hints of a Chinese view that the extraordinary degree of tension in the bilateral relationship inherited from Mao is an anomaly in the total context of Chinese foreign policy and excessive to the tactical requirements of the ongoing struggle against the USSR. This has been reflected in the very selective reappearance, at long intervals, of symbols suggesting a desire to introduce civility into some aspects of the state-to-state relationship. Although the Chinese quickly rejected a Soviet overture after Mao's death for the resumption of the party-to-party contacts, broken since January 1966,[44] they almost simultaneously revived a formula not used in authoritative Chinese comments for two years, one which affirmed China's willingness to establish or develop relations with "all" countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.[45] A year later, in November 1977, it was publicly revealed that the Chinese Foreign Minister had visited the Soviet national day reception at the Soviet embassy in Beijing for the first time since 1966, while on the same day China invited some Soviet sinologists to visit the Chinese embassy in Moscow. In 1978, Beijing's Sino-Soviet Friendship Association was resuscitated, and for the first time in more than a decade it sent greetings to its Soviet counterpart on the November 1978 anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.[46]

Prior to 1979, however, there was only one substantive issue—and that a secondary matter—on which the new Chinese leadership diverged from Mao's tactics toward the USSR sufficiently to allow significant new movement. On this question—the matter of the passage of Chinese river traffic between the Amur and the Ussuri—a modest agreement was reached in 1977 that apparently involved genuine mutual compromise, but without prejudice to the Chinese claim to

[39] Sun Yefang, the leading Soviet-trained economist purged during the Cultural Revolution and since rehabilitated, took this position in an article in the June 1979 issue of *Hong Qi*. He blamed the Soviet system for stifling the spread of technological innovation and called for more rapid replacement of the obsolete equipment imported in the past from the USSR. Other Chinese commentaries have cited Hungary, and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia, as more appropriate economic examples for China.

[40] NCNA commentary, "Why Is the Soviet Union Short of Steel?" Apr. 21, 1979.

[41] NCNA commentary, "Why Does the Soviet Union Want Long Term Cooperation with the Developing Countries?" Radio Beijing, May 24, 1979.

[42] An NCNA commentary, May 7, 1979, examined in some detail the negative impact the freeze in the level of Soviet petroleum exports to Eastern Europe had had on the growth rates of five East European states. *Renmin Ribao*, May 27, 1979, discussed what it depicted as the depressing effects on the economies of manpower-short CMEA states of arrangements to send sizable numbers of workers to projects in the Soviet Union.

[43] *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 24, 1979.

[44] *The New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1976.

[45] This formula was used in the address of China's UN representative in October 1976 (NCNA, Oct. 5, 1976) and in a Chinese announcement on foreign affairs a month later (NCNA, Nov. 2, 1976).

[46] NCNA, Nov. 6, 1978.

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Hei Xiazi.[47] Since then, as we have noted, the Chinese have continued to maintain their adamant demand in the border talks for a Soviet preliminary evacuation of Hei Xiazi, along with all other disputed areas.

It should again be stressed, moreover, that this one minor agreement and the few scattered symbols of civility appeared against a background of vehement ongoing mutual denunciation across a broad spectrum of issues. A month after the November 1977 invitation to the Soviet sinologists to visit the Chinese embassy, for example, *Hong Qi* published an article describing the new Soviet constitution as something "long and stinking" and as an instrument to strengthen "the fascist dictatorship" in the USSR.[48] An editorial article shortly thereafter in a Soviet journal apprised Soviet sinologists—some of whom, the article indicated, took a more optimistic view—of the official judgment that nothing had happened in Beijing to justify a change in Moscow's unrelentingly hostile assessment of the Chinese scene.[49] This view can only have been strengthened by public Chinese rejection a few months later of the February 1978 Soviet proposals for talks on the principles of Sino-Soviet relations.

Nevertheless, a difference of view among Soviets as to prospects for some conciliation of China is likely to have persisted, fed by such phenomena as the increasing pragmatism of Chinese economic and social policy, the gradual disappearance of ideological rhetoric from the ongoing Chinese criticism of Soviet policy, and the rehabilitation of former Chinese officials—purged during the Cultural Revolution—who had been associated, under the vastly different circumstances that had prevailed 15 or 20 years earlier, with a more moderate view than Mao's of appropriate tactics toward the USSR.[50] The appearance in 1979 of Chinese proposals for an exploration of the possibility of "normalizing" relations with the Soviet Union is thus likely to have encouraged the view of some in Moscow that forces were stirring in the Chinese party that now might be willing to accept compromises with the USSR more far-reaching than the river navigation agreement.[51]

Subsequent Soviet conduct and remarks suggest, however, that many well-placed Soviets remained highly skeptical on the matter, that events have strengthened their skepticism, and that this skepticism has reinforced a Soviet inclination to give no ground. Formal Soviet statements, for example, have implied suspicion that the Chinese overtures are tactical expedients deriving primarily from changing Chinese security needs as a result of the new situation in Indochina.[52]

As noted earlier, the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities in February 1979 did indeed for the first time force the Chinese to weigh the possibility of a two-front military confrontation, even though the USSR took no action on its borders with China; and in the aftermath of these hostilities, the necessity to face a hostile military presence on two sides has become a semipermanent reality for Beijing. Under these circumstances, China

[47] See Maxwell, loc. cit.
[48] *Hong Qi*, Dec. 5, 1977.
[49] *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Moscow), December 1977.

This Xinhua News Agency photo shows Chinese frontier troops from Guangxi entering Vietnam's Cao Bang City under the cover of artillery fire during the hostilities in early 1979.

—UPI.

[50] One such recently rehabilitated figure, Wang Jiaxiang—now deceased—was in fact a former ambassador to the USSR and is of symbolic importance for having put forward a proposal in 1962 which specifically envisioned, among other things, conciliation of the USSR. The Chinese press article rehabilitating Wang in fact alluded to this proposal and defended Wang's right to have made it (but not the content of the proposal.) See Zhu Zhongli, "Firmly Holding Premier Zhou's Concern for Comrade Wang Jiaxiang," *Gongren Ribao* (Beijing), Apr. 5, 1979.

[51] Such a view may also have been encouraged by the publication of the previously-mentioned article in a Hong Kong newspaper, which explicitly urged conciliation of Moscow. *Cheng Ming*, May 1, 1979.

[52] *Pravda* on July 11, 1979, asked whether the Chinese were seeking merely "talk about talks," and implied that China was attempting to drive a wedge between the USSR and Vietnam.

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might be thought to have acquired a new reason to seek some mechanism to reduce tensions with the USSR without sacrificing major substantive positions at issue with the Soviets, including especially the ongoing struggle over Indochina. Such an inclination might have been strengthened by the sobering experience of the PLA in dealing with Vietnam in February and by the equally sobering realization—as a result of the ongoing reexamination of China's economic tasks and priorities—that military modernization adequate to the new two-front challenge was going to take a very long time.

Accordingly, when the Chinese in April 1979 gave the USSR formal notice of abrogation of the long-dormant Sino-Soviet friendship treaty of 1950,[53] they simultaneously put forth a proposal for talks—outside of and parallel with the border negotiations—to address bilateral issues. In the ensuing weeks, this was gradually followed by some reduction in the volume of mutual polemics and by one peculiar exchange of esoteric and symbolic gestures by the two antagonists. On June 5, 1979, Radio Moscow broadcast in Chinese a recording of a nonpolemical statement prepared for Soviet radio by the Chinese delegate to an international coal-dressing conference being held in the Soviet Union. Three days later, *Pravda*—apparently to reciprocate for the preparation of the recording—published a two-paragraph nonpolemical account of an antipollution conference that had just been held in Beijing.

At the same time, however, as the prospective talks drew closer, the divergent objectives of the two sides began to emerge. The Soviets made it clear that they conceived the primary purpose of the talks as being the drawing up of a document to record the agreement of the sides on the general principles of a "normalized" relationship, as originally proposed by the USSR in early 1978 and rejected by the Chinese at that time.[54] According to the Western press, China, for its part, implied that some document might be possible and indicated a desire to have the talks result in improved economic, cultural, and scientific relations.[55] But the Chinese conveyed that, above all, they wished to use the talks as a vehicle to air all the concrete foreign policy grievances with the USSR which they lump under the heading of "hegemony" and which we have discussed above.[56] Beijing no longer required prior Soviet cessation of specific "hegemonic" practices—e.g., the stationing of Soviet forces in Mongolia—as a prerequisite for holding such talks, as Premier Hua had in effect done in rejecting the original Soviet proposal for talks in 1978.[57] However, the Chinese made it clear that they would reiterate such demands at the talks, and they left it publicly ambiguous whether they would insist in the talks that the USSR commit itself to concessions of this magnitude as a prerequisite for the document the Soviets had in mind.[58]

Soviet suspicions that the Chinese might intend to ultimately take such a position were apparently intensified by a public exchange of statements in June. In a calculated riposte to the Chinese harping on the Soviet practice of "hegemony," the USSR specified, in a published note to Beijing, that the document envisaged should include a mutual pledge not to recognize "anyone's claims to . . . hegemony."[59] Alluding to this issue in his address to the Chinese National People's Congress two weeks later, Premier Hua asserted that

[53] NCNA, Apr. 3, 1979. Before and after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty, Deng Xiaoping had indicated to Japanese newsmen that the Sino-Soviet treaty—which singles out Japan as a prospective antagonist—would be abrogated. See, e.g., Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), Sept. 6, 1978.

[54] Soviet Foreign Ministry Note, TASS, June 5, 1979.

[55] AFP, May 9, 1979.

[56] In July, Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong was quoted by a Japanese interviewer as saying that "during the talks, there is a strong possibility China will bring up the issue of a Soviet military withdrawal from Mongolia" (*Mainichi Shimbun*, July 15, 1979). In August, Vice Premier Geng Biao was quoted in a similar interview as asserting that so long as the Soviet Union did not change its attitude toward the "hegemony" issue, the results of the talks would be "obvious" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Aug. 12, 1979). In late September, after the talks had begun, Vice Premier Gu Mu, when questioned at a press conference about the economic aspects of the negotiations, stated that "trade between the Soviet Union and China has been going on for years, but the main question [in the talks] is not trade . . . . The basic problem is whether the Soviet Government will change its hegemonistic and expansionist activities in the world" (AFP in Hong Kong, Sept. 28, 1979).

[57] For the Hua statement, see *Peking Review*, Mar. 10, 1978. In contrast to this statement, the proposal that the Chinese put forward in April 1979, at the same time that they gave notice of their intention to abrogate the 1950 treaty, did not raise the issue of withdrawal from Mongolia. See NCNA, Apr. 3, 1979.

[58] The ambiguity in Chinese intentions with regard to this point, did not begin to fade until a month after the talks commenced. Deng Xiaoping was then asked by a Japanese interviewer if he did not think it would be better, "for the sake of the negotiations, first to sign a cultural exchange agreement, a technical agreement, and documents concerning state relations, and then to negotiate patiently on other difficult questions." Deng replied that "the Soviet side appears to think so; the Soviet Union tries to deceive world opinion by making the negotiations look as if they are progressing to a certain extent without resolving basic questions." But, added Deng, unless they resolve basic questions, the negotiations "are of no value at all." He went on to observe that the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty had not been of much use, and to suggest that any new treaty with the USSR could be useful only after "obstacles between the two countries are truly removed" (*Asahi Shimbun* [Tokyo], Oct. 19, 1979). The implication of Deng's remarks was that all agreements and documents would have to wait upon the resolution of the "basic" issues China was raising in the talks. That those issues centered on Chinese demands regarding specific Soviet "hegemonistic" practices—such as the stationing of troops in Mongolia—was plain in the statements cited in fn. 56 above.

[59] Soviet Foreign Ministry note, TASS, June 5, 1979.

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such a verbal statement could not change "the essence of the matter," for "whether one was genuinely against hegemonism could be judged only by one's deeds." Furthermore, he went on, "no ambiguity could be tolerated" on the matter. The prospects for the Sino-Soviet talks, he said flatly, "depend on whether the Soviet Government makes a substantive change in its position."[60]

A few weeks later, a major *Pravda* article signed with the "Aleksandrov" pseudonym—used especially for authoritative pronouncements on China—wondered if Beijing was putting forward "preliminary conditions" once more or attempting "to put pressure on the other side even before the start of the talks." The author also posed the question of whether China was interested primarily in "the fact of the talks" themselves or simply in using the talks to bring pressure upon Vietnam.[61] The Soviets are clearly highly defensive on this point, since the Vietnamese are likely to be deeply suspicious of any hint of a possible moderation of Sino-Soviet tensions while Hanoi-Beijing relations remain exacerbated and Sino-Vietnamese negotiations deadlocked, while Vietnam is fully extended in desperate struggle in Cambodia, and while Hanoi continues to be isolated and thus heavily dependent on the USSR internationally.[62]

Prospects

As of the fall of 1979, in sum, the probability of significant progress soon toward the normalization of Sino-Soviet bilateral relations seems modest at best because of constraining realities. In view of the long distance China and the Soviet Union have traveled since most of the newly-rehabilitated Chinese officials last held office, and the thousand fronts on which their national interests have become engaged in the interim, evidence is still lacking to show the existence of strong sentiment in China favoring the major Chinese concessions that would now be required to bridge the gap. Few Chinese of any background appear likely to be willing to yield those concrete Chinese interests—especially around China's periphery—that the expansion of Soviet activities and Soviet presence have challenged over the last 15 years.

Therefore, the prospects are for what Vice Premier Li Xiannian warned in advance would be a long and "tough" negotiation.[63] It seems quite possible that the 1979 Sino-Soviet talks on the overall state of bilateral relations will evolve into another indefinitely protracted negotiation, which might proceed sporadically for years in parallel with the stalemated border talks. To be sure, a compromise that papers over basic differences and permits a modest expansion of bilateral dealings remains conceivable. But large and important steps toward rapprochement appear highly improbable for a long time because of the implausibility of Chinese or Soviet concessions involving important national interests. In short, the fundamental causes of antagonism seem unlikely to be modified.

[60] NCNA, June 25, 1979.

[61] *Pravda*, June 11, 1979.

[62] The Vietnamese have repeatedly complained that China's use of "anti-hegemonism" in its proposals in the Sino-Vietnamese talks was designed "to deceive the world community" (Radio Hanoi, May 19, 1979). One of the Chinese proposals that is unpalatable to the Vietnamese but is likely to be reiterated to the Soviets, called on both sides to abjure granting military bases to outside powers or trying to secure bases on foreign soil (Han Nianlong's speech in Hanoi, NCNA, Apr. 26, 1979).

[63] Interview in *Newsweek* (New York, NY), July 16, 1979. Li earlier had stated that China had "no intention of changing even slightly its basic stance on international issues" in talking to the Soviets (Kyodo News Service, June 17, 1979). Deng Xiaoping had said he was pessimistic about improving relations with Moscow because the Soviets were "unlikely to give up their hegemonism and social imperialism" (ibid., May 16, 1979). PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiquan told Japanese newsmen in July that "China will not appease but will frontally oppose the world hegemonism of the Soviet Union" (*Mainichi Shimbun*, July 15, 1979).

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Books

"Rules of the Game" in Chinese Politics

by Frederick C. Teiwes

PAUL WONG. *China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition*. New York, NY, The Free Press, 1976.

JANE L. PRICE. *Cadres, Commanders and Commissars: The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920–45*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976.

ROXANE WITKE. *Comrade Chiang Ch'ing*. Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

HUNG LI. *China's Political Situation and The Power Struggle in Peking*. Hong Kong, Lung Men Press, 1977.

LI TIEN-MIN. *Liu Shao-ch'i: Mao's First Heir-Apparent*. Taipei, Institute of International Relations, 1975.

WANG HSUEH-WEN. *Legalism and Anti-Confucianism in Maoist Politics*. Taipei, Institute of International Relations, 1975.

POLITICS in any political system are generally governed by "rules of the game" which are more or less understood by the actors involved. Such rules—or understandings—may be formally enshrined in legal or quasilegal statements of principle, which can vary considerably in practical binding force. Or they may reflect less explicit social mores that draw sustenance from deep-seated cultural proclivities. Or guidelines may simply develop out of behavioral patterns so entrenched within the institutions of the system that leaders and bureaucrats alike know there are certain ways to go about things in order to maximize chances of success.

In China, there have been drastic fluctuations over the years in the personal fortunes of leading figures engaged in politics. But beyond this, the rules of the game have themselves undergone major ups and downs since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949. Now, with Mao's succession apparently resolved and with the post-Mao era already well under way, it is perhaps a good time to reexamine the conventions of Chinese political behavior.

None of the books on Chinese leadership under consideration here really comes to grips systematically with this issue. Paul Wong's attempt to relate career data to actual behavior results only in descriptive hypotheses which on the whole are remarkably similar to those of earlier studies conducted without the author's computer technology or mathematical equations (see pp. 137–38, 201–04, 255–57), and his arguments derive little additional credibility from such inexplicably starry-eyed affirmations of Maoist faith as: "as the highest leaders pass away, essentially a new leadership, which consists of a large proportion of the masses, will take over in the organizational system" (p. 270). In contrast, Jane Price's examination of CCP political training programs before 1945 provides detailed new information on important efforts to inculcate Communist cadres with behavioral norms and usefully reminds us of the substantial debt of Chinese practice to Soviet antecedents (e.g., pp. 106 ff.). Still, her study is essentially descriptive rather than analytic. Roxane Witke —or rather Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) herself—puts greater emphasis on the more informal mores of leadership practice which made life so difficult for an ambitious woman; but such insights and the interesting tidbits of inside information provided notwithstanding, the often tedious recounting of Jiang's side of the story, combined with a paucity of sustained analysis by Professor Witke, detracts substantially from the potential value of this political (auto)biography.

The three volumes published in

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East Asia are hardly more helpful. Hung Li's "power struggle" interpretation of post-1959 Chinese politics occasionally produces interesting ideas but often leads to odd conclusions, e.g., that Jiang Qing and Deng Xiaoping were allies against Zhou Enlai (pp. 66-67). A more fundamental flaw in Hung Li's analysis is that it eschews any explanation why power struggles (allegedly) recur unremittingly. Li Tien-min's more restrained study of Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) sensibly emphasizes Liu's long close working relationship with Mao, yet it provides little new insight into Liu's fall from grace. Finally, Wang Hsueh-wen's polemic—unfortunately the book deserves the epithet—only tangentially touches on questions of leadership politics in any meaningful way as it tirelessly reiterates the Kuomintang assertion that the CCP is destroying traditional Chinese culture.

Despite the shortcomings of each of these works, however, taken together they serve to stimulate our interest in the underlying rules of Chinese leadership politics. In fact, different "rules of the game" can be inferred from the various "models" of Chinese politics implicit in the books. Five overlapping models — or approaches — stand out in particular: (1) a political culture approach; (2) a policy conflict model; (3) a factional or power struggle model; (4) a bureaucratic or complex organizations approach; and (5) a Communist systems perspective. This essay will examine the guidelines for elite behavior suggested by each of these approaches.

WHAT RULES of political behavior can be deduced from a political culture approach? Careful attention to seniority in appointments and a suitable respect for age in leadership interaction would be obvious behavioral guidelines for China (see Wong, p. 169). The muting of conflict, as suggested by the traditional Chinese emphasis on harmony, was clearly an important feature of the early period of the People's Republic, if not of subsequent years. But perhaps most significant was the respect and loyalty due Mao not only as "emperor," but, in Peng Dehuai's words, as "founder of the dynasty."[1]

The adoption of a policy conflict model, in contrast, would draw attention to debate over the optimal strategy for economic growth and how to reconcile such growth with revolutionary socialist values. Depending on the circumstances, such debate can have quite divergent implications for political behavior. In periods of consensus, politics revolves around building support within established institutions for relatively limited adjustments to already accepted overall strategies, while periods of far-reaching disagreement—even if not necessarily in the mold of the "two-line struggle" interpretation, which has come under increasing

[1] **See Peng's alleged comments to Zhang Wentian at the 1959 Lushan meetings, in *Current Background* (Hong Kong), No. 851, 1968, p. 30. Cf. Mao's own comments on emperor worship and the discussion in Witke, pp. 360-61.**

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criticism[2]—can lead to bitter conflict involving extra-party actors and significantly higher stakes for the participants. A new, more forbidding atmosphere emerges as previously respected restraints are dropped from the rules of the game.

The factional model differs from the policy conflict approach in making politics appear to revolve around personalities rather than issues or ideology.[3] Relevant rules for survival in such a system include building networks of long-time associates and constantly readjusting alliances to maintain a favorable balance of power against opposing factions. The bureaucratic model provides yet another focus by highlighting guidelines for maximizing organizational resources, manipulating superiors, and controlling subordinates.[4]

Finally, the Communist systems approach suggests a variety of behavioral guidelines which intertwine with all four preceding perspectives. Rules for bureaucratic manipulation must reflect the parallel hierarchies and penchant for ideological control of Communist systems. The agenda and tactics for debates over developmental strategies are to a significant extent influenced by the experiences of other Communist regimes. Factional conflict also has precedents. The record of personal clienteles in Soviet leadership politics has fueled speculation regarding similar patterns in China, and the anticipation of implacable post-Lenin- and post-Stalin-style succession struggles has sometimes affected analysis. The dominant position attained by leaders of successful Communist revolutions likewise dovetails with that attributed to dynastic founders under the Chinese political culture model.

Yet it is often overlooked that Communist systems have *formal* codes of leadership behavior as well. Such codes are often violated in practice and vary significantly from system to system;[5] nevertheless, they form a critical part of the operative guidelines for political activity. In the Chinese case, a particularly strong set of organizational norms emerged by the early 1940's. The most significant of these were: (1) Leninist discipline, i.e., the implementation of higher-level directives by subordinate organs; (2) collective leadership, i.e., decisions by majorities rather than individuals; (3) minority rights, i.e., the legitimate expression of dissent within formal party bodies; (4) lenient rectification, rather than the harsh purges of the "ruthless struggle and merciless blows" approach ascribed to pre-Mao CCP leaderships; and (5) the handling of disciplinary problems within official organizations, with mass participation in their resolution kept under strict control.

The relationship of these organizational norms to less formal rules of the game is a variable one. Often the relationship is one of mutual reinforcement. Leniency in rectification measures fits nicely with traditional Chinese emphases on educability and elite responsibility, even if it clashes with extreme Confucian social harmony (see Price, pp. 194–95). The defense of minority rights both encourages the open policy process required for sound decisions on developmental alternatives and upholds the tradition of the upright official who honestly speaks his mind. Finally, by their very nature party organizational principles support bureaucratic activity by providing predictable guidelines for behavior. Yet in many instances official norms may also challenge the acceptability of informal behavioral guidelines. For example, factional conflict outside formal CCP bodies and essentially unrelated to policy issues quite clearly stands beyond the pale as "unprincipled" struggle, notwithstanding some tolerance in practice for personal (*quanxi*) ties. Other cases are more ambiguous. The exalted position of Mao as founding father of the revolution (and dynasty) stands uneasily with the principle of collective leadership. The advantages of predictability provided by party principles are somewhat offset by demands, enforced in the name of Leninist discipline, which challenge ploys commonly used by bureaucrats to maximize their own organizational interests. And situations approximating "line struggle" sorely test the restraints of the norms. As even Liu Shaoqi once argued, ideological correctness must ultimately take precedence over any notions of organizational discipline.[6]

The importance of official norms and their interaction with behavior

[2] See the critiques in Frederick C. Teiwes, "Chinese Politics 1949–1965. A Changing Mao," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), January and February 1974; and Lowell Dittmer, "'Line Struggle' in Theory and Practice: The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Reconsidered," *The China Quarterly* (London), December 1977.

[3] For a systematic elaboration of this approach, see Andrew J. Nathan. "A Factional Model for CCP Politics," ibid., January-March 1973.

[4] For a suggestive discussion of rules of getting ahead in the Chinese bureaucratic environment, see Michel Oksenberg, "The Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," ibid., October–December 1968.

[5] Note especially the divergence between Stalinist and CCP practice despite shared Leninist antecedents. Cf. Price's account of the influence of Stalin's preoccupation with ferreting out deviationists on early CCP practice (pp. 89–90), an influence only overcome by the consolidation of organizational norms discussed later in this essay.

[6] See Liu's "Self-Cultivation in Organization and Discipline" (July 1939), in *Chinese Law and Government* (White Plains, NY), Spring 1972, p. 27.

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reflecting less formal understandings can be seen more clearly through an examination of the role of official norms over succeeding periods of history in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Indeed, much of post-1949 Chinese politics can be viewed in terms of the changing vitality of these norms and the extent to which they have been reinforced or displaced by rules of the game derived from other sources.[7]

DURING THE initial period from 1949 to the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in late 1957, formal party norms held up well. Leninist discipline received unstinting support as the CCP's basic organizational principle for cadres at all levels. While cadres were vulnerable to criticism for shortcomings related to overzealous implementation of official policy, the sanctions meted out were generally mild. At the higher levels, the norms of collective leadership and minority rights also functioned smoothly. Mao operated largely as a centrist balancer in these years, warning against excesses of both the left and the right, and was even willing to be overruled by a majority of his colleagues, as evidenced by his acceptance in mid-1956 of the idea of a slowdown in economic growth. When the Chairman undertook dramatic initiatives, as with the Hundred Flowers experiment of 1956-57, he was able to muster a majority once his prestige was on the line.[8] As for policy dissenters, leading figures occasionally suffered mild career setbacks (e.g., Bo Yibo in 1953 over tax policy[9]), but the fact that few members lost their membership status when a new Central Committee was elected in 1956 suggests that top-level officials had little to fear from a frank articulation of their views. Finally, the conduct of elite discipline by and large followed the mild approach laid down by rectification doctrine and kept mass participation under tight rein.[10] Where harsh penalties and aroused masses were prominent—as in the "three anti" campaign regarding retained Kuomintang personnel and during the "anti-rightist" campaign against bourgeois intellectuals—the main targets were suspect nonparty groups, and mass anger was in response to cues from the regular party apparatus.

The vitality of official norms before the Great Leap Forward was also conducive to rules of the game associated with the limited policy conflict and bureaucratic politics models. Operating within the parameters of a broad consensus on modernization along the lines of the Soviet model, leadership debate centered on relatively narrow issues of rates of development and program modifications. Arguments had to be addressed to concrete problems rather than to broad ideological themes, even if the latter were sometimes introduced to provide an overall gloss for a position. The result was reinforcement of the vigorous policy process promoted by the principles of collective leadership and minority rights, a process in which harsh denunciation of opposing positions was largely avoided and formal party discipline was never invoked on policy issues. Limited policy conflict, in turn, contributed to the importance of bureaucratic considerations. With policy debates focused on specific problems, the reliance on bureaucratic expertise was of major importance. Price notes that prerevolutionary training programs generated different orientations based on function rather than factional ties (p. 191), and Wong's data confirm the growing significance of functional differentiation in career patterns after 1949 (p. 241).

Thus, tactics for maximizing bureaucratic interests became intertwined with policy conflict—a process which reached its apex in the open articulation of institutional and local interests at the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956.[11] To a certain extent, the practice of bureaucratic politics clashed with Leninist organizational principles, and the resulting tension was reflected in attacks on "independent kingdoms" and "departmentalism." But in a larger sense official norms provided basic parameters for the bureaucratic game which facilitated its pursuit. Thus, as we have seen, Leninist discipline served as a predictable guideline for success or at least survival. Furthermore, the general leniency of the rectification approach meant that such phenomena as departmentalism and other bureaucratic deviations would not meet with severe pun-

[7] For an extended analysis of the fortunes of CCP organizational norms, see Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965*, White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1979.

[8] See Teiwes, "Chinese Politics 1949-1965. . .," loc. cit., Part I, pp. 6-8; and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. I: Contradictions Among the People 1956-1957*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1974, pp. 86-90, 241-49.

[9] See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. V, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1977, pp. 103-11; and Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 740-41.

[10] A partial exception was the upsurge of criticism during the Hundred Flowers experiment in the spring of 1957. Even here, however, official policy called for control in significant respects. First, the actual disciplining of individual party members was to be on the inner-party model of the Yenan rectification. Morover, the entire process was to be conducted as a "gentle breeze and mild rain," thus promising the most persuasive of disciplinary approaches. See Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, op. cit., Chap. 6.

[11] See MacFarquhar, op. cit., pp. 130-33.

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ishment except in particularly blatant cases. Clear signals would be given when such behavior would no longer be tolerated, and bureaucratic life could be altered accordingly.

In contrast to policy conflict and bureaucratic modes of behavior, factional conflict was clearly inhibited by the strength of party norms in the 1949–57 period. Ironically, the major outbreak of factional activity in these years—i.e, the case of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi—underlines this fact. In a situation where Mao's health was in question and the succession question was raised, Gao and Rao apparently attempted to build a clique based on past career links and a future division of the spoils, with policy issues playing only a minor role at best in their plans. The failure of their effort in part reflected the fact that Gao and Rao were poorly placed for playing the factional game, for in terms of career contacts they were decidedly inferior to their main targets, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. But even more important was the fact that factional behavior in clear violation of existing norms was unacceptable on the grounds that it threatened the relatively open political process which had contributed so heavily to CCP successes.[12]

Finally, developments in 1949–57 were compatible with some major cultural rules. Mao's position remained unchallenged despite the deletion of "Mao Zedong Thought" from the 1956 CCP Constitution in response to international Communist developments. Indeed, quite apart from the various concerns which became apparent in official party statements, one can speculate that Chinese consternation over the attack of Nikita Khrushchev on Yosif Stalin reflected a strong feeling that one simply does not denigrate one's ancestors.[13] Furthermore, the avoidance of high-level purges fit well with the traditional emphasis on harmonious relationships. Finally, Jiang Qing's plight in these years, when she was removed from all official posts with Mao's apparent active consent (see Witke, pp. 224 ff. and 255–56), reflected not only resistance to "outsiders" without appropriate revolutionary credentials, but also deep cultural attitudes opposed to women's mixing in politics.

THE GREAT LEAP Forward marked a fundamental turning point for party organizational norms. These norms were not explicitly rejected before the onset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, but after the Great Leap they began to function in a much more erratic fashion. Minority rights were first called into question by the purge of provincial leaders in late 1957–58, which for the first time since 1949 involved policy views as a major focus of attack. An even more dramatic infringement of these rights came with Mao's 1959 dismissal of Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai following Peng's critique of the Great Leap at the Lushan Plenum of the CCP Central Committee. This punishment for views expressed openly in an official CCP forum caused considerable resentment within higher party circles, where many leaders, including some who disagreed with the substance of Peng's views, felt he had merely been exercizing his legitimate rights.

Linked to the decline of minority rights was the erosion of collective leadership. Concern in this regard surfaced in 1959 also, as various officials grumbled about Mao's increasingly "individual style." Despite efforts by Mao himself to reaffirm the principle of collective leadership, the Chairman's withdrawal to the "second line" in the 1960's actually complicated matters even further. Cut off from ongoing contact with his ranking comrades, Mao's interventions became increasingly unpredictable and thus more difficult to integrate into a functioning collective leadership.

But if norms concerning the policy-making process were increasingly under stress, principles concerning elite discipline were also being threatened. In contrast to the generally mild rectification campaigns of the early and mid-1950's, higher purge rates and harsher sanctions became common after the Great Leap Forward. Distressed party officials even began to complain of the reappearance of the hated "ruthless struggle and merciless blows" methods associated with pre-Mao CCP leaderships, particularly during the anti-right-opportunist drive which followed Peng Dehuai's dismissal. The direct participation of ordinary peasants in the disciplinary process during the 1960's, especially in the "socialist education movement" under Liu Shaoqi's guidance in 1964, likewise had grave consequences for cadre morale. Finally, even Leninist discipline failed to provide a totally reliable guideline for political behavior. Although never challenged in theory, strict discipline was undermined in practice during the 1960–61 rectification campaign by harsh criticisms of hapless cadres whose excesses had been due in large measure to the incredible pressures placed on them from

[12] For a detailed analysis of the Gao-Rao case, see Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, op. cit., Chap. 5.

[13] I am indebted to Wang Gungwu for this observation. In this regard, the apparent unwillingness of the current leadership to go too far in allowing direct criticism of Mao can also be seen as reflecting qualms about the propriety of attacking ancestors.

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above during the Great Leap Forward.

Clearly, formal organizational norms were no longer fully effective regulators of political behavior. At the same time, other rules of the game were in a similar state of uncertainty. Policy conflict could no longer be conducted according to the rules of the 1950's. The Great Leap marked the end of a broad consensus in the party, and policy debate no longer centered on relatively minor adjustments but instead involved—initially at least—far-reaching alternative paths. The guidelines concerning policy conflict were altered to create an increasingly close linkage between policy position and political power, a situation graphically illustrated by the case of Chen Yun. Although not formally disciplined, Chen lost his operational authority over the national economy in late 1957, apparently because of his misgivings concerning the Great Leap strategy, only to regain a key role briefly in 1961–62, when there was a need to cope with the collapse brought on by the strategy he had earlier disapproved. But this linkage was not complete. After the failure of the Great Leap, the leadership of the party groped for new directions rather than polarizing into antagonistic groups. Mao continued to advocate the expression of minority views without fear of retribution—though at the same time he escalated political rhetoric with repeated warnings against revisionism.[14] As a result, a great many concrete issues continued to be thrashed out in normal fashion in official party bodies. Nevertheless, with the stakes clearly higher, a new note of reticence was injected into the policy game, as indicated by Peng Zhen's secret review of Great Leap directives in 1961.

Similarly, bureaucratic politics continued but, because of the indecisiveness of the top leadership in the early 1960's, with even greater leeway and greater risks for individual officials. Thus, the view restated by Li Tien-min that Liu Shaoqi sought to neutralize Mao's initiatives in this period by means of bureaucratic obstruction (p. 152) not only overestimates Liu's control of the bureaucracy but, more important, misperceives the dilemma of officials below the top rank. While Mao's withdrawal to the "second line" did give these officials an opportunity to experiment with their own approaches, it also left them vulnerable to attack from an increasingly disillusioned Chairman. Although unable to offer a coherent program of his own, Mao persisted in intervening with "supreme directives" which, in the words of one leader, were "very difficult to fathom."[15]

With the rules of policy conflict and bureaucratic maneuver becoming increasingly problematic, signs of incipient factional behavior began to appear as well. In contrast to the situation which prevailed in the 1950's, personal contacts of the most intimate kind now came to center stage with the involvement of both Jiang Qing and Liu Shaoqi's wife, Wang Guangmei, in important political issues. Yet it should be emphasized that the activities of these two women were limited to a few specific areas where they served largely, to use Jiang's term, as "roving sentinels" for their husbands. Widespread signs of factional behavior were not yet observable, and appointments still continued to be made by functional and bureaucratic criteria.

Finally, while echoes of traditional themes abounded in the 1958–65 period, these were frequently in conflict with official party norms. The analogy drawn at the time between Peng Dehuai and imperial minister Hai Rui was no mere artistic convenience. It reflected deep feelings that an upright official had been mistreated by the emperor. But at the same time it implied that no redress was possible except by the dispensation of that emperor. Similarly, the growing attention given to the study of Mao's works as an all-purpose panacea and his own comments on the desirability of a personality cult stood in striking and increasing contradiction to the Chairman's repeated calls for collective leadership and his assertion that he was "no god."[16]

THE CONTRADICTIONS of 1958–65 came to a head during the Cultural Revolution, when CCP norms were effectively shattered. The most striking manifestation of this development, of course, was the almost free rein given to student Red Guards and other nonparty "rebel" groups to attack some of the highest party leaders without clear guidance from official structures. At the same time, the sanctions invoked by both nonparty groups and official authorities departed radically from rectification principles. Not only were senior leaders seized and roughly paraded through the streets by Red Guards, but at the Ninth CCP Congress in 1969 some 70 percent of

[14] The Chairman's ambivalence in this regard was clearly indicated in his remarks to the Tenth Central Committee Plenum of 1962, when he noted that class struggle and work were "two different kinds of problems" and "our work must not be jeopardized just because of class struggle." *Chinese Law and Government*, Winter 1968–69, pp. 90, 92.

[15] The quote is from Hu Qiaomu. See Teiwes, "Chinese Politics 1949–1965 . . .," loc. cit., Part II, pp. 14–15.

[16] Contrast Mao's statements in Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution*, New York, NY, Random House, 1971, p. 18; and *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought*, Arlington, VA, US Joint Publications Research Service, No. 61269, 1974, p. 403.

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the previous Central Committee members were dismissed.

Moreover, the charges brought against disgraced officials in fact represented a frontal attack on remaining party norms. Many accusations focused on alleged opposition to Mao and his policies. Yet since in most cases the culprits were being charged ex post facto with expressing what had been the official CCP line of the time in question, the charges directly undermined the concept of collective leadership. Various attacks further demonstrated that policy dissent was now sufficient for punishment even if such dissent were openly articulated within formal party bodies. Assurances of minority rights became meaningless in such circumstances.

Finally, Leninist discipline was challenged by the rejection of arguments by cadres that they were merely implementing higher-level policy. Instead of such "slavish" behavior, a truly committed revolutionary was urged to scrutinize higher directives in "the mirror of Mao's thought" and reject all that did not measure up. Clearly, a Leninist organization could not function in this manner.

WITH THE post-Cultural Revolution effort to rebuild China's political system, it became necessary to provide a new set of organizational principles as well as revived institutions. In the period up to Mao's death, particularly following the demise of Lin Biao in 1971, two distinct approaches to the norms of inner-party life were locked in conflict. While Mao still sporadically backed some traditional principles, the Chairman and those close to him—most notably the so-called "gang of four"—were determined that the new norms reflect the basic ideological thrust of the Cultural Revolution. However, the rebuilding process also offered an opportunity to those associated with pre-1966 political institutions — perhaps Zhou Enlai above all others—to try and restore the organizational principles of the 1940's.

The conflict between the two approaches was perhaps most sharply delineated at the 10th CCP Congress in 1973. The new party constitution adopted at the congress reaffirmed many long-standing norms: Leninist discipline ("the lower level is subordinate to the higher level"), collective leadership ("the minority is subordinate to the majority"), and minority rights ("if a party member holds different views . . . he is allowed to reserve his views"). But the new constitution, and particularly Wang Hongwen's report on it, likewise contained many elements which conflicted with these norms. The continuing primary role given Mao and his thought, even if toned down from Cultural Revolution days, made true collective leadership difficult. The emphasis on the danger of capitalist restoration and the need for recurrent cultural revolutions boded ill for any leaders seeking to exercize their rights to articulate alternative policies. Wang supported the right of nonparty masses to engage in criticism of party leaders without direction from above. And finally he underscored the merits of the rebellious attitudes of 1966–68 and rejected strict obedience to organizational authority by introducing and promoting a new saying from Chairman Mao: "Going against the tide is a Marxist principle."[17]

In the bitter struggles of the post–10th Congress period, these divergent approaches to party principles were both a key issue and a tool of struggle. The "establishment" forces of experienced party officials used rectification concepts to facilitate the rehabilitation of more old-line leaders and demanded disciplined implementation of central decisions, while the "gang of four" encouraged both the new mass supervision aspects of the new constitution as reflected in wall-poster attacks on top leaders and the rejection of "revisionist" directives by lower-level officials in the spirit of "going against the tide."

How did the crisis of party norms in the 1966–76 period affect behavior based on other understandings? In the absence of a stable set of official organizational principles, it became increasingly hazardous to play according to either bureaucratic or policy conflict rules. Given the unpredictability of Cultural Revolution politics, it is hardly surprising that the pursuit of bureaucratic interests became less critical than the quest for political survival for cadres at all levels.[18] Even after the Cultural Revolution, when the revival of institutions once again facilitated the pursuit of bureaucratic objectives, many officials remained unwilling to play active leadership roles because of the traumas of the recent past and the continuing risk inherent in a situation where sharply conflicting signals were coming from Peking.

The Cultural Revolution made the incremental policy game of the 1950's—and to a lesser extent of the 1960's—untenable too. From

[17] See the documents of the 10th Congress in *Peking Review* (Beijing), Nos. 35–36, 1973.

[18] For discussions of strategies for survival during this period, see Richard Baum, "Elite Behavior under Conditions of Stress: The Lesson of the 'Tang-ch'üan P'ai' in the Cultural Revolution," in Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1972; and Parris H. Chang," "Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival during the Cultural Revolution," in ibid.

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1966 to 1968, it was even impossible for a more polarized policy process to function, as the rhetoric of "two-line struggle" justified a wide-ranging ideological *cum* factional struggle, but with little room for true debate on concrete policy alternatives.[19] Following the Lin Biao affair, however, something akin to a genuine "line struggle" did emerge in the policy process, with establishment forces favoring a return to political stability and the pursuit of economic modernization while radicals led by the "gang of four" sought to keep alive the values of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, the rules of policy conflict, as during the Great Leap Forward, came to involve strident characterizations of opposing views and higher stakes for the individuals involved. But unlike the conditions of the Great Leap period, this development was now thoroughly enmeshed with rampant factionalism.

The Cultural Revolution initiated a period of intense conflict involving fundamental ideological issues but manifested in struggles for power and position between groups organized to a large extent on the basis of personal ties. The growing importance of such ties was perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the rise of Jiang Qing to Politburo status (along with another wife, Madame Lin Biao) and by Jiang's use of her new power to take vengeance on those who had slighted her during the 1930's (see Witke, pp. 120–22, 335–36). In effect, with bureaucratic and policy conflict rules of the game no longer providing effective guidelines for behavior, political leaders found themselves increasingly forced to rely on long-standing personal connections, which had been helpful but in a sense dormant as long as politics had revolved largely around institutional and policy considerations, to ride out the storm. Thus, for example, Sichuan leader Li Dazhang's survival was in no small measure the result of his sponsorship of Jiang's party membership in the 1930's (Witke, pp. 353–54). More broadly, the importance of clientele ties determined the disproportionate rise and fall of military men associated before 1949 with Lin Biao's Fourth Field Army as Lin's personal fortunes waxed and waned from 1966 to 1971. And veterans of the Long March—perhaps the classic Maoist revolutionary experience—fared considerably better during the Cultural Revolution than cadres who had participated in underground work under the aegis of Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen.[20] Although the post-Lin Biao period saw greater attention given to institutional and policy interests, the factional alliances of 1966–68 remained a major axis of political conflict up until Mao's death and beyond.

Finally, traditional factors played a major role during the 1966–76 period. Rules derived from political culture must be invoked to make both the Cultural Revolution and Mao's continued pivotal role despite his grave illness during his last few years fully intelligible. Why was the Cultural Revolution "allowed" to happen when it grievously threatened the interests of the vast majority of important political actors in China? The bureaucracy and elite as a whole, who had generally been protected by party norms, were victimized by new instability. No particular institution was a clear beneficiary of the upheaval, and even the People's Liberation Army saw its capacity to perform its major function seriously weakened while significant segments of the military were caught up in the purge. Of the highest leaders on the Politburo Standing Committee, only Lin Biao stood to gain. Yet Mao prevailed on the basis of his personal authority, which certainly derived from his role as revolutionary leader but which, one suspects, was also bolstered by centuries of deference to strong emperors.

The impact of political culture was perhaps even stronger in the Chairman's last years. In the post-Lin Biao period Mao's deteriorating health and the damage done to his prestige by the demise of his personally chosen successor left the Chairman in a weaker position than at any time since the 1930's. Indeed, Hung Li is correct to emphasize the crucial role of Zhou Enlai in this period (pp. 29–30), even if he grossly underestimates Mao's continuing influence. It is probably closest to the truth to say that there existed between Mao and Zhou a complex relationship in which a faithful minister, loyal both to Mao and to the larger community of party leaders—many of whom he had already protected during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution—served as an effective counterweight to a declining emperor. The political influence of Zhou, which in his case too continued right up to the moment of death, despite physical incapacity, was undoubtedly based on many factors; but the traditional image of an upright official may arguably have played an important part. As Hung Li remarked in an earlier context, Zhou "tried to impress people that he was a perfect gentleman and strict moralist . . .

[19] On "two-line struggle" as a method of conflict management, see Dittmer, "'Line Struggle' . . .," loc. cit., pp. 702 ff.

[20] See William L. Parish, Jr., "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1973, pp. 689 ff.; and Donald W. Klein and Lois B. Hager, "The Ninth Central Committee," ibid., January-March 1971, pp. 39, 46.

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[who] knew the right and honorable relationship between a king and his ministers . . ." (pp. 28–29). The fall of Deng Xiaoping after Zhou's death demonstrated that all of Deng's organizational powers did not afford as effective protection against the wrath of the emperor as did the patronage of the loyal minister. Deng's supporters could not effectively resist the will of a dying man, though many of them did make a traditional gesture of disapproval by leaving their posts.[21]

SINCE MAO'S DEATH and the defeat of the "gang of four," the new CCP leadership has been engaged in a systematic effort to restore pre–1966 party norms, despite initial lip service to Cultural Revolution values. This was evident in the proceedings of the 11th CCP Congress of September 1977 and in the new party constitution presented there. Leninist discipline assumed a central place in party behavioral guidelines, with centralism declared even more important than democracy. The rebellious slogan of "go against the tide" was still articulated but was transformed into an attack against factionalism. CCP members were to resist "tides" represented by those engaged in conspiratorial activities, not the legal decisions of higher party bodies. At the same time, the congress placed heavy emphasis on reviving inner-party democracy. Minority rights were upheld, and debate was encouraged by the new constitution's call to "say all you know and say it without reserve." Decisions on all issues were to be made collectively, and tendencies to one-man rule were to be resisted. An effort was made to restore institutionalized methods of handling disciplinary matters through the establishment of commissions of inspection. While mass supervision was still called for, as it had been at the 1973 congress, its role was considerably played down. In actuality, although wall posters have been used since 1976 to criticize individual leaders, there has been an evident desire to keep the practice under control. Finally, traditional "save-the-patient" methods were reasserted, with guidelines for the campaign against the "gang of four" emphasizing a discriminating approach.[22]

The themes of the 11th Congress have been reiterated ever since and have had a major impact on Chinese politics. Emphasis on inner-party democracy has facilitated the revival of an open policy process. A new consensus on priority to economic development has formed, and policy conflict has centered on how to realize this agreed-upon objective. As in the 1950's, the rules of this game require technical expertise and concrete proposals rather than vague ideological broadsides,[23] and numerous work conferences have been held to address vigorously such matters. The new situation has opened the way for a new flowering of bureaucratic politics as various agencies make claims for resources and for programs designed to enhance their own positions.

As the salience of these games has increased, factionalism has come under relentless criticism. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, the restoration of official norms notwithstanding, a decade of factional strife has left deep scars on Chinese political life. Lingering animosities of the Cultural Revolution have been reflected in harsh sanctions against radicals despite the rectification guidelines adopted for the campaign against the "gang of four." Even at the Politburo level, personality conflict linked to the tumultuous 1966–76 decade has been a source of divisiveness, as evidenced in the dismissal of Wu De from his leading posts in the Peking Municipality. Still, the fact that Wu has been allowed to retain Politburo status, in a gesture similar to the treatment accorded downgraded top-level figures before 1966, indicates a strong commitment to change the "winner-take-all" aspects of factional politics which prevailed during the Cultural Revolution. Factional considerations will remain an important feature of Chinese politics for a considerable time to come, but they are likely to be increasingly subordinated to policy and bureaucratic conflicts sustained by official organizational norms.

It is also clear that traditional in-

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[21] On the protest gesture, see Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1976, pp. 11–12. It might be objected in view of Leonid Brezhnev's continued crucial role in the Soviet Union despite his obviously deteriorating health that an explanation should be made more in terms of Communist systems than Chinese culture. The argument here is not of an either/or nature but simply suggests that traditional factors strongly reinforce any Communist systems factors. Also, with regard to Brezhnev, one must emphasize that the Soviet leader has operated on a consensus basis reflecting the interests of the larger ruling group. This approach stands in sharp contrast to that of Mao in his last decade, when he was profoundly out of step with the wishes of the great majority of the CCP elite.

[22] See the documents of the 11th Congress in *Peking Review*, Nos. 35–36, 1977.

[23] For a contrasting perspective, emphasizing differences over the ideological implications of modernization programs, see Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Politics of Modernization in the PRC," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1978. In my view, such differences may indeed exist, and certainly many lower-level officials have been hesitant to commit themselves fully due to fears that they do exist. But any conflict in this regard is far subordinate to the consensus on the need to attach top priority to development.

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fluences will continue to play a significant role, but most likely in a way which reinforces formal party principles. With a new, weak emperor on the throne, the collective leadership of his ministers is enhanced. The Confucian emphasis on harmony fits particularly well the effort to reduce the stakes of leadership conflict. And the reappointment of venerable (and bureaucratically experienced) leaders such as Chen Yun further bolsters the likelihood of effective decisionmaking.

Throughout the history of the PRC, official party norms have by and large been mutually supportive of bureaucratic and limited policy conflict behavior, while being clearly antagonistic toward factional politics. Political culture considerations have played a less consistent role, with Mao's overwhelmingly dominant position always potentially in tension with party norms and since 1959 (and especially since 1966) often in fundamental conflict with them. In the post-Mao period, various considerations, including the absence from the scene of the founder of the Communist "dynasty," the revival of bureaucratic institutions and debate on concrete policy alternatives, and efforts to stamp out factionalism, all augur well for a strengthened set of formal party norms. Given the multitude of problems which have arisen in the pursuit of modernization, these guidelines, or "rules of the game," may prove indispensable to ensuring the stability required for uncertain times ahead.

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Beijing and the Countryside

by Edward Friedman

ELIZABETH JOHNSON and GRAHAM JOHNSON. *Walking on Two Legs: Rural Development in South China.* Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1976.

WILLIAM L. PARISH and MARTIN KING WHYTE. *Village and Family in Contemporary China.* Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1978.

E. B. VERMEER. *Water Conservancy and Irrigation in China: Social, Economic and Agro-technical Aspects.* The Hague, Leiden University Press, 1977.

GORDON BENNETT. *Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

HOLLAND HUNTER. *Chinese and Soviet Transport for Agriculture.* Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974.

THE AMERICAN RURAL SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY DELEGATION. *Rural Small-scale Industry in the People's Republic of China.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION was not the Bolshevik Revolution. This truism contains essential truth, for the relation of ruling groups in Beijing to the peasantry in the provinces in 1949 bore little resemblance to the nastier, darker, and more obdurate situation in Soviet Russia in the first years after World War I. Mao Zedong enjoyed the advantage of popular support in the countryside which V. I. Lenin did not have. What is extraordinary is how near Mao and his closest associates came to frittering away that pool of general goodwill.

All the books under review afford insights into this broad state of affairs. Elizabeth and Graham Johnson's report on their visits to some villages in China's southeastern province of Guangdong in August 1973 provides a short, pleasant introduction to the underlying bond that has existed between government and village, and it also offers a body of honest and shrewd observations about the strains that Mao and his associates placed on that bond through their policies, especially in the 1960's. For example, pork was exported to Hong Kong and rationed in Guangdong. The Dazhai egalitarian incentive system was not popular. And so on.

However, interspersed with such observations is the misleading thesis that things really became favorable for China's peasants only in the mid-1950's, when China abandoned a Soviet model of development and opted for self-reliant agriculture. The fact is that China, with the acquiescence of virtually all its new leaders, had moved in a very anti-Stalinist direction before 1955. Moreover, as Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito and Mao's opponents in China know, what Mao actually did in 1955 was to launch China on a more arbitrary and unpopular course—one which these other leaders saw as Stalinist, one which increasingly privatized the citizenry as the government became more unfathomable and tyrannical.

Mao was obsessed with the question of how to prevent China from becoming like the Soviet Union. Although this goal was highly popular in China and remains so even today, the Chairman's fixation with what Nikita Khrushchev's USSR had supposedly become turned his attention away from too much of what China actually was. That is, Mao grew preoccupied with abstractions which, though decent in nature, were not always relevant and ignored China's particularities. China suffered dearly for Mao's obsession and the political situation which permitted him to turn his rigid perceptions into policy imperatives. Mao actually abandoned his major "Maoist" insight that the paths of China and the USSR were entirely different because they emanated from fundamentally distinct circumstances.

As a result of Mao's initiatives, China's objective was redefined as doing everything to move rapidly toward full socialism and communism. Thus, the portals were opened wide to the excesses of the 1958–60 Great Leap Forward. The

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Great Leap's typhoon-like Communist wind ripped through village China and ruined the economy. That disaster made people skeptical of government-initiated mobilization cum ideological appeals while tempting local officials into a host of petty, familial corruptions. Consequently, the tie between rulers and ruled attenuated, becoming painfully fragile. By steering this misguided course meant to avoid the shoals upon which he believed the Soviet Union had foundered, Mao succeeded in wrecking the Chinese ship of state and in giving Khrushchev hope that by depriving China of the lifeboat provided by Soviet economic aid, he could force a mutiny against Mao's helmsmanship.

From that point on, Mao and China were caught. On the one hand, Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and others criticized the policies and proponents of rapid, imposed transformation of the Chinese countryside. Indeed, Mao finally dismissed the theoretical leader of that Marxist idealist group, Chen Boda, in 1970. But at the same time Mao had to demonstrate the viability of his effort to build a "communism" distinctly different from Soviet practice. Such an imperative opened the way for the sharp politician-theorist Chang Chunqiao and his slowly coalescing extremist group to try to grab power as Mao's true heirs. The group was finally ousted from positions of power in October 1976 and vilified as the "gang of four."

THE HIGHLY political combat over the fate of rural China played havoc with development in the Chinese countryside. Although none of the books considered here pays much heed to the political struggle per se, all do attempt to explain rural development in the People's Republic. In this sense, they offer useful evidence of the impact of the political struggle on the countryside. Their evidence is particularly worthwhile because, despite the political chaos, enough local control and national bureaucratic specialization persisted that efforts to increase supplies of water, fertilizer, seeds, etc., moved ahead slowly, even with significant ups and downs in the process. Major elements of societal continuity, in short, accompanied the internecine slaughter within the ruling apparatus.

In what is far and away the finest survey of rural change in China to date (based on interviews in Hong Kong with refugees from Guangdong), William Parish and Martin Whyte suggest that the sudden intervention of outside officials during the Cultural Revolution led to inappropriate crop choices and decreased farm productivity. We know now that the ultra-Left's stress on self-reliance in grain production, an approach theoretically supposed to free China's peasants from disadvantageous dependence on capitalist world markets, elitist agricultural technicians, and hierarchical, specialized divisions of labor, actually made things worse for the poorest rural provinces in the northern part of the country, thereby increasing the gap between rural rich and poor. Despite the rhetoric, grain was in practice planted on bad lands more suited to other crops. Erosion followed. Yields fell. The poor got poorer.

By 1979, such regions were returning—with great government inputs of capital and know-how—to high-value animal husbandry and forestry. Other, better-suited areas were specializing in grain, and a transportation and trade infrastructure was being built to link the whole. Ultra-left rhetoric had been replaced by genuine progress.

Parish and Whyte also show that male-female equality was set back by the ultra-Left. If measured by the ability of a young woman to marry within her own village, a most important index of whether a village woman would have the human resources for advancement, gender equality actually declined significantly. In short, Parish and Whyte warn us of the danger of taking ultra-Left descriptions of ever more equality as genuine reflections of reality.

Consider education in this regard. The post-Cultural Revolution line of the ultra-Left was that an end to exams would facilitate college entrance for peasant youth. But, even if one lays aside the fact that perhaps more than 100,000 people died in the Cultural Revolution—with one of the results being tremendous damage to education, research, science, and technology — did poor peasant youth actually benefit from such a policy? While the data are incomplete, there are solid grounds for skepticism. Reports from foreign teachers in China on the eve of the Cultural Revolution already showed a sizable and steadily rising proportion of students coming from peasant backgrounds. The ultra-Left's propaganda hid the momentous change that had already taken place. Subsequent revelations also suggest that in the ultra-left period the children of rural cadres were classified as peasants. That is, connections served to deny equal opportunity to the rural poor. The bias of the recently reintroduced exam system may be fairer than the ultra-left bias in favor of the small percentage of entrenched powerholders.

More important, the issue itself may be less decisive than it seemed to the ultra-Left. China's college population remains a minute percentage of college-aged

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youth. Advanced education is more a matter of whether vocational, technical, and other special schools exist for that rural majority. They do, and they are expanding. Of course, the political issue, to which we shall return later, is whether there are avenues of power and access for peasant representatives.

What made the issue of rural education seem larger than life, it should be noted, was Mao's thesis, which the ultra-Left endorsed, that while Khrushchev was in office in the USSR, a capitalist managerial-technical intelligentsia seized power there. Hence, it was argued, China had at all costs to avoid that alleged outcome. But, as those who study the party, the government bureaucracies, and the military in the USSR well know—and as once highly placed, democratically oriented scientists such as Andrey Sakharov have found out—state powerholders in the USSR, as elsewhere, find pliable intellectuals to serve their interests. The technical intelligentsia did not and still does not rule.

THE COSTS for rural people of the abandonment of the knowledge of technicians, the price of China's ultra-left anti-intellectualism, are brilliantly, powerfully, and persuasively described in E. B. Vermeer's volume. This thorough tome on the politics of water, while too dense for a nonspecialist audience, is required reading for all China specialists. Vermeer richly details how attempts at social change by rural mass movements were counterfeit. In fact, as with the Great Leap Forward, they were murderous. Turning labor into a mass athletic contest led to a decline of safety and health standards. What actually leaped forward were accidents and heart attacks. More people were needlessly killed. All peasant workers put in extra hours at no pay. Compensation for the inundation of land and homes caused by big water projects was reduced. Too far left meant ever more exploitation.

In addition, warnings by technicians, specialists, and others about unfavorable consequences of ultra-left policies were treated as needlessly pessimistic and counterrevolutionary. Salinization of the soil increased. The water table fell. Production declined and became more costly.

Naturally enough, the hungry, uncompensated, and corvée workers experiencing these disasters did not become more enthusiastic about ultra-left rural mass mobilization. Continuing ultra-left undertakings therefore turned many villagers sullen and passive.

It is because of the ultra-left disasters of the past that the post-Mao government of China has had to do so much to turn around the rural situation and to woo back the peasantry. Prices for farm products have recently been raised, while prices for farm inputs and rural taxes have been cut. Savings-bank interest rates have been increased. Pressure not to celebrate popular occasions has been reduced. Foreign exchange is used to purchase breeding animals, seeds, and needed machinery—and special consumer items that the population desires. State investment in agriculture has risen. A Ministry of Agricultural Machinery has been organized. Improving the lot of the rural dweller has become China's absolute number one priority.

This picture does not mean that Gordon Bennett's welcome book drawing together the reports of numerous visitors over time to a model commune not far from Canton was erroneous in depicting more or less steady advance. It means rather that we need a more complex and differentiated overview. The Guangdong villages benefited from double and triple cropping, trade with Hong Kong, and a fairly extensive transportation system. And model villages got the best of everything. Many poorer areas went in reverse.

Transport costs, as Holland Hunter's slender pamphlet claims and Vermeer details, can be decisive in determining the extent of progress. Until the government improves the transport infrastructure, as it is now committed to doing, China is condemned to a pattern of low-production, nonspecialized cropping. Rapid exchange of products is essential for high-production specialization to pay. Transportation inputs can transform the partial successes of the past into a more general improvement of the condition of all China's rural citizens.

THE MID-1975 study tour of the American Rural Small-scale Industry Delegation headed by Dwight Perkins convincingly shows how China made the most of its earlier bad situation.

At the same time, the delegation conveyed misgivings about ultra-left policies. Perkins was surprised, for example, that "rural off-farm employment" was not a major goal of the government. In short, the ultra-Left, because it feared the creation of "capitalist" attitudes and interference with food production (its fixation), did not give enough help to the program which promoted higher-value, higher-wage intermediate technology. Furthermore, Perkins viewed small, local enterprises as rational at a given stage but eventually to be transcended by large, more efficient units better suited to meeting the needs of more of the people. The ultra-Left, in contrast, took the small and local as virtually a good

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in itself and ignored the implications of the fact that the poorest areas of the country did not possess the resources, water, or transport to sustain such enterprises.

Today the post-Mao ruling group in China blames the stagnation of rural production on the ultra-Left. There is much truth to that charge, yet it overlooks a lot. It does not take into account that China really has done amazingly well by most ordinary standards, even though it may have fallen far short of its potential. The father of the "Green Revolution," Dr. Norman Borlaug, who surely has no political axe to grind, concluded, based on comparative observations, that the Chinese are carrying out the world's most spectacular Green Revolution.

Moreover, one must remember that the past has not by any means been unreservedly bleak for China's peasants. The original revolution of 1949 destroyed a landlord-usurer order. The new government worked to end famine, misery, and poverty without building up a top-heavy, new, exploitative bureaucracy. The army worked on water control projects. The ultra-Left helped diffuse culture, medicine, and education to the countryside. Local units obtained training for local technicians and received permission to reinvest much of their earnings and pay people more out of expanded production. The government did a good job of protecting society from the buffeting of the world market. Few institutional obstacles precluded diffusion and employment of productive knowledge. In fact, in many if not most regions and periods, the ultra-Left did not run agricultural policy.

The statistics offered by the post-Mao rulers to show that no growth occurred in the past must be treated with the same skepticism as earlier ultra-Left claims that communism and prosperity were just around the corner. To see the immediate past as pure evil created by a malicious enemy is a dangerous error. It leads to the erroneous conclusion that the good guys can now produce miracles. It in fact resulted in the beautiful visions of 1978 which were shattered by the realities of 1979. As a consequence, targets have had to be scaled down.

The problem here is politics. If one group controls the line, the party, and the media, how can it resist the temptation to scapegoat its opponents? The rural dweller remains vulnerable to and mistrustful of those at one policy extreme who seek to negate their opponents at the other extreme. The lack of democracy continues to foster lack of trust and realism because opponents cannot respond and clash in an arena where all members of society can judge the merits of the issues.

The post-Mao group, it is true, has made significant movements in a more humane and democratic direction. But the consequence of a Leninist party, an untouchable military, a tense and unchecked factional situation at the state level, and the restricted contours of ideological discussion (e.g., Mao's policies cannot be criticized directly) could yet reverse these democratic gains. The most hopeful sign—still just a bud which could easily wither and die—is the growth of genuine local elections. There is an effort to assure at least twice as many candidates as the positions available, to welcome non-party nominations from non-party groups, and to foster genuine campaigning and debate on real issues. While this democratic trend has been promoted by some of the highest levels of the party, it has powerful opponents, who fear the result of these first few real elections. Such elections may ultimately bring to the fore more peasant representatives to express their own interests. If so, they may again make real the fundamental original distinction between the Chinese and Russian revolutions—the popular rooting of the Chinese revolution in the leadership's knowledge of, ties to, and identification with the real aspirations of the rural poor.

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Law and Chinese Foreign Trade

by William P. Alford

GENE T. HSIAO. *The Foreign Trade of China: Policy, Law, and Practice.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

GEORGE GINSBURGS. *The Legal Framework of Trade Between the USSR and the People's Republic of China.* The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff FB, 1976.

VICTOR H. LI, Ed. *Law and Politics in China's Foreign Trade.* Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1977.

GORDON BENNETT, Ed. *China's Finance and Trade: A Policy Reader.* White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1978.

ALLEN S. WHITING and ROBERT F. DERNBERGER. *China's Future—Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era.* New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1977.

THE ANIMOSITIES of the cold war era, coupled with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the "gang of four," have instilled in American thought the notion that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has from its inception been an essentially lawless society. Indeed, many Americans—including formulators of US foreign policy and even a large number of China-watchers—believe that the People's Republic has had little use and respect for law, either domestically or internationally. Therefore, the argument goes, whether it be in the area of human rights, treaty commitments, or trade, we in the US need not bother ourselves particularly with legal concerns when dealing with China.

The works by Gene Hsiao and by George Ginsburgs, and many of the contributions to the volume edited by Victor Li, go far toward dispelling the notion of Chinese lawlessness which is still prevalent in the US. For, as these authors show, although the Chinese neither are now nor ever have been as enamored of law and lawyers as Anglo-American society, it is equally evident that they have in fact not been adverse to relying upon law—especially when it has been to their advantage.

The Chinese have—in Confucian and Communist days alike—always been suspicious, if not disdainful, of law as a tool for regulating political, social, or even commercial activity. Worthy individuals, the Chinese have felt, know instinctively what is proper behavior and therefore do not need external rules to guide them. Unworthy persons do not know what is proper and accordingly will find a way to twist or evade any set of rules; what is needed to right their behavior is not laws but rather moral reeducation.

Nonetheless, the Chinese, as evidenced throughout their history and underscored again this past year by a spate of major legal undertakings, including the promulgation of a new criminal code and a law governing joint ventures with foreign investors, recognize that law has its uses. There is a curious aptness in devising laws for dealing with foreigners in commercial matters, for, as Chinese myth would have it, law did not originate in Chinese culture, but rather was the creation of "barbarian" (i.e., non-Chinese) society.

A comprehensive overview of the role of law in China's foreign trade from the late years of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) to the early 1970's is provided in Professor Li's volume, which contains 14 papers delivered at a 1971 London conference on Chinese law but generally updated through early 1973 (or 1976 in the case of Professor Li's introduction). This helpful work consists of four parts. The first is historical—made up of insightful essays on the regulation of trade in late Imperial China and on the state control of foreign trade in the early years of the People's Republic. These essays, by Professor R. Randle Edwards of Columbia Law School and Professor Li of Stanford Law School respectively, reveal that, notwithstanding first a Confucian and then a Communist unwillingness to promulgate an intricate system of laws in the foreign trade area, neither late Imperial officials nor early Communist cadres were loathe to develop and apply

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legal rules for their commercial intercourse with "foreign devils."

The second major component of the Li volume is a series of country studies—largely by practitioners—in which the experience of China's major trading partners (including Japan, West Germany, the US, and the USSR) is examined. Although these essays do not encompass the extraordinary events of the past six years, they nonetheless are still valuable references both for historians of the first two decades of the PRC's foreign trade activity and for members of the legal community now engaged in interaction with the Chinese. Of particular interest is Alan H. Smith's piece on the PRC's trade with Hong Kong. Although he readily acknowledges that Hong Kong is a special case, Smith shows that when "[p]laced in a private enterprise and common law environment, the PRC-associated companies . . . find little difficulty in operating within the system . . . [and using] the law to protect and promote their business interests" (p. 212).

The third part of *Law and Politics in China's Foreign Trade* comprises essays on fairly specialized practical concerns arising in the China trade, such as the personal security of foreigners, methods of payment, the structure of the state trading apparatus, and Chinese maritime law. Although it is evident from Harvard Law School Professor Jerome Cohen's thoughtful account of the treatment of foreigners that doing business in China is no routine matter, the essays by British attorney Tony Dicks on admiralty and by the German scholar Frank Münzel on banking show China's practice in these areas to be remarkably close to international norms.

The fourth and final component of Professor Li's book consists of reprints (in English) of various Chinese legal materials, including contracts, arbitration rules, and shipping documents. Although they are all at least six years old, the contracts reprinted in the volume are fairly typical of the most basic contracts utilized by the Chinese today. Any lingering doubt that the Chinese are attentive to legal detail — notwithstanding the fact that their standard commercial contracts generally are shorter than ten pages—should vanish when one compares how the payment, shipping, insurance, and force majeure terms differ between their purchase and sales contracts.

Professor Gene Hsiao's work on China's foreign trade is appreciably shorter than Professor Li's but is nonetheless almost as comprehensive, on the whole more current, and simpler to use (being the product of one person's hand). To be sure, portions of the work—such as the detailed statistical charts included in the chapter on China's foreign trade policy objectives—seem somewhat dated and of uncertain utility save to the historian. Nevertheless, Professor Hsiao, who teaches at Southern Illinois University, is to be commended for his systematic account of the first 26 years of the PRC's experience in foreign trade and his keen analysis of the Chinese perspective on trade matters. As do so many of the contributors to Professor Li's volume, Professor Hsiao shows graphically and convincingly that although the Chinese have been less legalistic than the West and have been more inclined to subordinate legal to political considerations, they nonetheless understand the function of law in international commerce and have been able to use it adroitly to their advantage.

Hsiao's book closes with an extensive bibliography and reprints of an impressive array of legal materials (including contracts, arbitration rules, and government-to-government trade agreements). However, the practitioner regrets the absence in this book, as in Professor Li's collection, of a glossary of Chinese legal and trade terms.

The third of the volumes, Professor Ginsburgs' expanded and updated version of his contribution to the Li collection, is intended more for an audience of academicians than for one of practitioners, yet it offers considerable practical insight into the Chinese approach toward trade. The work traces Sino-Soviet trade relations between 1949 and 1972 in extensive detail. As Ginsburgs—a Professor at Rutgers-Camden Law School—shows, relations between the two Communist states in the vital area of trade were less than harmonious even in the early years. Nonetheless, the short-lived relationship that did exist between the Communist world's two great powers was for its duration one marked by a willingness to encapsulate their commercial and economic interaction in a legal framework.

Neither the collection of materials on China's trade and finance by Professor Gordon Bennett of the University of Texas nor the essays in the book by Professors Alan Whiting and Robert Dernberger, both of the University of Michigan, deal directly with the question of law in China's foreign trade. The first—a reader containing a number of interesting and revealing documents about China's banking practice and economy in general—is difficult to use, for although Professor Bennett does provide short introductions to the documents presented, he does not include either a table of contents or an index detailed enough to guide the reader to desired topics. The second book consists of two essays on China of the 1980's, the first by

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Professor Whiting on foreign policy and the second by Professor Dernberger on economic objectives. In essence, these two provocative essays suggest that as China assumes a more prominent position as a world leader during the next decade, her acts are likely to be increasingly tempered by the pragmatism which has come to characterize so much of her behavior in the years since the downfall of the "gang of four."

RECENT events in China provide abundant confirmation of the picture of the pragmatic Chinese approach to law presented in the works by Professors Li, Hsiao, and Ginsburgs described above. Specifically, over the course of the past year, the Chinese have launched a series of bold legal undertakings on both the domestic and foreign fronts which illustrate vividly that the Chinese understand the utility of law even if they view it far less positively than Westerners do.

On the domestic side, the most notable of the undertakings of the past year has been the development of a new criminal code and its promulgation at the June-July 1979 session of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC). Although in theory the code offers fewer protections of individuals' rights than does, say, the system of criminal justice in the US, and in practice may not provide even those safeguards it offers theoretically, it nonetheless represents a marked improvement over its predecessor codes. For example, the code offers citizens the right to an attorney in all criminal actions (to be appointed by the court, if necessary) and places stricter prohibitions against both the extraction of confessions by torture and the collection of evidence by "threat, enticement, deceit and other illegal means."[1]

The issuance of a new criminal code is not the only major legal step taken of late by the Chinese on the domestic front. During the past year the Chinese have revised their labor law, issued (in some locales at least) rules governing the inheritance by citizens of the People's Republic of property left to them by Overseas Chinese, and promulgated environmental protection laws.[2] The last-mentioned in particular represent quite a departure from the days of the United Nations-sponsored Stockholm conference on the human environment in 1972, at which the Chinese reportedly brushed aside those foreigners who urged the Chinese to learn from the developed world's mistakes, saying that China could not be concerned about industrial pollution until it had first developed an industrial base capable of polluting.[3]

On the international front, China's most significant legal development of the past year—if not of the past decade—has been the promulgation by the NPC of a law to govern joint ventures with foreign investors. Although it intentionally leaves a number of key questions unanswered and will undoubtedly raise others as it is put into practice, the law as a whole is a remarkably well balanced and pragmatic effort to strike a compromise between the interests of the Chinese and those of potential outside investors. Under the law, any joint venture established on Chinese soil is to be controlled by the Chinese and subject to Chinese law. Foreign investors, who may contribute equipment, technology (provided it is advanced and appropriate to China's needs), personnel, or cash, will be entitled to a profit (in the same proportion as their investment), which they may repatriate.[4]

The development of a law on joint ventures has not been China's only noteworthy legal development on the international front in the past year. In a further effort to facilitate expanded commerce with the West, the Chinese have begun seriously to consider revision of their own tax and patent laws and the development of a copyright statute. In regard to tax matters, the Chinese have been studying the foreign tax credit provisions of the US Internal Revenue Code, with the apparent goal of applying their own tax code to American companies operating in China in such a way as to assist those companies in securing tax credits.[5] In regard to patent and copyright law, the Chinese have sent teams of observers to Japan and to the appropriate world organizations, as it is their goal ultimately to develop provisions in these areas capable of quieting the concerns of foreign investors and trading partners about the ability of the Chinese to protect foreign industrial property rights.

AT THE SAME time that they have been undertaking such major legal

[1] *The Law of the People's Republic of China on Criminal Procedure adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979*, Beijing, *Xinhua* News Agency, July 7, 1979, Part 1, Articles 8 and 32.

[2] Information on these legal developments was derived by the author during trips to China in 1978 and 1979. See also *China Business Review* (Washington, DC), May–June 1979.

[3] See Jerome A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, *People's China and International Law*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 1377.

[4] *The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National Peoples Congress, on July 1, 1979*, Beijing, *Xinhua* News Agency, July 8, 1979.

[5] China's interest in the tax law of the United States was conveyed in discussions between Chinese officials and the author during his August 1979 visit to the PRC.

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developments on both the domestic and international legal fronts, the Chinese have also taken steps to resume on a large scale the training of the individuals needed to administer these laws. In the past year, a growing number of Chinese universities—including the prestigious Beijing University—have resumed instruction in law, which had been interrupted (along with the study of most other humanistic disciplines) during the Cultural Revolution and the heyday of the "gang of four." Chinese legal scholars have begun to reemerge after a period of temporary eclipse. In recent months, such scholars from Beijing University have visited American universities and have received foreign delegations.[6] A limited number of Chinese students are now studying law at Harvard and Hong Kong universities, and there is talk of US students studying law in China in 1980. Moreover, in recent months, the Chinese government has undertaken an unprecedented mass media campaign to inform the populace of the latest legal developments—including the publication of popular texts and journals on law and the broadcast of a full trial and special programs on law.[7]

This recent burst of legal activity in China ought not to be construed as representing a wholehearted self-transformation by the Chinese into a nation of legalists. For there has been no departure by the Chinese from their traditional view of law as an imperfect tool for the regulation of society. Rather, in launching their most recent set of legal undertakings, the Chinese have merely affirmed that they understand the utility of law and are quite capable of using it when necessary to foster their own modernization and create the climate required to attract those forms of foreign investment and commerce China deems appropriate.

[6] One such foreign delegation was that led by former US Ambassador to France Sargent Shriver, and the author in August 1979.

[7] *Beijing Review* (Beijing), July 20, 1979, p. 3.

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Eurocommunism: Challenge to West and East

by Gianfranco Pasquino

RUDOLF L. TÖKÉS, Ed. *Eurocommunism and Détente.* New York, NY, New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1978.

ROY GODSON and STEPHEN HASELER. *"Eurocommunism." Implications for East and West.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

HELMUT KÖNIG. *Der Rote Marsch auf Rom. Entstehung und Ausbreitung des Euro-Kommunismus* (The Red March on Rome. The Origin and Expansion of Eurocommunism). Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag, 1978.

GIOVANNI BENSI. *Mosca e l'eurocomunismo* (Moscow and Eurocommunism). Milan, "La Casa di Matriona," 1978.

ANNIE KRIEGEL. *Eurocommunism: a new kind of communism?* Translated from the French by Peter S. Stern. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

R. NEAL TANNAHILL. *The Communist Parties of Western Europe. A Comparative Study.* Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1978.

"A GHOST is haunting Europe: the ghost of communism. But is it the same Europe? And is it the same ghost?" asks Pierre Hassner in one of the recent outpouring of books and articles on Eurocommunism.[1] Unfortunately, most of the contributions on the phenomenon are, at best, informed speculation and, at worst, political pamphleteering. In large measure, the volumes that are reviewed here suffer from these same drawbacks. Thus, while the books by Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler and by Helmut König are modestly informative—certainly more so than Giovanni Bensi's work—their policy recommendations are either shallow or unsoundly based. Only John C. Campbell's contribution on "Eurocommunism. Policy Questions for the West" in the volume edited by Rudolf L. Tökés, offers a thoughtful, balanced, and intelligent approach to Eurocommunism, albeit from an American perspective. What is still lacking is a historically documented and theoretically informed explanation of the variables which have produced the changes labeled as Eurocommunism.

THE LABEL "Eurocommunism" is, of course, misleading. One could legitimately apply the term to certain non-European Communist parties (e.g., the Japanese and Australian), and there are likewise certain European Communist parties (for instance, the Portuguese CP and the Greek Communist Party-Exterior) that do not share most of the features associated with Eurocommunism. Nevertheless, the label is useful as a sort of shorthand. For purposes of the present article, "Eurocommunism" is taken to mean a *process,* not a fixed and accomplished phenomenon, but a temptation—as Annie Kriegel puts it—undergone by some European Communist parties, more specifically Southern European parties. In examining this process, the reader should be reminded from the beginning that there are many variations among Eurocommunist parties not simply with respect to membership size and electoral strength, political influence and domestic strategies, internal organization, and social presence, but also in terms of the major components of the process of Eurocommunization.

In particular, Eurocommunist parties differ from each other in terms of their evolution away from support of the Soviet Union and toward criticism of that country (a trend that so far has not advanced much beyond "critical solidarity"—i.e., continued general solidarity with the Soviet Communist Party combined with exercise of the prerogative to criticize its specific acts) and in terms of their respective positions on the most important issues concerning the governance of democratic societies—i.e., abidance by the rules of

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[1] See Pierre Hassner, "Postwar Western Europe: The Cradle of Eurocommunism," in the collection edited by Rodolf Tökés, the first of the volumes reviewed here.

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the electoral game, respect for all "bourgeois" freedoms, adherence to the persistence of a multiparty system and to the principle of alternation in power. This diversity reminds us that we are dealing with a process—neither inevitable nor irresistible—with varying rhythms for different parties, with thresholds and, perhaps, turning points with regard to domestic evolution as well as to international posture.

However, we still lack an authoritative and global explanation of this process.[2] None of the books under review really provides a theoretically satisfying and balanced treatment of the several components relating a Communist party's organization to its strategy and behavior, although some good material in this vein is supplied by some of the individual contributions to the Tökés collection—Ronald Tiersky on the French Communist Party (PCF), Eusebio Mujal-Leon on the Spanish and Portuguese Communist parties (PCE and PCP), and Norman Kogan on the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Similarly, Annie Kriegel's book offers some useful inputs regarding the PCF, based on her wide knowledge of—and hate-relationship with—that party, but her references to the PCI are often completely off the mark (as on pp. 86 and 91). R. Neal Tannahill's comparative study gives perhaps the best synthesis of the available knowledge of Eurocommunism in its many aspects, but, unfortunately his ambitious theoretical effort falls short.

The origins of Eurocommunism as a process are usually traced to détente, itself not a situation but a process—one which in turn is neither inevitable nor irresistible. However, the nexus between the dynamics of the international environment and changes in the doctrine, attitudes, and behavior of the West European CP's needs to be examined more closely. Thus, while there is no doubt that an increase in international tensions, a reversal of détente, would make the situation of the West European CP's more difficult, their evolution cannot be simply and globally linked to détente. Most of those who have addressed the linkage between détente and Eurocommunism even tangentially seem to believe that a lessening of détente, a sharpening of tensions between East and West (especially on the European continent) would considerably damage the chances of West European CP's to acquire a role in their respective governments. Moreover, according to this speculation, international tensions would reduce the size of Communist electoral support, or, at the very least, push the parties into isolation, as during the cold war, and thereby make it almost impossible for them to enter into indispensable coalitional arrangements. Few authors explore the possibility that heightened international tension would provide an incentive for West European CP's to break decisively with the USSR. Yet it might be of some interest to identify conditions and occurrences that might produce just such a break (even if Communist spokesmen refuse to speculate on the issue).

The situation most frequently mentioned in this last context is that of a possible Soviet intervention — however disguised — in a succession crisis in Yugoslavia. The most frequently mentioned scenario sees the Italian CP as needing to take a clear stand against Moscow's actions and to rally other Southern and West European CP's—perhaps even NATO—against the Soviet intervention. Since the Italian Communist leaders have already laid much of the groundwork of explaining to "comrades" inside and outside the party the importance and sensitivity of the Yugoslav case, a Soviet attempt to forcibly shift Belgrade to Moscow's side might create conditions for a break with the USSR by some West European CP's. Under such circumstances, one might anticipate possible additional electoral gains for West European CP's and certainly the removal of a major objection to their participation in West European governments—i.e., the fear that the CP's subordinate national interests to Soviet foreign policy interests.

However, there is an alternative scenario to a break between the West European CP's and Moscow in the event of a Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia. The USSR might attempt to paralyze those parties, if necessary by splitting them. This the CPSU would do by cultivating sympathetic Communist leaders and militants, with the PCF being both the most important and most promising target in Moscow's eyes, and with the PCP, PCI, and PCE less so, in descending order. But, in light of the clumsiness—almost nonchalance—that the Soviets display in their maneuvers and the difficulty that they would encounter in trying to shift the positions of large Communist parties, this scenario would be conceivable only under conditions of prolonged international crisis, and even then it would be problematic.

The complexity of the interaction of the behavior and expectations of West European CP's and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is highlighted in

[2] Donald Blackmer's *Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World*, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1968, and his piece in Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Eds., *Communism in Italy and France*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975, remain landmarks in the study of the PCI.

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Robert Legvold's contribution to the Tökés volume. He starts from the premise that "West European communism is to be understood as a problem, object or hope of Soviet foreign policy," and cautions that if one is to study this topic, "the missing dimensions have to be restored, their interplay sorted out, and their different, sometimes competing effects put into perspective." Legvold singles out for comprehensive, balanced, and imaginative treatment the following major dimensions:

First, the inter-party dimension, that is, these parties in their relations with Soviet and East European communism; second, the internal dimension, these parties as the bearers of change within their own societies; and third, the international dimension, these parties as an increasingly important factor in East-West relations. (p. 316)

A FRUITFUL WAY of looking at these dimensions is as challenges. The most formidable would seem to be the internal challenge. In this perspective, Eurocommunism, as a substantive process, represents the challenge to the CP's of Western and Southern Europe to demonstrate their capability to revise their doctrines (ideological, political, and economic); to modernize and democratize their party structures; to formulate coherent defense and military policies and to adopt independent foreign policy positions; to respect pluralism, while at the same time maintaining (or acquiring) the role of representative of large social strata; and to innovate in their social policies. Can the Eurocommunist parties change themselves while changing their societies through democratic means? Will they be willing or able to pay the price of electoral and other political setbacks in order to introduce profound reforms?

From what we know so far about these parties, the PCI and possibly the PCE might be capable and willing to take this road, while the PCF and PCP seem reluctant to engage in such a "war of attrition." In assessing the possibilities, Ms. Kriegel notes that leaders of the French, Italian, and Spanish CP's "sincerely *desire* to change"; however, she asks rhetorically, "But into what are they *capable* of changing? At what price? And what risks are they willing to run?" (p. 5) It is clear that the author has ready-made, largely negative answers to these questions. One is left to wonder why such an insightful analyst remains so much a prisoner of her preferences and biases. Or is it that she allows her global vision to be determined by an obsession with the French case? True enough, in the major test of the March 1978 French elections, the French Communist leaders clung to "party patriotism" (*patriotisme de parti*), to protection of the citadel of the "countercommunity," as the paramount standard. They clearly preferred not to jeopardize in the least the purity of their organizational structure and political constituency by possibly participating in a victory of the Left in which the PCF would have been the junior partner. When one turns to the PCI, however, there is a different picture. The Italian CP, although better entrenched in its country's leftist alignment, has been willing to run many risks in order to shape the policymaking process in Italy.[3] And even the smaller Portuguese CP (by offering to abstain on establishment of a minority Socialist government) and the Spanish CP (by its signing with the ruling Union of the Democratic Center and opposition Socialist Workers' Party of the economic and political agreement known as the Moncloa Pact) have shown their willingness to go beyond the traditional philosophy of opposition: so much the worse, so much the better. These changes, the motivation behind them, and their consistency over time, constitute a major portion of what we mean by Eurocommunism domestically.

BUT WHAT KINDS of changes and challenges will appear on the international scene if one or more West European CP's enter into the governments of their respective countries? Annie Kriegel voices a minority opinion: "For the moment Eurocommunism is a process of differentiation in the international communist movement that by itself does not modify the strengths of the camps and the forces at the international level" (p. 114). She may be right, but most authors take a different view. Pierre Hassner, Legvold, Tökés all see both gains and liabilities for the West. Tannahill, König, Godson and Haseler, and Bensi are more inclined (in ascending order) to emphasize—as do most Western policymakers—the actual and potential gains for the Soviet Union.

This reviewer starts from the premise that Eurocommunism constitutes a challenge to both East and West. To distinguish the various elements of this challenge—actual and potential—to the two camps, one must first assess the real value of West European Communist parties to the Soviet Union. As Legvold argues (Tökés, p. 317), Moscow's major concerns vis-à-vis these parties are (1) to reinforce Soviet prestige among them and the CPSU's leadership over them,

[3] See Stephen Hellman's thoughtful contribution, "The Italian CP: Stumbling on the Threshold?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1978, pp. 31–48.

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(2) to get them to sanction or, at least, tolerate the course of events in Eastern Europe, and (3) to have their cooperation in the dispute with China.

It is on the first count that the West European CP's present the greatest challenge to Soviet goals. No matter what kind of references these parties still make to the October Revolution, none is willing to consider the Soviet Union as a model of socialism. The USSR's technological achievements might be extolled (recently in much subdued manner), its military power might inspire awe (publicly) and preoccupation or fear (privately), but its domestic organization and functioning rarely escape some form of direct or indirect criticism from the West European Communists. While the Soviet Union is certainly not an anti-model for all parties and members—as Jean Elleinstein would have it be—the awareness is relentlessly growing that the Soviet path belongs to a different, unrepeatable experience. Understandably enough, Soviet leaders and ideologues are unwilling to concede this totally. They might accept the idea that there are national roads to socialism, but they insist that the end-product must be the dictatorship of the proletariat exercised through its best-prepared and most conscious representatives organized in the Communist party, the vanguard of the working class.

In this context, then, Eurocommunism can easily become, has already become, the bearer of two types of challenges to the Soviet Union: ideological and political. While there is ample room for doctrinal challenges—largely occupied by a critical reading and imaginative adaptation of the thought of Antonio Gramsci (especially in the PCI) and by the delimitation of the relevance and pervasiveness of Leninism (in all parties)—it is the political challenges that are the more serious.

One major political challenge relates to the traditional role of the West European CP's in extolling the prestige of the Soviet Union ("the great anti-fascist, anti-imperialist motherland of socialism") and thereby perhaps lessening hostility toward the USSR or at least preventing the emergence of an anti-Soviet consensus in Western societies. It should be noted that the Soviet Union in turn was long viewed by West European CP's as an anchor, a source of reflected prestige, an object of political identification. Kriegel speaks of the danger to the CP's of "foundering in a crisis of identity. . .in the process of moving away from the source of Soviet orthodoxy" (p. 71). However, for the last 10 years or so, criticism of what PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer defines as "illiberal traits" of the Soviet political system and of deviations from "socialist legality" there have become frequent and widespread, even if sometimes mild and convoluted.

The criticisms are obviously not welcome to the Soviet leaders, but as long as they are kept within certain limits, they are not perceived as major threats. However, the attack by PCE Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo on the very legitimacy of the Soviet state, his support for a third way between social democracy and Soviet communism, and his suggestions to Soviet comrades that they establish a "true workers' democracy" struck at the heart of the position of supremacy taken for granted by Soviet leaders (the privilege to define what is right and what is wrong on matters of socialism). In effect, Carrillo lent legitimacy to the idea that *anti-Sovietism* is not identical with *anti-communism*. In the process, he challenged the principle that West European CP's should above all play an active role in reinforcing the prestige of the USSR; in fact, he seemed to be working deliberately in the opposite direction. To be sure, not all the parties or CP leaders follow precisely in Carrillo's footsteps. Characteristically, the Italians have quietly shelved the Soviet experience and relegated it to the status of an object of detached historical inquiry. The French still pay lip service to the Soviet experience—in part to mask the poverty of their own theoretical elaborations, in part because of continuing genuine attachment. This attachment, however, has not prevented the PCF from sharply criticizing the (belatedly "discovered") existence of Soviet concentration camps, and of pressing the case of (some) Soviet dissidents, with all the necessary and unnecessary distinctions.

The issue of dissent represents a second area in which Eurocommunism constitutes a challenge to the USSR. Expression of concern over the treatment of dissidents and support for their views is a major way of recognizing that there is something rotten in the kingdom of the Soviet Union (and for that matter in the associated East European kingdoms). It is also, of course, an opportunity (if such is wanted) for the West European Communists to demonstrate with actions and incisive statements their advocacy of civil and political rights not just in bourgeois democracies, but for nonsocialist opponents in established "socialist" societies. There have been considerable ambiguities and variations in intensity of such responses. Nevertheless, one detects a trend toward an overall increase in sensitivity on the part of Eurocommunists to this issue.

The evolving Eurocommunist

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positions on the phenomenon of dissent and the treatment of dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe are linked to another major, if potential, challenge of Eurocommunism to Moscow. Implicit in these positions is the possible emergence of an alternate model to Soviet communism—a challenge that is usually defined as an infection, a contagion that might plague the socialist regimes (one is reminded of Leszek Kolakowski's references to "sick Stalinism"[4]). The analogy is somewhat misleading, for to the degree that Eurocommunism is a process that leads or tends toward the shaping of democratically oriented parties respectful of bourgeois freedoms and political principles, that aims at building a pluralist regime, then it must be viewed as a process of recovery from the disease of Stalinism. But good health or recovery is not contagious; hence, one might suggest that the chances that Eurocommunism will spread are minimal.

Actually, we know very little about the international, interparty transmission of ideas and the adoption of political models (William E. Griffith's detailed essay on "The Diplomacy of Eurocommunism" in the Tökés collection only scratches the surface of this issue). One cannot deny, however, that there has been considerable reciprocal influence—again with variations and unevenness—among the West European CP's. Ms. Kriegel notes "the coaching role played by the Italian Communist party in the development of the French and Spanish parties . . ." (p. 34). As for relations between the Eurocommunists and the socialist states, one could probably argue the case two ways: that Eurocommunism will prove "contagious" or that socialist countries will develop immunities to the process—i.e., that there will be either rapprochement or polarization. But the sequential appearance and reappearance in Eastern Europe of explosions and demands for liberalization and democratization do suggest the existence of a spreading effect. The antigerms for recovery appear to be there—kept in check in the last instance only by a powerful and ruthless Red Army. The question remains: Can the positive germs of Eurocommunism be exported and take hold within the East European CP's?

Godson and Haseler see little likelihood of some sort of "a 'convergence' between a 'Eurocommunist' Southern Europe, and the regimes of Eastern Europe" (p. 102). With the Southern European CP's still not established as a pole of attraction, the direction of influence seems to have been the other way, with the Prague Spring of 1968 supplying the most important accelerator and issue leading West European Communists to embark on the path of a "liberal communism." (To this, one would, of course, have to add the impetus given by the lessons of the Chilean tragedy concerning coalition politics, the need for bargaining and for gradualness in reform, the importance to be attributed to political-constitutional mechanisms and historical traditions, and the requirement of making cold assessment of international realities.) If this direction of influence flow has been the dominant one, what does Eurocommunism have to export to East European communism? Is Eurocommunism but an additional form of heresy (following Titoism and Maoism), whose impact on the Soviet bloc and its political development has been on the whole very limited. Both of the earlier schisms involved defiance of Soviet domination over the Communist world, of CPSU pretensions to be the interpreter of "orthodoxy," of Moscow's request to be recognized and revered as the exclusive center of world communism. In neither case was the challenge taken directly to the heart of the Soviet system. Even though Mao and Tito implemented different strategies of domestic development, their models could not be transplanted and, in sum, were not so different from the Soviet model.

By contrast, Eurocommunism has the potential for mounting such a fundamental challenge. If it evolves steadily and positively—fully accepting political democracy as not only a necessary but the best and only framework under which to struggle for socialism and to accomplish socialist transformations—Eurocommunism may indeed create a pole of attraction for East European Communist leaders. In highlighting "the shared characteristics and perhaps the shared destiny of Eurocommunism and democratic and socialist dissent in Eastern Europe," Tökés stresses that

both have arisen as protest movements against Stalinist orthodoxy and Soviet domination and have been fueled by a perceived sense of powerlessness in the political environments which they seek to change through nonviolent means. (p. 491)

However, it is one thing for Eurocommunism to become attractive to East European dissidents and wholly another for it to be able to serve as a source of pressure on the Communist leaders in power. Speaking of Jean Elleinstein's idea of the PCF as a "pole of attraction," Annie Kriegel correctly asserts: "Before this French 'democratic

[4] Cited on the concluding page of Giovanni Bensi's book.

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socialism' reaches a level of consistency and stability enabling it to perform as a credible challenge and a workable model likely to rival the deficient Soviet version, the Soviet Union will have an ample buffer period" (p. 112). But what is even more important, Eurocommunism can only provide a meaningful pole of attraction if major transformations in Western Europe take place, including minimally the ascent to power in the same period of time not only of a "reconstructed" PCF but of the Italian party as well.

Thus, the "realists" are right, at least with respect to the short run: Eurocommunism is not in a position to bring about major changes in the East. However, such a judgment may be shortsighted. Many unexpected upheavals have occurred in the Eastern sphere in the past, and one cannot preclude further breaks in continuity: a generational renewal of the Soviet leadership is overdue; pressures for change exist in Poland and Hungary; not all the flowers of the Prague Spring have blossomed or been stifled. Thus, one can hardly discount the possibility that Eurocommunism will have a substantial impact not only in terms of relations between Eastern and Western Europe but also specifically in terms of pressures for liberalization in the East.

Ms. Kriegel notwithstanding, Soviet leaders and ideologues do consider Eurocommunism a headache. Otherwise, they would not devote so much time and attention to the phenomenon, to its changes over time, to the pronouncements of Eurocommunist leaders, to subsequent rebuttals and applications of political pressure. The sheer outpouring of documents, statements, and refutations emanating from the CPSU is good evidence of Soviet preoccupation with this ghost, no longer a spectre dreamed up in Moscow.

HOWEVER, Ms. Kriegel is right when she denounces the wishful thinking and/or manipulative statements of those analysts and West European Communists who would make believe that Eurocommunism will be a windfall for the West. In the field of defense and military policies, there is little doubt that the ascent to power of a Eurocommunist party would require some accommodation on the part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The presence of a Communist party in the government of a NATO member could not but be seen as a setback to a US policy premised on the reduction of Communist influence in Western Europe. Whether as a Soviet Trojan horse or on their own account, West European CP's are bound to challenge NATO military and defense policies. Even where these Communists temporarily accept NATO as a shield under which it might be easier to build their version of socialism, their commitment to the alliance is, understandably enough, by no means unconditional or without reservations. However unrealistic it may be, the overall long-term goal of West European CP's remains—with the inevitable variations from party to party—the dissolution of military blocs on the European continent, and the medium-term goal is the emergence of a united Europe independent from both the US and the USSR. What is not clear is whether European CP's would be willing to pay the price of a defense policy adequate to create and maintain the requisites for a true independence and for a merging of West European military equipment —something that, politically, the Gaullocommunists and, economically, the Italians are at the moment decisively unwilling to do.

Eurocommunism also poses a challenge in the area of European integration. The four major Southern European CP's do not analyze the "crisis of capitalism" in the same manner. Great differences exist between the positions of the PCI and PCE, on the one hand, and of the PCF and PCP, on the other hand, regarding both the causes of the crisis and its remedies, be they purely economic measures or the establishment of political coalitions to introduce those measures and to support their implementation. As in any potential coalition at the national level, the Eurocommunists will remain minority partners in the institutions of the European Community for a long time to come, and their influence will be minimal unless they are willing to work through and with Socialist parties (themselves greatly divided on many social and economic issues). The challenge is there, but it remains a minor one, likely to produce adaptations only in the long run.

Perhaps the most formidable challenge of Eurocommunism to the West relates to how other elements in Western Europe—political forces, entrepreneurs, bankers, etc.—would react to inauguration of a government with Communist participation. Would such a national coalition with Communist participation be allowed to govern under "normal" conditions without covert or overt attempts at subversion or destabilization? And for how long? Pursuing their strategy of international acceptability, the Italian Communists have tried to establish good working relations with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), while the French Communists attack the SPD and its government. There is no informed speculation on the results of the

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PCI efforts. The conclusion of Helmut König on this topic, one of the few treatments of it in the reviewed books and one which is unfortunately not very well argued, is extreme: "The manifest conflict between German interests and the goals of Eurocommunism is irreconcilable" (p. 320).

Without underestimating or discounting all the doubts and reservations about the reality and profundity of the evolution of the Eurocommunist parties, I would submit that the issue of Communist participation in a Western government boils down to two fundamental and interrelated issues. The first is respect for the results of the ballot. The second is the degree of domestic and international confidence about the effectiveness of domestic and international checks and balances in case of undemocratic behavior of Communist governmental partners. Uncompromising postures such as König's leave no room for bargaining and adaptation in a process requiring a great deal of both.

FROM WHATEVER PERSPECTIVE one looks at it, Eurocommunism is a potentially destablizing process—at present more so for the West than for the East, particularly with regard to the foreign and defense policies of Western states. But the process is potentially much more threatening for East European regimes. This is so because while there is room for adapatation at the level of the international system, the East European regimes have little room for maneuver domestically. Thus, the Eurocommunist challenge to their interpretation and implementation of communism could be rather powerful. Continuation of this challenge, however, will depend very much on the evolution of the international system. As noted, Eurocommunism is at least in part a product of overall incremental changes in the international system, above all of détente. As Tannahill observes,

Barring a major increase in international tensions, the bonds that historically have tied the Western [Communist] parties to the Soviet Union will continue to relax, and the domestic interest of each party rather than the foreign policy interests of Moscow will be foremost in the minds of younger leaders and cadres. (p. 239)

Herein lies a paradox: détente has created the international and domestic conditions for the electoral gains and increased legitimacy of West European CP's. But their very growth produces tensions between East and West as well as within both camps. These tensions may jeopardize détente and consequently have a backlash effect on the Eurocommunist parties. As Legvold shrewdly remarks concerning Soviet perspectives on the matter:

West European communism occupies a very delicate place: It is both a solution and a problem. A solution in the sense that détente is supposed to facilitate the role of Europe's 'progressive forces,' and their advance in turn is supposed to reinforce détente. But a problem in the sense that their advance may in fact hinder or even disrupt détente. A solution in the sense that the change these forces embody is theoretically a major point to détente, change incidentally that reaches across the whole of Mediterranean Europe. But a problem in the sense that the Soviet leaders are not sure they can afford it. (Tökés, p. 363)

Once one reflects on the paradoxes of the situation, it is possible to comprehend why, among other reasons (including the belief that it can exercise more leverage on the Soviet-led movement from within—the strategy of "presence" transferred to the international level), the PCI is very cautious in its international postures and unwilling to break openly with Moscow.

Of course, Eurocommunism is above all the outcome of changes taking place in domestic environments, of the emergence of new demands and new social groups in individual Western societies. It is the product of the inability of conservative parties to innovate politically and to bring about the social integration of the working class, and of the resilience of democratic institutions, which have provided both the setting and the constraints for the blossoming of a new kind of communism. Indeed, as Pierre Hassner aptly puts it, Western Europe is the "cradle of Eurocommunism." If the baby is not thrown away with the bath water, it might grow and mature in the face of all sorts of difficulties: the problems of combining democracy and socialism and of managing complex mixed economies, the hostility of both the US and the USSR, the eruption of renewed international tensions. No forecast is possible, but the seeds have been sown. Eurocommunism represents an important process of transformation of West European and particularly Southern European Communist parties, one with uneven rhythms and wide variations. For this reason, it poses a major challenge to analysts and decision-makers, East and West, and to the old kind of communism.

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Nationalism and Communism

by Paul B. Henze

HUGH SETON-WATSON. *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

HUGH SETON-WATSON. *The Imperialist Revolutionaries: Trends in World Communism in the 1960's and 1970's.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

NATIONALISM is of enormous and growing significance in global political life. As Hugh Seton-Watson points out in *Nations and States,* it is an extremely varied and complex phenomenon—witness, e.g., its contrasting manifestations in Latin America, the Near East, and Africa. Even Communist states are not insulated from the effects of this phenomenon, as Seton-Watson demonstrates in *The Imperialist Revolutionaries.* The latter analysis of the contradictions and strains in the interactions between nationalism and communism in Communist states and parties over the past decade lends support to the view that while nationalism may have presented communism a number of opportunities, the debit side of the ledger is at least as significant and may now be more important.

Unlike some scholars who, as they grow older, fall into the comfortable habit of writing more and more about less and less, Hugh Seton-Watson is excited by the challenge of applying his knowledge and judgment to ever broader spans of history and political experience. Starting out in academic life by following his father's footsteps into Eastern Europe, he extended his interests to the vaster expanses of Russia. Here he was drawn to study not only Russian national evolution but the relationship between Russia and her colonies. This preoccupation led him to turn to the lands of Islam to the south of Russia and to the rapidly developing Third World. His first global synthesis of all these interests was *Neither War Nor Peace,* which first appeared in 1960.[1] In that book, Seton-Watson demonstrated strengths that also mark his two most recent works: scrupulous intellectual honesty, profound humanism, lack of pretense about writing neutral history, but, at the same time, a disinclination to rush to judgment of situations that are still in a state of flux.

Those who like rigid, all-encompassing general theories of political and social development will not be comfortable with Hugh Seton-Watson's latest books. These volumes pose a special challenge to Marxists and other determinists, who must concede that Seton-Watson has an extraordinary talent for analyzing politics in depth, with attention to economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors—in short, for doing what Marxists claim to be able to do but usually fail to do because of the customary intrusion, even domination, of dogma in their analysis. Seton-Watson is not merely opposed to dogma—he finds it irrelevant as a tool for interpretation:

I have read enough history to know that the interplay of personalities, institutions, ideas, impersonal forces and mere chance is exceedingly complex and infinitely variable, and this has caused me to distrust allegedly comprehensive and scientific theories. I am also painfully aware that history . . . needs and gets constant revision. (*Nations and States,* p. xiv)

Dogma to him is significant only because of the fact that it is believed in and acted upon. He has a deep sense of operative perceptions in history. To him history is to be understood *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist* (as it really was), yet not to be studied within the narrow political confines and limited temporal framework which that phrase has sometimes been taken to imply. This is what makes both these books so pertinent to the political concerns of the present era and also ensures that they will be read as major contributions to

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[1] London, Methuen.

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the understanding of nationalism for many years to come.[2]

In *Nations and States,* Seton-Watson takes the whole world under scrutiny. In a short introductory essay he deals with problems and contradictions in terminology—the differences in meaning of words such as "nation," "state," "people," "tribe," "nationality," or "citizenship," in different languages, in different societies, and at different times. These remain important distinctions. The words do not match smoothly in translation even among European languages, let alone among those of other parts of the world.

While he considers nationalism a modern concept, dating from the French Revolution and deriving from ideas of the Enlightenment, he emphasizes that some nations are much older—some very old. Most have corresponded to established states, but some, such as the Castilians, Scots, Poles, Armenians, and Jews, survived as nations through periods when their people lived in other, or several other, states. Seton-Watson's own definition of a nation is characteristically and appealingly simple and pragmatic:

I am driven to the conslusion that no "scientific definition" of a nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists. All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole of the population should so feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses "national consciousness." (*Nations and States,* p.5)

In succeeding chapters, Seton-Watson surveys first the "old, continuous" nations of Europe, then the newer nations that resulted from nationalist movements that culminated in the 19th or early 20th centuries, and then the European nations overseas—those, like the American nation, which resulted from the complex process of European discovery and colonization of the New World and the outer reaches of the Eastern Hemisphere. Most of this is classic terrain for students of nationalism, but there are a broadened perspective and new insights which hold the reader's attention and lift the analysis well above the level achieved by scholars who have written from a less comprehensive, less global viewpoint.

Next, Seton-Watson turns to the Middle East, a region that was once encompassed in the great Arab, Iranian, and Ottoman empires and has again become the center of concern about nationalism. He charts the development of Iranian, Arab, and Turkish nationalism. Of the three, Turkish nationalism has emerged most solidly based and clearly defined, but its relationship to the rapidly increasing populations of Turkic speech and Turkish-Islamic culture to the north and east, most of them located in the Soviet Union, involves elements of dormant ambiguity.

The Arab "nation" is much more vaguely defined; it is, in fact, an artificial concept in many respects. Yet, the intensity with which people adhere to and defend this concept makes it a political fact which has an impact in many directions. The author's rather gloomy conclusions about Arab nationalism seem well justified in light of the fissiparousness among Arabs that has become accentuated during the past year and a half:

The overall impression in the mid-1970's was that a large part of the driving force behind Panarabism came from traditional Muslim fanaticism; that a modern Arab national consciousness had penetrated the intellectual elite in all Arab lands, but had not reached down very deep into the social structure of the various and scattered Arabic-speaking peoples; and that the fulfillment of the vision of a single Arab state still lay far beyond the horizon. (*Nations and States,* p. 271)

One approaches Seton-Watson's discussion of Iran with keen anticipation. Writing in 1976, he could not have foreseen the exact outlines of the events which led to the collapse of the Pahlavi Dynasty in the winter of 1978–79, but he shows remarkable foresight in the stress placed on the weaknesses of Iranian nationalism. He comments in some depth on the loosely consolidated political condition of the whole region of which Iran forms the center—"the soft underbelly of Asia," stretching from the Himalayas through Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, to Iraq and Syria. Baluchi, various Turkic groups, religious minorities with a keen sense of separateness, and last but not least the Kurds—all threaten to become disruptive forces in this region in the 1980's.

The chapter on Africa is the leanest in the book (30 pages) and the most episodic in its treatment of the development of nationalism, although this is not entirely without reason. For all the outpouring of

[2]The literature on nationalism, already extensive, continues to grow. Seton-Watson, of course, acknowledges his own debt to Hans Kohn, Eugen Lemberg, and Elie Kedourie, as well as to numerous authors who have written about single peoples and areas.

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oratory which it regularly provides, African nationalism is still underdeveloped in most fundamentals. Nowhere else in the modern world has nationalism involved as much artificiality and superficiality, emotion and contradiction, as in Africa, where various supranational concepts—Pan-Africanism, négritude, African socialism—have affected and sometimes obscured the development of national feeling. Many of Africa's political entities have none of the attributes of nations except occupation of a segment of territory with recognized international boundaries. Indeed, Seton-Watson calls attention to the low level of interest among African nationalists in cultivation of national languages and serious exploration of ethnic traditions—preoccupations which characterized national development in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and are a predominant feature of nationalism among non-Russian peoples of the Soviet empire.

In 1960, at a time when such observations were unfashionable, Seton-Watson had the courage and foresight to question in *Neither War Nor Peace* whether independent Africa offered much prospect of providing the world with new and higher forms of political synthesis and opportunities for individual freedom and moral development. Two decades of independence in Africa have provided a mixed set of experiences on the continent. The framework for representative government established by colonial powers did not survive for long after independence in most African states. While European democracy may have been unsuited to African circumstances, the systems that have been substituted for it have proven neither more just nor more viable. Several promising African countries have experienced economic disaster in the wake of political adventurism. African elites, in power, have too often been greedy and self-seeking. Several countries have provided a dismal spectacle of coups and military takeovers which have neither extended human rights nor improved governmental performance. The continent has proved peculiarly susceptible to outside influences, which have often worked to the ultimate disadvantage of the Africans themselves. Africa, more than any other part of the world, epitomizes a basic theme of *Nations and States:* that liberty of the nation, however one defines it, does not automatically lead to liberty of the citizen. Seton-Watson remains pessimistic about the continent:

It might be that the future of Africa would lie . . . in multi-lingual empires ruled by centralising despots perhaps nearer to the ancient Iranian or Indian models than to any modern European example. One obvious difficulty was to see an institution which could ensure continuity. If national consciousness based on religion, language and deeply rooted historical mythologies were not available, then the agent of continuity could only be the central power. (p. 353)

Seton-Watson sees the Horn of Africa as somewhat of an exception to this generalization. It is an area having "a pattern more similar to European experience" than the rest of the continent. The similarities are not only with Europe, but also with the Middle East. Indeed, what happens in the Horn of Africa continues to relate as much to contiguous areas of the Middle East as it does to the rest of Africa. Ethiopia, along with Egypt and China, ranks as one of the oldest polities in the world. It was a nation, in a sense, long before nationalism took form, but as was so with many European nations, its national sense was closely linked with its Christianity, even if it was often the Christianity which seemed to take precedence. (This was still the case in the 16th century when the arrival of the Portuguese prevented the total collapse of Ethiopian power under the pressure of Muslim invasion.) During the late 19th century revival under Menelik II, a more modern form of nationalism played a greater role. How strong this nationalism was, however, remained in doubt through the end of the imperial period. There was wide expectation that Ethiopia would disintegrate as a nation when no longer held together by imperial leadership. As in China and Turkey, however, so in Ethopia the sense of nationalism has proven to be much stronger than the imperial structure within which it developed.

Somali nationalism is a much more recent development. The Somalis are hard to find in history before the 15th century. But the fact that their nationalism is recent has not affected its intensity. Based on common language, common culture and sense of consanguinity, and common religion, Somali nationalism, too, is more similar to the nationalisms of some of the newer states of Europe and Asia than to that observed in most of the rest of Africa.

The clash between Somali and Ethiopian nationalism is one of the most dramatic encounters of this kind we have witnessed in the Third World in the current era, made all the more intense by the involvement in recent years of the Soviet Union and Cuba. More strikingly than any other confrontation in the world today—and with more complexities and contradictions than most other situations in

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which Communists have played a role in the past 60 years—the situation in the Horn of Africa is proving to be a severe test of the capacity of Communists to manipulate and contain nationalism while exploiting it to their advantage. The drama in the Horn is far from over, and most of the problems and strains which Seton-Watson highlights in *The Imperialist Revolutionaries* can still be observed and studied in events there today.

The last four chapters of *Nations and States* are the most stimulating. In addition to examining issues of race and class in relation to nationalism and discussing nations and movements of seminational character that do not fit easily into regional analyses (American Indians, Afro-Americans, Blacks in South Africa, and diaspora nations such as Jews, and overseas Indians, Chinese, and Malays), Seton-Watson also reviews the relationships between nationalism and all the main political trends and ideologies of our time: liberalism, socialism, fascism, and communism. Of particular interest is his thesis that nationalism has been a greater problem for communism in countries dominated by communism or within Communist parties than for political systems less totalitarian in spirit and more pluralist in structure. In elaborating, he sketches out the precarious balance which exists between nationalism and communism in the Soviet empire, in Yugoslavia, and in China.

At the same time, the author recognizes that such categories as nationalism and communism are of more questionable analytical value when it comes to examining developments in many other parts of the globe. He writes:

In the rest of the world in the 1970's an epidemic of violent rhetoric and small violent actions—kidnappings, piracy, urban and rural guerrilla—made it difficult to distinguish "communism" from "nationalism," or either of these from "fascism," or indeed to give a precise meaning to any of those three words. There was a nationalisation of communism, a Marxisation of nationalism, and a predilection by the adepts of both to ape the style of Mussolini. Though the top cadres of established communist parties remained disciplined exponents of orthodox Soviet-type Marxism-Leninism; and though the leaders of nationalist parties or nationalist regimes neither considered themselves to be communists nor were accepted by true believers as being communists; yet below the highest level in both types of party it was increasingly difficult to say whether an activist was primarily a nationalist, a Marxist, or a pseudo-Marxist revolutionary. (*Nations and States,* p. 461)

Here Seton-Watson comes to the threshold of a fundamental problem of our time—the fact that the terminological framework we still use for analysis of political phenomena is inadequate. It obscures as much as it enlightens. In reflecting on this book, one is struck by the degree to which the author has found traditional notions of "right" and "left" for the most part irrelevant for understanding the political and sociological manifestations he deals with. Real life is far too multidimensional. Seton-Watson appears to recognize implicitly that we need a fresh body of terminology which can take into account more varied features of political structure. How do different systems deal with problems of legitimacy, representation, human rights, economic and social justice, and other fundamental values? How flexible are the systems over time? How do they handle discontinuity, adjust to internal and external challenges and temptations, accommodate dissent, provide for succession of leadership? Conventional right/left analysis is not much more helpful in examining these issues than long-since-discredited notions of the role of race or the influence of climate on human intelligence.

A work such as *Nations and States* is such a splendid survey and synthesis that it would be unfair to take the author to task for failure to provide a new set of categories of political analysis. He has done well enough in avoiding conventional clichés and superficial labeling. Repeatedly, he delves beneath the rhetoric that nationalists, Communists, fascists, and democrats have all used to excess. But someone still needs to do for political terminology what Walt Rostow did many years ago in defining the stages and characteristics of economic growth and development. One would like to see this task tackled by a mind as acute and original as Hugh Seton-Watson's. Perhaps he can be persuaded to undertake it in a future book.

TURNING TO the second of the reviewed volumes, *The Imperialist Revolutionaries,* we find that Seton-Watson examines developments in Communist states and parties in terms very different from those which these states and parties prefer to use themselves. The author addresses himself to the fundamental question: "Is there a world Communist movement?" Basing himself largely on the contents of the first 10 volumes of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* published by the Hoover Institution of Stanford,

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California, Seton-Watson concludes that the answer must be "no," even though a "common residue of ideology makes it possible to attempt a meaningful discussion of the activities of 'communists' in world politics. . . ." He discovers "a Soviet-led movement, a Chinese-led movement, and several other small movements with followers in many countries." The image of Cuba as a third distinct center is deemed an "illusion," as demonstrated by Castro's endorsement of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and by what Seton-Watson perceives as Havana's role as a mercenary in the hire of the Soviet Union (pp. 3–6).

In this short volume, Seton-Watson does not shy away from pithy insights, provocative political judgments, and stimulating hypotheses ranging over the immediate subject and beyond: Communist successes have generally "occurred in underdeveloped societies ruled by dictatorial methods" (p. 11). Urbanization does not necessarily reduce ethnic conflicts (pp. 63–64). During the 1970's, Marxism-Leninism in the USSR became more and more synonymous with Russian national arrogance (p. 69). Soviet interpretation of the history of non-Russian peoples is "the mixture of truth and fiction that characterizes all imperialist ideology" (p. 93). Soviet policy in the Middle East seems to aim at "preservation and intensification of a state of chaos" (p. 72). "Whatever the Soviet leadership [says] at any moment on any subject [is], by definition, the truly Marxist view" (p. 125). Racist contempt among intellectuals of both the Left and Right in the West has deeply affected attitudes toward political developments in Asian countries (p. 132). Arab atheist intellectuals maintain that "Islam is a splendid thing, not for its divine revelation to the Prophet or for its ethical teaching, but simply because it was invented by an Arab" (p. 140). West European Communist parties, whatever their leaders' feelings about the Soviet Union, by their persistent opposition to US involvement with Europe, advocate a policy "placing their countries at the mercy of Soviet military power" (p. 146). One would also observe that Seton-Watson's doubts about Iran persist in this book: as of 1977 it seemed "premature to attribute to Iran the relative importance in the world balance of power that it had known under Xerxes or Darius" (p. 120).

Seton-Watson's discussion of Southeast Asia and the American misadventure in Vietnam (pp. 130–34) is particularly apt, even though developments of 1978–79 have made premature his judgment that "the emergent regime in Vietnam was likely to be relatively independent both of Soviet Russia and China" (p. 7). Instead, as of today, the whole Indochinese region appears likely to be a region of more or less permanent confrontation between the Russians and the Chinese. Here, Communist ideological considerations as such are being subsumed into a more classic pattern of imperialist-nationalist competition. Indeed, this may be symptomatic of what has been happening in several other regions of the world: communism is becoming merely an ideological framework within which nationalist—and, by extension, imperialist—motivations and ambitions are clothed.

The brief section on "China, the Soviet Union, and the United States" (pp. 124–30) is both pertinent and prescient, forming a logical prelude to the dramatic sequence of events that occurred in 1978–79 as the US and China normalized relations. By contrast, Seton-Watson's discussion of Eurocommunism prepares the reader for more than has actually occurred. If the author were writing this section in the summer of 1979, his conclusions regarding the importance of Eurocommunism might be more tentative.

In examining the prospects for communism in the late 1970's, Seton-Watson takes a backward look at his own earlier interpretations of developments in the Communist-dominated world and Communist movements, as well as at events themselves. He finds Communists to have been poorly served by their own analysis and expectations of developments in both the Third World and the advanced industrial countries and—while naturally inclined to exploit the revolution of rising expectations everywhere in the world—to have been poorly equipped to deal with it in any fundamental political fashion or to satisfy human material and spiritual aspirations. The author reserves his sharpest criticism for what he calls the "failure of nerve" of Western rulers and Western public opinion, which he sees as dominated by a "strange combination of material greed and moral scruple," but which he concedes may be more apparent than real. His criticism of the West does not deflect him from a brilliant summary of the perhaps even greater flaws of the Soviet system. Seton-Watson finds the rulers of the USSR confronted with problems and trends to which there are several possible alternative solutions, all of which involve dangers to the Soviet system. An aging leadership has shown great skill in deferring consideration of serious solutions, but the problems persist and cannot be deferred forever.

Seton-Watson closes on a note of guarded pessimism about the

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capacity of either political system—Communist or Western—to change and adapt to the new challenges facing it:

Surrender of the civilized, technologically brilliant, hedonistic, and indifferent West to the semibarbarous, industrially inferior, but militarily superior and politically ruthless Soviet empire was not inevitable, but it was possible. Escalation into a nuclear war between the giants was also not inevitable, but it too was possible. (p. 151)

He concludes that such disasters can be avoided if rulers display greater civil courage in "the choice and execution of intelligent policies."

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Muslim Peoples in the USSR

by James Critchlow

YAHYA GABDULLOVICH ABDULLIN. *Tatarskaya prosvetitel'skaya mysl' (The Thought of the Tatar Enlightenment).* Kazan, Tatarskoye Knizhnoye Izdatel'stvo, 1976.

ALEXANDRE A. BENNIGSEN and S. ENDERS WIMBUSH. *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union.* Chicago, IL, and London, University of Chicago Press, 1979.

ALEKSANDR M. NEKRICH. *The Punished Peoples.* New York, NY, W.W. Norton & Co., 1978.

THE RETARDANT and often disruptive effect of ethnic factors on integrative processes associated with development has attracted worldwide attention in the 1960's and 1970's. In this connection, the Soviet Union, as a multinational society par excellence, whose component groups have retained distinct ethnic features despite the assimilationist goals of decades of political leadership, is a focus of particular interest. Aleksandr Nekrich, a former Soviet historian now resident in the West, has written of Soviet history that "energetic social reorganization without any special allowance for the particular national features and conditions produced an intensification of all the contradictions in the life of the state. . . ."[1] And a leading Soviet ethnographer recently found it necessary to call attention to the continuing need in the USSR "to consider national factors in the practice of building socialism."[2] In fact, Soviet and Western scholars, despite the obstacles to research on the society of the USSR which they both encounter, are producing a mounting volume of published material on the subject.

All three of the books under review here shed useful historical light on the present situation of a particular group of Soviet nationalities, the Muslim peoples of the USSR, who, because of the elements of community which enable them to coalesce on issues as a single interest group, their linkages with Islamic societies outside the USSR, their salient resistance to alien norms, and their demographic dynamism, invite special investigation. The volumes are disparate sources—one an official Soviet publication, one a study by Western scholars, and one the book of a Soviet author who accompanied his manuscript into emigration in 1976. Nevertheless, taken together, they help to show how, over a period of development of nearly two centuries, encompassing major political and social transformations engendered by war and revolution and witnessing substantial modernization, the ethnic factor has been key to the behavior of the different Muslim nationalities and to the behavior toward them of other groups, most notably the Great Russians.

The three works illuminate events of different historical periods, but in each case ethnic values provide the leitmotif. Thus, Yahya Gabdullovich Abdullin studies the rise in the past century of a national intelligentsia among the Volga and Siberian Tatars. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush examine the emergence in the early Soviet period of Muslim variants of communism, and Yosif Stalin's liquidation of the most prominent exponents of these movements as "bourgeois nationalists." And Aleksandr Nekrich surveys the mass deportation toward the end of World War II of entire ethnic populations—preponderantly Muslim—from their native lands on wrongful accusations of wholesale collaboration with the Nazi invaders. The books and the events they treat deserve detailed scrutiny, for each contributes to the broad conclusions we can make about the Soviet Muslim peoples today.

ABDULLIN'S *Tatarskaya prosvetitel'skaya mysl'* celebrates the Tatar "enlighteners" *(prosvetiteli),* intellectuals largely unknown in the West, whose work "coincided," in

[1] See the Nekrich volume reviewed here, p. 177.

[2] Yu. V. Bromley, "Toward Study of the Basic Stages and Directions of National Relations in the USSR," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), 1979, p. 58.

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the author's words, "with the process of [Tatar] nation-building" (p. 48). Unless the book is an aberration—which would seem unlikely given the fact that the author is Director of the History of Social Sciences Section of the Galimjan Ibrahimov Institute of Language, Literature and History of the Kazan Branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences—its publication is a hopeful sign that the Soviet trend toward a more objective historiography of the nationalities is continuing. For the activities of the enlighteners were to merge toward the end of the last century with other Islamic reform currents in the Russian Empire into a movement given the general label "jadidism," which in the past has been associated in the Soviet lexicon with "bourgeois nationalism," "counterrevolution," and even "foreign agents." A section of the book is devoted to the creation in prerevolutionary Tatarstan of schools using the "new method" *(usul jadid)* of combining secular with religious instruction, from which "jadidism" derived its name.

But the work of Tatar enlightenment encompassed far more than education, leading its standard-bearers into the domains of philosophy, science, history, and linguistics. In Abdullin's view, this was an expression of the "age-old striving of the Tatars for national freedom and equal rights" (p. 305). Progress was facilitated by the fact that the Tatars, thanks to their Muslim religious schools and their economic achievements, already had a level of literacy that was high by 19th-century standards and was assessed, in fact, by the contemporary Hungarian turcologist Arminius Vámbéry as superior to that of Britain or France.[3] The task of the enlighteners was to found schools that would provide *secular* education in the natural and social sciences and offer instruction in the national language of the Tatars rather than exclusively in Arabic. Their efforts, in education and on other fronts such as publishing, met with dual resistance from conservative Muslim elements and from "those encroachments and persecutions of the Tsarist authorities" which, as Abdullin puts it, had plagued the Tatars ever since destruction of their "national statehood" by Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan in the 16th century. Tsarist officials saw independent Tatar cultural development as an impediment to their "russifying" policy.

In their writings, the enlighteners drew inspiration from a wide variety of sources. Aristotle, Plato, and others of the ancients were available to them in Arabic and Persian texts. For West European science, philosophy, and social thought, they could choose between Russian versions or, for some writers, Arabic and Persian translations. Abdullin stresses the special influence of figures of the golden age of Islam—Avicenna (ibn-Sina, whose birth 1,000 years ago is being observed in 1980), Averroes (ibn-Rushd), Firdausi, Khayyam, and Navoi. Their manuscripts reached the Tatars on the Volga together with traders' cargoes of other delicacies—"dried fruits, oriental sweets, and spices." Finally, it was not uncommon for young Tatars to study theology in the once-flourishing cities of Central Asia, where in the libraries of Bukhara and Samarkand they also became acquainted with medieval manuscripts.

Out of all this, the credo of the enlighteners developed, portrayed by Abdullin as stressing rationalism and freedom of inquiry (including *inakomysliye,* or "dissidence"). A special target of their criticism was the theological principle of *taqlid,* blind acceptance of authority. Shihabetdin Marjani (1818–99), Muslim cleric and outstanding leader of the movement, declared:

Rejection of any new idea without determining its essence is a sign of thoughtlessness and ignorance, like shooting blind from a bow.[4]

And a Tatar writer of the Soviet period, Galimjan Ibrahimov, who joined the Bolsheviks and later died in a Soviet prison, summed up Marjani's teachings as follows:

Do not enchain reason, which was created free. The consciousness of a Muslim must remain unfettered. There are the Koran and the Hadiths—let each read them for himself, and then believe and act according to his understanding. I do not consider myself obligated to accept someone else's opinion on that question.[5]

Who were the people who propagated such ideas? Adbullin does not equivocate about the social origins of the enlighteners. Many were Muslim clergymen, and virtually all were from the privileged classes. The Soviet author points out that this was a natural consequence of historical conditions, an argument that he buttresses with a comment from Lenin condoning the "bourgeois character" of the European enlightenment. However, regarding Muslim clergymen in general, who were "not in their ideological orientation a single

[3] Arminius (Hermann) Vámbéry, *Das Türkenvolk* (The Turkish People), Leipzig, 1885, p. 431, cited in T. Davletshin, *Sovetskiy Tatarstan* (Soviet Tatarstan), London, Our Word Publishers, 1974, p. 34.

[4] Untitled manuscript in the Archives of the Kazan Institute of Language, Literature and History, Fond 22, cited in Abdullin, p. 67.

[5] G. Ibrahimov, "Some Writings of Our Great Teacher," *Ang* (Kazan), No. 1, 1915, cited in Abdullin, p. 74.

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whole," he insists that one differentiate between the "charlatans" and those "linked to the people." Still, even *sufism*, anathema in most Soviet writings, is given a limited defense in this book through the author's claim that "under its banner there were progressive as well as reactionary thinkers." Thus here, too, Abdullin's contribution is noteworthy.

THE NAME Alexandre Bennigsen appears in Soviet author Abdullin's bibliography, as it has for years in most bibliographies touching the history of Islam in Russia and the USSR. The latest of Bennigsen's valuable contributions to our knowledge, written this time in collaboration with an American scholar, is concerned with those radical Muslim nationalists, mostly from the ranks of middle-class intellectuals, who were led by conviction or necessity into alliance with the Bolshevik regime. Tatars like Mulla-Nur Vahitov (1885–1918) and Mir-Said Sultan Galiev (1880–1939?), who shared the legacy of the *prosvetiteli,* were in the forefront of the movement. They were joined by Communists from other Muslim regions. As Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush point out in their book, the loyalties of these individuals came to be more ethnic than ideological, and the sum of their ideas and actions in the early Soviet period forged what the authors call "Muslim national communism."

Bennigsen and Wimbush trace the ultimate disaffection from Soviet rule of the more prominent Muslim Communists, men like Sultan Galiev and Khojayev, due to the ethnocentric policies of former members of the Russian bourgeoisie who emerged as top leaders of the "proletariat." The authors have appended valuable new documentation to their study, including two articles by Sultan Galiev. Of particular interest for its attitudinal insights is the program of the clandestine "Erk" party (later "Turkestan Socialists"), which came into being at the start of the 1920's. The program—translated from a "manuscript in possession of the authors"—included such demands as cessation of Russian immigration into Turkestan and encouragement instead of immigrants "belonging to nonimperialistic nationalities of Asia and Europe such as Tatars, Persians, Indians . . . ." With demands such as these, it is hardly surprising that leaders of the Muslim Communists were liquidated by Stalin.

Particularly provocative in this volume is the chapter on the legacy of Muslim national communism, which examines in substantial detail the heritage of the phenomenon in the Muslim Soviet republics today. The authors do find evidence of the influence of Muslim national communism beyond the borders of the USSR.[6] The genesis of this influence is said to have been in the contacts made in Moscow during the 1920's between Soviet Muslims and foreign Communists like M.N. Roy, Liu Xiaoqi, and Ho Chi Minh, "who would change the shape of communism in the world by giving it an Eastern face" (p. 110). But it is the relevance of "national communism" to the status of the Soviet Muslim peoples today which insures that the Bennigsen-Wimbush volume is of more than historical interest. In official Soviet texts, it is implied that the only alternative to the present system would be an ineluctable return in the Muslim republics to the abuses of a past feudal society dominated by reactionary beys and mullahs. This is underscored by frequent references to dark émigré forces who are allegedly conspiring to set back the clock, threatening the economic growth and social progress which have come with modernization in the Soviet period.

It is true, of course, that pre-Communist Uzbekistan was not pre-Communist Czechoslovakia and that Muslims in the USSR are better off in important respects than their brethren in some neighboring countries like Afghanistan, with whom they once shared a common historical lot. But national communism offers an alternative which is neither blind submission to the alien rule of the present nor a retrogression to the past, and it thus has incendiary political potential. Stalin sensed this back in the 1920's and 1930's when he labeled his nationalist opponents "bourgeois" despite the fact that many of them had impeccable credentials as Communists. It was essential to undermine their political appeal as a third force.

THE NADIR of Muslim fortunes was symbolized by the 1943–44 deportations *en masse* of whole nationalities, events which are the subject of Aleksandr Nekrich's book. All but one of the affected nationalities, the Buddhist Kalmyks, were Muslims.[7] Nekrich's study, based in part on information in unpublished Soviet doctoral dissertations—some by scholars of the affected nationalities—details the patriotism of these peoples in resisting the Nazis. Many individu-

[6] It is the author's view that "almost without exception, the main tenets of Muslim national communism as they were articulated by Sultan Galiev and his companions in the 1920's have been adopted in a like or slightly modified shape by virtually every present-day national liberation movement which claims Marxism. . ." (p. 116).

[7] The Volga Germans had been deported in 1941, at the outset of the German invasion of the USSR.

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als, like the Crimean Tatar aviator Sultan Khan, who was twice a Hero of the Soviet Union, received high decorations for their actions in defense of the USSR. Nonetheless, Nekrich notes, all Crimean Tatars in the military were demobilized at the height of the war and assigned to construction battalions. Servicemen of the other proscribed nationalities endured a similar fate. Similarly, Tatar civilians who took part in or assisted the partisan resistance movement gained little by doing so. Nekrich cites a case of betrayal to the Germans of Tatar patriots by a Soviet Russian partisan commander, and another incident of a Soviet "pogrom" against civilians for having aided Tatar partisans who blew up a German troop carrier.

To be sure, there were traitors and collaborators among the nationalities later deported by Stalin, but traitors and collaborators were also plentiful among Russians and others who did not suffer collective punishment. Soviet accounts of treason by the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and other Muslims invariably stressed the nationality of the perpetrator, but when a Russian was involved, his nationality was passed over in silence.

A very significant feature of *The Punished Peoples* is the evidence that Nekrich produces that the deportations were not rooted merely in one man's paranoia. Stalin's actions were preceded not only by pogroms at the local level, but by denunciations transmitted to higher echelons by local Russian leaders, denunciations which cannot have failed to feed the Soviet dictator's obsession with treason. Nekrich traces the historical roots of Russian antipathy toward the Crimean Tatars back to the Russo-Turkish wars, when the Tatars were "invariably accused by Tsarist officials and other rank chauvinists of collaborating with the Turks" (p. 169). This historically-based antipathy may help to explain why, of all the peoples deported toward the end of World War II and subsequently rehabilitated after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Crimean Tatars alone have not been allowed, despite determined efforts, to return to their ancient homeland—where, Nekrich insists, there is ample room for them.[8]

IN BROADER perspective, though, what is the relevance of these historical studies today? In Soviet policy debates, the question of ethnicity versus social integration has been put in terms of whether national development is continuous (sometimes stated as the "single stream" or *yedinyy potok* concept) or undergoes qualitative changes as transformations in social relationships, caused by revolution and socialist construction, take place.[9] All of the writings surveyed here lend support to the idea of continuity. At each historical juncture, class interests are transcended by ethnic values. Thus, the enlighteners—"petty-bourgeois obscurantists" by the definition of an earlier period of Soviet rule—now emerge in the work of a well-placed Soviet author as valued contributors to the national philosophical and cultural development of their people. Similarly, the Muslim national Communists, once relegated to political (and physical) oblivion as "bourgeois nationalists," are now being rehabilitated by their own nationalities: an Uzbek review published in Tashkent recently called Khojayev, who was condemned to death along with the still unrehabilitated Bukharin, "a true son of his people."[10] Finally, even in the cases of the Crimean Tatars and the other deported peoples, ironic recognition was given from on high to the primacy of ethnic over class distinctions: the top CPSU leaders of each nationality were taken into exile along with the rank and file, in some cases driven to the waiting railroad cars in their official limousines.

That ethnicity is a permanent factor to be reckoned with is implicit in the Soviet regime's recent retreat on at least two crucial issues. First, the "merging" *(sliyaniye)* of nationalities which was once the official goal for a future Soviet society, has now given way to the equivocal concept of "rapprochement" *(sblizheniye).* Even the current campaign to promote the teaching of Russian as a *second* language is, at least for areas like Central Asia where the ascendancy of indigenous nationalities is not in doubt, an apparent renunciation of assimilationist goals. Second, and perhaps even more significant for the future, was the recent failure, when the Soviet constitution was revised, to adopt proposals to alter the federal structure of the USSR, a structure which has provided shelter for emergent nationalism in the union republics. The treatment of both issues signals continuation of the trend which has made *yedinyy potok* an

[8] Those Crimean Tatars who have tried to return have met determined resistance by Soviet authorities. Aishe Seitmuratova, a Crimean Tatar activist who was allowed to emigrate in 1978 brought with her to the United States photographs of Soviet militiamen in the Crimea pulling down the shacks of Tatar squatters and grinning as they did it. Enough said about "friendship of the peoples."

[9] See, on this debate, Grey Hodnett, "What's in a Nation?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1967, pp. 2–15.

[10] Hämdäm Sadikov, "Pictures of a Shining Life," *Shärq yulduzi* (Tashkent), No. 11, 1978, p. 230. The article eulogizes Khojayev in reviewing a photo album dedicated to his memory.

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obstacle to political and social integration.

However, if the role of ethnicity seems beyond question here, the exact nature of that role is more elusive. For peoples like the Tatars, with a well defined history and culture, the boundaries of national identity seem clear. But with respect to those Muslims, especially in Central Asia, who have been given a national identity only under Soviet rule, the situation is more ambiguous. The Uzbeks, for example, were essentially synthesized as a nationality from tribal and local Muslim groups who spoke 92 distinct dialects. How "Uzbek" do these subgroups feel today, and, alternatively, to what extent do Uzbeks and other Central Asian Muslims feel an extended regional affinity (e.g., around the concept of "Turkestan")? While subnational and supranational identifications clearly do exist, they are, in this reviewer's opinion, both culturally and historically compatible with feelings of Uzbek, Kazakh, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirgiz nationality. Such feelings have had more than 60 years in which to become internalized in the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia.

The final question which remains concerns the extent to which these peoples are motivated by their common Islamic heritage. Bennigsen and Wimbush indicate that each Muslim national Communist identified first of all with his own national or geographic group. As for Islam, there is internal evidence in the documentation that Muslim nationalists—Marxist atheists as well as believers—have perceived it as something to bind them together when confronting Russians or other "colonialists." This widely-shared perception helps to explain the intensity with which even nonbelievers in the Soviet Union cling to Islamic practices. Official spokesmen have complained that such practices have come to be regarded not as manifestations of religion but as "national symbols," making it easier for their appeal to cut across ideological lines.

Under Soviet conditions, where published writing must conform to ideological prescriptions, such Islamic national symbols have survived up to now mainly by transmission from generation to generation through family or other interpersonal communication, or by preservation as cultural artifacts in museum displays or in texts aimed —at least ostensibly—at holding them up to opprobrium or ridicule as "remnants of the past." The importance to Muslim self-appraisal of Abdullin's work stems from the fact that it restores for Tatar and other Muslim intellectuals a coherent historical and philosophical context, indeed a secular ideology, for today's ethnic survivals. That this has been done within the larger context of Marxist-Leninist ideology will not obscure the book's essence for knowing readers.

What would happen to the unifying power of Islam for the Muslims of the USSR if someday the Russian presence were removed? The example of Iran may be instructive. As long as the Shah, regarded by many as the instrument of Western imperialism, stayed on his throne, Islam was the rallying cry of his enemies. With the Shah removed, ethnic interests and antagonisms—among Muslims—have come to the fore.

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Governing the USSR

by Archie Brown

JERRY F. HOUGH and MERLE FAINSOD. *How the Soviet Union Is Governed.* Cambridge, MA, and London, Harvard University Press, 1979.

MERLE FAINSOD'S *How Russia is Ruled*[1] stood for a quarter century as the most scholarly and weighty attempt to understand how the Soviet political system worked. By the 1970's, however, it had lost some of its value as a student textbook, if only because the late Professor Fainsod's last revision of his book was undertaken while Nikita Khrushchev still headed the Soviet party and government. Much institutional and other change has occurred within the USSR since then. Thus, while Fainsod's volume remained—and remains—a classic study of the Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev years, the news that Professor Jerry Hough of Duke University was preparing a third edition of the work provoked keen expectation intermingled with perplexed curiosity.

The warmth of the expectation rested on the knowledge that Hough's combination of immense industry, careful scholarship, and intellectual curiosity made him an outstanding candidate among contemporary sovietologists to write a book which would be a worthy successor to Fainsod's. The puzzlement rested on doubts as to whether the different emphases in the study of Soviet politics and the somewhat different value judgments of Fainsod and Hough could successfully be blended in a manner which would do justice to both authors.

In the event, the book fully lives up to the expectations of those who had eagerly awaited it, while not entirely resolving the doubts of those who wondered whether rewriting a classic work was the most appropriate way for Professor Hough to make his own major contribution to understanding the Soviet system. The change in title reflects the fact that the new edition is very different from its predecessors, but the compromise achieved,[2] whereby Fainsod's words are sometimes reproduced verbatim without attribution (especially in the early chapters) and sometimes cited in quotation marks, is an unhappy and confusing one. Given that Hough has, in my judgment, written a work which deserves to be read by every serious scholar in the field—a book, moreover, which should be recommended to students as the best advanced textbook available—it would have been better to avoid the ambiguity inherent in joint authorship between the living and the dead.[3]

Still, if the best tribute a student can pay an esteemed teacher is that of thinking for himself and of constantly asking new and stimulating questions, then Jerry Hough, in this book as in his other work over the past decade and a half, has done the late Merle Fainsod proud. In *How the Soviet Union Is Governed,* Hough provides better and more comprehensive answers to a number of important questions than sovietologists have succeeded in producing up to now. Yet there can be no doubt that, even after having completed this book, Hough's answer to the question posed, somewhat rhetorically, by Adam Ulam a few years ago, "Do We Know All There Is to Know

[1] It was first published in 1953. The second edition (revised by Fainsod himself) appeared in 1963.

[2] Explained by Hough in his preface.

[3] The example of the late John Mackintosh springs to mind. In 1958 he was asked to join Professor J.D.B. Mitchell in producing a third edition of Arthur Berriedale Keith's *The British Cabinet System.* After some months of work by Mackintosh, however, it was "agreed that an adequate revision would alter the original text to such an extent that the book could scarcely continue to be attributed to Keith. It seemed better to leave the second edition as it stood giving Keith's views and to bring out a new book" (John P. Mackintosh, *The British Cabinet,* London, Stevens, 1962, p. ix). The new book which Mackintosh wrote is one of the major contributions to the study of British politics to appear in the postwar period.

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About the USSR?"[4] would be a resounding "No!" Hough's identification of what we do not know about the USSR is scarcely less valuable than the very important additions he has made to our stock of knowledge about how the Soviet system works.

It would be very unfair, of course, if *Hough* were to be blamed for not answering *Fainsod's* questions, despite the dubious wisdom of presenting this new book in the format of a third edition of Fainsod's work. For at the outset of *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (pp. vii–viii), Hough makes clear the major distinction between his focus of attention and Fainsod's. Fainsod, Hough writes, "was greatly interested in how the system as a whole, the regime as a whole, was maintained, and in the politics that revolved around that process. I am much more frequently interested in the question: Given the existence of the system, how are within-system questions decided? Given the ultimate structure of power and the dominance of the party leadership, what is the structure of influence and of responsiveness to social forces?" While Hough acknowledges that both sets of questions are important, he rightly observes that one person's answers to one set of questions should not be compared with another person's answers to the other set.

IN CONTRAST with Fainsod's chronological treatment of themes within each chapter, Hough divides his book into two broad sections. The first is an historical account of the development of the Soviet system from the origins of Bolshevism to the 1970's. The second and larger part of the book concentrates on the post-Stalin period and is concerned with the part played by the various political institutions (as well as individuals) of the USSR in the policy process. The first section contains less that is new, but even when he is writing about matters which have been mulled over many times—such as the explanation of Stalin's rise to supreme power—Hough's reflections are interesting, and the author skillfully presents the arguments of other scholars before going on to give his own views.

It is the second part of the work, with its policy process orientation, however, which makes *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* as stimulating for specialists as it will be valuable for students. It would be difficult to find another book which is as informative on, for instance, departments of the Central Committee and ministries and state committees. Hough's resourcefulness in digging out such elementary, yet obscure, facts about the Soviet system as the relative size of the apparatus of particular institutions is illustrated by his comparison (p. 418) of the size of the staff of the Central Committee apparatus and that of the Party Control Committee. Having spotted the fact that all officials of the Central Committee apparatus and of the Party Control Committee appear to receive awards on their 50th and 60th birthdays, Hough goes on to observe: "From 1967 through 1976, 321 responsible officials of the Central Committee apparatus were so honored and 37 responsible officials of the Party Control Committee, figures that tend to suggest that the latter employs slightly more than 10 percent of the number of persons in the Central Committee apparatus." It would, of course, make life simpler if the actual figures were published by scholars in the USSR, but on many such matters Soviet officialdom has not confided in them either. In noting (p. ix) that in "far too many places . . . it has been necessary to end with an admission of ignorance," Hough appositely observes that this often involves issues "where there seems no Soviet self-interest in maintaining a policy of secrecy."

Nevertheless, our information about the Soviet Union—garnered from a wide variety of sources, including, increasingly, Soviet social scientists and political leaders—is steadily expanding. In some instances it is possible to amplify what Hough has to say on particular themes and to provide fuller answers to questions in which he expresses interest.

Discussing the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, for example, Hough says that nothing is known about its work—not even the frequency of its meetings (p. 382). On its work, he notes, "The type of Council of Ministers decision that has been published suggests that the Presidium is, in fact, most involved in economic planning and decision-making, and its membership would make it a natural 'Economic Bureau,' which handles questions just below the level of significance for Politburo consideration" (p. 383). As a court of appeal in interdepartmental disputes, the Presidium stands between Gosplan and the Politburo, and it seems probable that many disagreements over allocation and economic policy are settled at its level. Furthermore, the supposition that it is a very significant working institution is supported by the fact, not known to Hough, that it meets once or twice a week.

On the basis of research conducted by the Dutch scholar

[4] Adam B. Ulam, "Do We Know All There Is to Know About the USSR?" in Paul Cocks et al., Eds., *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, MA, and London, Harvard University Press, 1976, pp. 3–8.

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Gerard Pieter van den Berg, it has been possible over the past two years to hazard a guess that the Presidium of the Council of Ministers meets approximately once a week.[5] But we can now do better than guess. During the 11th World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), held in Moscow from August 12 to 18, 1979, 20 or more political scientists from different countries, including the present author, were able to take part in a meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet presided over by Vitaliy Petrovich Ruben, the Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.[6] Chairman Ruben's answers to questions in considerable measure reflected the greater openness which Western scholars such as Professor Hough have been hoping for. This was notably true of his answer to my question on the frequency of meetings of certain political institutions. He stated that the Presidium of the Council of Ministers meets at least once a week and quite often twice. More surprisingly, he added that the Politburo meets twice a week, on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, once a week, on Wednesdays.

The statement that the Politburo normally meets twice a week—and I have checked with other political scientists present to be certain that this was not a mishearing on my part—is a remarkable one, for it conflicts with previous information on the subject. Either the statement contained an element of unintentional exaggeration or the number of meetings has increased very significantly since the 25th CPSU Congress of February-March 1976. At that congress, Leonid Brezhnev stated that the Politburo had held 215 meetings and the Secretariat 205 since the previous congress of March-April 1971.[7] Allowing for longer gaps between meetings during holiday periods, it is evident that both bodies had met approximately once a week. (That the Politburo held 10 meetings more than the Secretariat may indicate how many times the Politburo met twice a week.) Even earlier, in a 1973 newspaper interview cited by Hough, Brezhnev provided essentially the same information when he stated that the Politburo regularly meets once a week, "usually on Thursdays, in sessions that last from three to six hours" (p. 471).

Thus, the information on Politburo and Secretariat meetings given to the IPSA group of scholars partly corresponds with that given by the General Secretary in 1973 and 1976. Insofar as it indicates more frequent meetings, it may mean that, as the average age of the members of the Politburo has increased, the General Secretary and his colleagues have preferred to divide their long agenda between two weekly sessions. Or, more simply, "sometimes" twice a week may describe the frequency of meetings better than "normally" twice a week. It seems quite probable that what happens is strikingly similar to the procedure of the British institution most nearly equivalent to the Politburo. The British Cabinet usually meets on Thursdays, but when a second session is necessary, such meetings are normally held on Tuesdays.[8]

JERRY HOUGH's reading of Soviet primary sources has been remarkably extensive, and he makes good use also of material on the Soviet Union published in the West. The occasional failure to take into account a particularly relevant book or article is inevitable in such a comprehensive undertaking as *How the Soviet Union Is Governed,* as is the occasional factual error. Such signs of fallibility, which one encounters almost with a sense of relief in the work of such a diligent scholar, are to be found, for instance, in Professor Hough's apparently hasty reading of the work of the Medvedev brothers. Hough may well be right in expressing skepticism about the validity of Zhores Medvedev's statement that "copies of all publications are automatically sent to the office of the First Secretary of the CPSU for approval,"[9] but he incorrectly attributes this statement to Roy Medvedev (p. 285) and fails to note

[5] The conclusion was based on the assumption of a correlation between the frequency of meetings of the presidiums of councils of ministers in the union republics and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers at the all-union level, on knowledge of the *prescribed* frequency of meetings in some union republics, and on the fact that there were 45 *actual* meetings of the Presidium of the Estonian Council of Ministers in 1974. See G.P. van der Berg's doctoral thesis, *"De regering van Rusland en de Sovjet-Unie"* (The Government of Russia and the Soviet Union), Leyden, 1977, pp. 122–24 and 250–51; and idem, "Elements of Continuity in Soviet Constitutional Law," in William E. Butler, Ed., *Russian Law: Historical and Political Perspectives,* Leyden, Sijthoff, 1977, esp. pp. 230–32.

[6] The meeting took place in the Kremlin on Aug. 16, 1979. On V.P. Ruben, see *Yezhegodnik bol'shoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii 1977* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1977), Moscow. Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1977, p. 615; and *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Devyatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: Ninth Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya," 1974, p. 375.

[7] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1976, p. 7.

[8] As the former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson has put it: "Cabinet normally meets on Thursday mornings," but "when business is heavy, a supplementary Cabinet can be put in on Tuesday mornings. . . ." See Harold Wilson, *The Governance of Britain,* London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1976, p. 45.

[9] Zhores Medvedev, *10 Years After Ivan Denisovich,* London, Macmillan, 1973, p. 9.

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that Zhores Medvedev actually emphasizes the limitation on the powers of the General Secretary (particularly in the post-Khrushchev period) in relation to the publication of books.[10]

A closer scrutiny of the Medvedevs' work would also have provided Hough with more information on one of Khrushchev's important personal assistants, described in *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (p. 419) simply as "a man named Lebedev who handled cultural affairs."[11] The story of how V.S. Lebedev persuaded Khrushchev to use his great influence to promote the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* in 1963 has been told more than once.[12] Indeed, more general light is thrown on the part played by Lebedev—and others among Khrushchev's personal assistants—in the Medvedevs' *Khrushchev: The Years in Power.*[13]

Similarly, though Khrushchev's memoirs have to be treated with at least as much discretion as the memoirs of any other politician, they are an important primary source, and Professor Hough could, with advantage, have made as much use of the second volume, published in 1974, as he did of the first, published four years earlier.[14] Even where the first is concerned, the occasional point of great relevance to his argument escapes his notice. Thus, Hough suggests that in the mid-1950's "Suslov was one of the spearheads against the ideological and foreign policy positions being advanced by Molotov and that he was serving as Khrushchev's 'second secretary' during this period" (p. 209). On the following page, he notes that Molotov opposed the reconciliation with Tito and Yugoslavia which Khrushchev favored. If the second point is scarcely in doubt, it is much less clear that Suslov offered Khrushchev consistent and unambiguous support on this matter. Khrushchev's own testimony in the first volume of his memoirs should not be overlooked:

After Stalin died, we began to exchange opinions in our leadership about the possibility of reestablishing contact with the Yugoslavs and liquidating the hostility which had been created by Stalin between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This idea ran into sharp opposition from the outset . . . . Mikhail Suslov was particularly adamant in resisting the idea of trying to relieve the tension between us and the Yugoslavs. He insisted that Yugoslavia was no longer a Socialist country.[15]

In view of the part played by Suslov in engineering Khrushchev's removal from office, the former First Secretary may not have been the most objective observer of Suslov's past career. Yet Khrushchev's statement is an especially categoric one and needs to be taken into account in any consideration of Suslov's role in the mid-1950's.

ON BROADER QUESTIONS of approach and interpretation, I find myself time and again in agreement with Hough and impressed by his arguments. As is natural, though, agreement is less than total. One possible blind spot in his general approach and one dubious further development of his previous interpretation of the Soviet system deserve mention.

While Hough's focus on political institutions and the policy process is entirely to be welcomed, it is a pity that he pays little explicit attention to the issue of continuity and change in political culture and to the successes and failures of Soviet political socialization. In his section on "Citizen Participation in Political Life" (pp. 297–305) and elsewhere, Professor Hough introduces some evidence relevant to these issues. But the entire attempt to create a "New Man," the tremendous emphasis in the Soviet Union on moral education *(vospitaniye)*, the relationship of socialist to traditional Russian values, and the rapidly growing interest of Soviet social scientists in the concept of political culture (and their view that change in political culture is a sine qua non of progress in other spheres)[16] are either neglected or given rather short shrift. Some of these matters relate

[10] Ibid., esp. pp. 8–10 and 120.

[11] In a note on p. 643 Hough adds: "information about Lebedev was received in an interview with a former high Soviet cultural official, who, unfortunately, had forgotten his first name and patronymic." Is it for this reason that Lebedev is omitted from the index of *How the Soviet Union Is Governed?*

[12] See *10 Years After Ivan Denisovich*, op. cit., p. 10; and, for a substantially fuller account, Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, *Khrushchev: The Years in Power*, London and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 137–40. The latter book was first published in Russian in 1975 and in English by Columbia University Press, New York, NY, in 1976.

[13] See Chap. 12, "The Men Around Khrushchev," pp. 129–42.

[14] Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1970; and idem, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1974.

[15] Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, op cit., p. 377.

[16] Soviet interest in the concept and theme of political culture has been developing throughout the 1970's (and some discussion of it has been published too recently for Hough to have considered in his book). Significant Soviet books in this respect and for the development of Soviet political science more generally are: F.M. Burlatskiy, *Lenin, gosudarstvo, politika* (Lenin, The State, Politics), Moscow, Nauka, 1970; F.M. Burlatskiy and A. Galkin, *Sotsiologiya, politika, mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*

(continued on p. 107)

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to questions of system-maintenance, with which Hough, as he has noted in his preface, is less concerned than was Fainsod. But they also relate to the speed and direction of political change, in which Hough is undoubtedly directly interested. In the past, Hough has shown his wariness of the notion of political culture,[17] and in view of some tendencies in Western scholarship to make it a facile substitute for the kind of serious analysis of institutions and interests which Hough has undertaken, this is understandable. He is also conscious of the fact that "historical traditions and antecedents are always multifaceted and ambiguous." He is right, of course, though it is equally true that in any nation's history some traditions, modes of thought, and styles of government have been more dominant than others. A crude historico-cultural determinism has got no more to commend it than a crude economic determinism. But the difficulties of evaluating the political cultural dimension and of integrating it with a policy process approach do not entirely justify the neglect of the former in a book which sets out to be, within reason, a comprehensive study of Soviet government.

Where Hough ill-advisedly goes beyond one of his previous arguments and interpretations is on the vexed question of pluralism. Elsewhere, Hough has argued the case for describing the Soviet system as one of "institutional pluralism,"[18] and numerous variations on this theme have become popular with scholars who believe that the Soviet Union has moved too far away from ideal-type totalitarianism to merit the label "totalitarian." There has been general agreement that the term "pluralism" on its own would be a highly misleading description of the Soviet system, so it has been qualified by one or more adjectives.[19] Terms like "institutional pluralism" and "bureaucratic pluralism" refer to features of the system which are described in official Soviet discourse as "departmentalism" and "localism," and a certain measure of "departmentalism" and "localism" is widely accepted in the Soviet Union as a fact of life. But these elements of pluralism can hardly be said to have been accorded official legitimation. So far have the Soviet leadership been from approving a move toward the pluralization of political life in Communist states that they undertook (and continue to justify) a massive military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to put an end to the Czechoslovak experiment in "socialist pluralism." Hough is almost certainly unwise, therefore, in suggesting that the phrase "institutionalized pluralism" perhaps conveys better than "institutional pluralism" the fact that in the Soviet Union "the legitimate political process must take place within an institutional framework" (p. 547). "Institutionalized" pluralism would not be an improvement. It carries the connotation of "legitimized" pluralism, and pluralism has not been legitimated in the USSR.

Soviet leaders and theorists would much more readily accept that the system is, in practice, one of "imperfect monism."[20] The danger of a phrase such as "institutionalized pluralism" becoming common currency in the analysis of Soviet politics is not only that it blurs distinctions between the Soviet political system and certain Western systems, but that it also lacks a comparative Communist perspective. In terms of tendencies in the direction of and attitudes toward the pluralization of political life, there are considerable variations among the USSR, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 1968 (not to mention differences between the Soviet ideological position on pluralism and that of the Italian or Spanish Communist parties).[21] If the choice is to be be-

(Sociology, Politics, International Relations), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1974; F.M. Burlatskiy and V.E. Chirkin, Eds., *Politicheskiye sistemy sovremennosti* (Contemporary Political Systems), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, esp. the section by L.S. Mamut on "Political Culture and Political Consciousness," pp. 43–53; and V.N. Kudryavtsev and V.P. Kazimirchuk, Eds., *Lichnost' i uvazheniye k zakonu: sotsiologicheskiy aspekt* (The Individual and Respect for the Law: A Sociological Perspective), Moscow, Nauka, 1979.

[17] See Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 314–18. Some progress, however, has been made in the use of the concept since then, including the recent appearance of the first systematic book-length study in English of Soviet political culture. See Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, London, Macmillan, and New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1979.

[18] See, for example, Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 10–11, 22–24, 33, 43–46, and 69–70.

[19] Not because it seemed a completely satisfactory description of the Soviet system in the 1970's but because it appeared less unsatisfactory than the various alternatives, I opted several years ago for "a limited institutional or bureaucratic pluralism." See Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, Eds., *The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev*, London, Macmillan, 1975, p. 245. The fact of the matter is that Soviet reality is too complex, multifaceted, and downright contradictory to be encapsulated in so few words.

[20] See the early use of this expression by H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1966, p. 449.

[21] No Soviet scholar has devoted an entire book to the analysis of pluralism in its various conceptions and concrete manifestations. Many articles and sections of books have, however, been devoted to the subject, and a number of these are cited in a volume by a Bulgarian scholar which has been translated into Russian. See Asen Kozharov, *Monizm i plyuralizm v ideologii i politike* (Monism and Pluralism in Ideology and Politics), Moscow, Progress, 1976.

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tween "institutional pluralism" and "institutionalized pluralism" as a description of Soviet political life, I hope that Professor Hough will have second thoughts on his attempt to "creatively develop" his earlier terminology.

INSOFAR AS I have concerned myself more with some of the issues on which I disagree with Hough, rather than with the incomparably larger number of instances where, it seems to me, he has argued superbly and made a real contribution to understanding the Soviet political system, this is partly because the latter course would require a far longer commentary than the former. It is also because Jerry Hough has so profoundly and successfully challenged the previous "conventional wisdom" on the USSR that his views—often in an oversimplified form, as was the case with the views of Merle Fainsod in his generation—are themselves in danger of becoming the "conventional wisdom" among students of Soviet politics. Hough's stature in the field is now such that his judgments are destined to be quoted by thousands of students in Western universities. Provided that these students do not accept his views too hastily, at second hand, or on the basis of cursorily dipping into Hough's latest book, but give *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* the close reading and critical scrutiny it deserves, they will emerge greatly stimulated in their interest in the Soviet system and better equipped to ask challenging questions as well as to answer them. The author of a major textbook could scarcely hope for more, except, perhaps, for a long life for his book and periodic requests for new editions. On that score, Professor Hough need have no worries. *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* is surely destined to be as much in demand over the next quarter of a century as was *How Russia is Ruled* over the preceeding one.

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Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20547, USA

MOSCOW AND ADEN

TO THE EDITORS: I should like to draw your attention to some errors regarding Soviet naval support facilities that appear in David Lynn Price's otherwise competent and balanced survey of Soviet relations with the countries on and around the Arabian peninsula ("Moscow and the Persian Gulf," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1979, pp. 1-13).

First of all, in purporting to show the value that the Soviets place upon naval support facilities, the author misquotes Admiral Gorshkov (p. 10). In fact, Gorshkov's actual remark has nothing to do with facilities. The full quote reads:

A Navy, thanks to high mobility and endurance, possesses the capability to demonstrate graphically in peacetime the economic and military power of a country abroad (Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," *Morskoy sbornik* [Moscow], No. 12, 1972, p. 16).

In the second place, information contained in the article about the current status of Soviet access to facilities in the region is inaccurate. The 8,500-ton capacity floating drydock identified as being in Aden (p. 11) was actually towed from Aden to Dahlac islands off Massawa, Ethiopia, well over a year ago (Elmo Zumwalt and Worth Bagley, "Soviet Drydock in Africa Stirs U.S. Concern," *Detroit News*, July 9, 1978, p. 19). Also there is no evidence that the Soviets are "building a vast harbor in the bay of Turbah on the Bab el Mandeb strait," much less that they are building one there to "compensate for their loss of facilities at Berbera, Somalia . . ." (p. 10).

This does not mean, however, that the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has not granted the USSR important access privileges, as the recent visit to Aden of a new Soviet aircraft carrier, the Minsk (*Washington Star*, May 31, 1979, p. 11), suggests. In fact, South Yemen is now the only Indian Ocean country that permits the Soviets to stage periodic maritime reconnaissance flights (of IL-38 Mays) from its airfields (Edgar Prina, "Soviet Combat Aircraft Sent to South Yemen," *San Diego Union*, Dec. 1, 1978, p. 1, and Charles W. Corddry, "U.S. Protests Soviet Jets' Buzzing Ship," *Baltimore Sun*, May 23, 1979, p. 1)—an important point overlooked by the author.

RICHARD REMNEK
Center for Naval Analyses
Alexandria, VA

MR. PRICE REPLIES: I am impressed by Mr. Remnek's careful reading of my survey.

I know Admiral Gorshkov's text very well, but in the seven years since his work was published, the political implications of Soviet naval power have become synonymous with port facilities. Soviet naval policy has repeatedly demonstrated the linkage. A blue-water fleet per se is useful but has little diplomatic effect unless it can be seen showing the flag in port. If I have interpreted Admiral Gorshkov's text too loosely, then I am only following current Soviet naval practice in the Indian Ocean.

The floating dry dock was not mentioned in my original text, but it is of more than passing significance that Aden has the capacity to handle the Soviet dry dock. In July 1979, I was informed that a smaller Soviet dry dock had been towed into Aden. But I have been unable to verify this personally.

I am now able to agree and to confirm that plans to build a harbor in the bay of Turbah have been scrapped. The plans were first drawn up in May-June 1977. No earthwork was carried out, but the plans remained on the drawing board until early 1979. I was informed by a Soviet diplomat in Kuwait that it was much more cost-effective for Soviet ships to call more frequently at Aden than to incur the financial and political risks a permanent structure would create. I did overlook Soviet maritime reconnaissance flights, and Mr. Remnek's point is a fair and important one. Since May 1979, air force activity in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) has increased. Since the clashes in the spring with the Yemen Arab Republic, PDRY MiG's have been flying regular nighttime sorties into the interior, and during the first two weeks of July, a bomber (or reconnaissance aircraft) was observed daily coming in across the sea

CORRECTION

In some copies of the July-August 1979 issue of *Problems of Communism* the column headings were inadvertently omitted from Table 4 on page 14 of Jerry Hough's article "The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession." The first column indicated the "Type of official," and the succeeding columns indicated the years 1950, 1961, 1966, and 1977, for which the average age of the officials in question was calculated.

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and landing shortly after nightfall.

An Omani government official divulged that PDRY MiG's had violated Omani airspace in May 1979 by flying over the Musandam peninsula.

DAVID LYNN PRICE
Kuwait

EDITORS' NOTE: We assume responsibility for the publication of the photo of the dry dock in Aden, which was serviced April 23, 1979, by Eastfoto, New York, NY. The photo caption was undated and gave no indication that the dry dock had been removed, for which information we thank Mr. Remnek.

ANALYZING CHINESE POLITICS

TO THE EDITORS: With reference to Jack H. Harris's review of my book, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina*, in his essay, "Politics of National Security in China" (*Problems of Communism*, March-April 1979, pp. 64-66), I must protest his failure to read what I wrote. He claims that I "assumed a Chinese policymaking process based upon rational consensus rather than upon factional conflict." Yet my introduction (p. xiv) explicitly alerts the reader to

a division between those who advocated muting confrontation with foreign opponents at this time of internal crisis and those who demanded a more defiant posture. This policy debate is fleetingly glimpsed throughout the year and is climaxed that fall by contradictory postures in Chinese statements concerning Prime Minister Nehru.

I will not recapitulate the evidence offered in the study. Suffice it to say that I subsequently examine three alternative hypotheses to explain Chinese behavior, two of which concern a "united leadership" and the third of which "focuses on a divided leadership," and I conclude (p. 157) that "a more plausible interpretation is that factions existed in Peking which espoused contending judgments on the efficacy of deterrence and diplomacy as compared with direct confrontation and the controlled use of force."

I do not object to being faulted for failing to prove a point. But the complete dismissal of my effort as "single-minded" is wholly unjustified. My determination to ground the analysis in empirical data rather than leave it floating on a priori logic explains the reluctance to push the factional model further. I would welcome Professor Harris's effort in this regard, particularly when he can identify the composition of factions with the "central issue of conflict" which he posits as providing both "utility and dependability."

ALLEN S. WHITING
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI

MR. HARRIS REPLIES: The disagreement between Professor Whiting and me is both clear-cut and severe; it can hardly be attributed to a "failure to read what [Prof. Whiting] wrote." He claims *not* to be using the "unitary rational actor model" to explain Chinese political behavior. I maintain that he *does* use that model, that in fact his work is unitary rational actor analysis in one of its purest forms, and that his work suffers as a result.

That Professor Whiting relies upon the rational actor model is incontestable. Consider the following excerpts from his introduction:

Although this study speculates on possible linkages between individuals and groups in the Chinese policy process with alternative approaches to handling the crises of 1962, for the most part a rational actor model which treats the regime as a unified whole must be utilized. (p. xiv)

The primary focus of the present study is on the response of China to the stimulus of other governments' behavior as mediated by the perception of policy makers in Peking. The internal dynamics of policy formulation with the interaction of factions, organizational procedures, and bureaucratic politics are treated only as a secondary consideration. (p. xv)

. . . there is sufficient consistency in Chinese conflict behavior over time to justify use of this unitary model in forecasting PRC policy, with specific adjustments to allow for changes in factional and organizational influence. (p. xv)

A pure rationality model requires modification to allow for elements of distortion in PRC perceptions of other political systems and for the possible intrusion of factionalism in the policy process, but otherwise has proven adequate for explicating past behavior and predicting future action. (p. xx)

These four excerpts were chosen for two reasons: each one clearly reveals Professor Whiting's expressed preference for the unitary rational actor model, but each one also includes some reference to the complexities of the actual Chinese policy process — complexities which Professor Whiting explicitly excludes or relegates to "secondary consideration." Professor Whiting's letter suggests that these gestures in the direction of an organizational or bureaucratic politics model should render his work immune to being labeled "rational actor analysis." On the contrary, these gestures are the very mark of an analyst who thinks in rational actor terms, but mistakenly believes himself to be doing otherwise. Professor Graham Allison, in his classic work, *Essence of Decision*, warns against those who imagine the rational actor model to be rendered more acceptable simply by acknowledging that policy initiatives may have been preceded by disagreement within a government:

A more complex variant of the [rational actor] model recognizes the existence of several actors within a government — for example, hawks and doves or military and civilians — but still attempts to explain (or predict) an occurrence by reconstructing the calculations of the victorious actor. Thus, for example, some revisionist histories of the Cold War recognize the forces of light and the forces of darkness within the U.S. government, but explain American actions as a result of goals and perceptions of the victorious forces of darkness. (p. 37).

Interestingly, this passage follows by only 15 pages Professor Allison's extended description of Professor Whiting's earlier work (*China Crosses the Yalu*) as quintessential rational actor analysis.

Does it matter that Professor Whiting's analyses are of the unitary rational actor variety? Yes, it does. What is at issue here is not an esoteric matter that should interest only a certain cult of political epistemologists. The question at hand is whether a unitary rational actor explanation of China's (or any other major nation's) political behavior can *ever* be correct.

Hardly anyone would dispute the fact that China's political process is highly factional, bureaucratic, and organizational — Whiting himself makes this point repeatedly, as the excerpts above demonstrate. Why, then, would an analyst begin his explanation of Chinese politics by assuming away these fundamental characteristics of the political system and imposing a set of

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fictitious characteristics: unified, purposive, calculating, rational behavior at the national level? A few answers suggest themselves: *economy of effort,* since it is certainly easier to paint a picture of events that makes the rational actor explanation seem plausible than it is to treat the national political process in its complexity; *lack of data,* the problem that plagues all sinologists and forces even the best of them occasionally to revert to rational actor explanations when the details on bureaucratic and organizational realities simply are not available; *wishful thinking,* since most of us, in our heart of hearts, would probably like to believe that nations (especially our favorite nations) behave judiciously and rationally; and *lack of understanding,* which accounts for the nearly universal use of rational actor explanations by those who know no better.

If these are the reasons, what are the *consequences* of substituting a rational actor model for a more realistic one? Ultimately, an explanation based upon the rational actor model will explain events in terms of behavior that never occurred, calculations that never were made, relationships that never existed, goals that never were set, strategies that never were adopted, and decisions that never were taken. In fact, it will explain the behavior of a nation that itself does not exist—one that is manufactured for the occasion out of unrealistic assumptions. The rational actor model is not a *simplification,* nor is it an *exaggeration.* It is a *fiction.*

Two additional questions are worth raising. First, is rational actor analysis of political behavior *ever* correct? Of course it is, but only at the individual or small-group level, never at the nation-state level for a major nation. We naturally assume that each *individual* in the political process behaves rationally—setting his own goals, estimating costs and benefits, and maximizing whatever he values. The problem arises when we seek to aggregate the rationality of a large number of individuals in a "national rationality." The items simply do not add. They barely add at the level of the organization. We may reasonably speak of a small, homogeneous organization as a rational actor, but that characterization becomes less defensible as the membership of the organization becomes more heterogeneous and its roles multiply. Even an organization far smaller and less complex than the Chinese polity—consider, for example, the University of Michigan — would rarely be described as a unitary rational actor. So much more inappropriate is the application of the model to the Chinese nation.

This problem may also be understood as an issue of the level of analysis. A whole generation of American political scientists have learned at the knee of Professor J. David Singer, Professor Whiting's colleague at the University of Michigan, that certain attributes may be appropriately treated at certain levels of analysis, but are meaningless at others. This is certainly true in the case of "rationality," which is a proper assumption at the individual or organizational level of analysis, but not at the nation-state or international-system level of analysis, where there can be no collective sense of costs, risks, and goals to underlie a concept of "rational behavior."

Second, where does all this leave us as far as *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* is concerned? Professor Whiting's book remains one of the most important in the field, by far the best collection of information on the events of the 1962 border war. Where it fails is in its explanation of those events. One might usefully compare this rational actor version of the war to the Book of Genesis, the unitary rational actor model of creation: both are compelling works, but neither is a very useful starting point for science.

A final point. By suggesting that I belittled his "effort as 'single minded,'" Professor Whiting is feigning an injury that he did not really suffer. My original article referred only to his reified Chinese nation as "single minded" in its behavior. I remain profoundly respectful of Allen Whiting as a towering figure in my profession; my only quarrel is with his selection of analytical tools.

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